International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
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EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES pp. 307-326: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters
REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE HIT-AND-RUN INTERLOPER MODEL pp. 327-345: Robert W. McKelvey, Leif Sandal and Stein I. Steinshamn
A PSEUDO "FOLK" THEOREM IN THE STRATEGIC PROVISION OF STOCK EXTERNALITIES pp. 347-359: Zili Yang
THE LINEAR QUADRATIC DYNAMIC GAME FOR DISCRETE-TIME DESCRIPTOR SYSTEMS pp. 361-374: Hua Xu and Hiroaki Mukaidani
HADAMARD AND TYKHONOV WELL-POSEDNESS IN TWO PLAYER GAMES pp. 375-384: Graziano Pieri and Anna Torre
A NOTE ON NTU CONVEXITY AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES pp. 385-390: Ruud Hendrickx
BOOK REVIEW: Oligopoly Dynamics, edited by Tönu Puu and Irina Sushko pp. 391-392: Georges Zaccour
ERRATUM: APPROXIMATING EQUILIBRIA IN NONZER0-SUM GAMES pp. 393-393: Altman

Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models pp. 193-209: Lawrence Blume and Steven Durlauf
The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation pp. 211-228: Ted Bergstrom
Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation pp. 229-247: Philippe Grégoire and Arthur Robson
Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model pp. 249-262: Burkhard Hehenkamp
Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria pp. 263-290: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities pp. 291-305: Alex Possajennikov

On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker pp. 83-103: Marcel Dreef, Peter Borm and Ben van der Genugten
A Two-Person Conflict Model in Train Scheduling pp. 105-125: Keivan Ghoseiri, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Mohammad Jawad Asgharpour
From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction pp. 127-137: Antonio Quesada
Progressive Current Accounts: Profit-Sharing Interest pp. 139-149: Salvador Cruz Rambaud and María del Carmen Valls Martínez
When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players? pp. 151-165: Yigal Gerchak and Qi-Ming He
Verification Theorems for Optimal Feedback Strategies in Differential Games pp. 167-189: Ştefan Mirică
Book Review: "A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games". By Sylvain Sorin pp. 191-192: Ferenc Szidarovszky

INFORMATION SHARING GAMES pp. 1-12: Marco Slikker, Henk Norde and Stef Tijs
LOCATION GAME ON THE PLANE pp. 13-25: Vladimir Mazalov and Minoru Sakaguchi
DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES WITH CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS II: SEMI-DECOMPOSABLE GAMES pp. 27-40: Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER pp. 41-61: Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR pp. 63-71: Anders Poulsen
A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH MARGINAL COST DIFFERENTIALS pp. 73-81: Pamela M. Schmitt

EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS pp. 357-370: Sjur Didrik Flåm
COMPLEMENTARITY, SUBSTITUTABILITY AND STRATEGIC ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL pp. 371-390: Charles Figuieres
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH POPULATION UNCERTAINTY pp. 391-403: Mark Voorneveld
A RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA pp. 405-413: Ruud Hendrickx, Ronald Peeters and Jos Potters
TECHNOLOGICAL FAILURE, ECONOMIC SUCCESS pp. 415-434: Hans Haller and Anthony Pavlopoulos
ABSENT–MINDED DRIVERS IN THE LAB: TESTING GILBOA'S MODEL pp. 435-448: Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller
ASSESSING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MERGERS FOR MARKET POWER pp. 449-458: Ramon Fauli-Oller
ON THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT MATCHING SCHEMES pp. 459-473: Nicolas Jonard

EGALITARIAN SETS FOR TU-GAMES pp. 183-199: J. Arin and E. Iñarra
SOME RESULTS ON (PRE)KERNEL CATCHERS AND THE COINCIDENCE OF THE KERNEL WITH PREKERNEL pp. 201-211: Chih Chang and Chrong-Hsin Lian
CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF SOCIETAL CONFLICTS AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THEIR RESOLUTION PROCESSES BASED ON DEONTIC LOGIC pp. 213-236: Osamu Katai, Kentaro Toda and Hiroshi Kawakami
ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING pp. 237-254: Marc Pauly
STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES pp. 255-264: L. A. Petrosjan and L. V. Grauer
CORES OF STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH STOCHASTIC ORDERS pp. 265-280: F. R. Fernández, J. Puerto and M. J. Zafra
REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERS pp. 281-299: Agnieszka Rusinowska
TIME-CONSISTENT SOLUTION OF A COOPERATIVE GROUP PURSUIT GAME pp. 301-317: Svetlana Tarashnina
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIES WITH INFINITELY MANY AGENTS: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS pp. 319-329: Andrzej Wieczorek
DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES WITH A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS I: DECOMPOSABLE GAMES pp. 331-342: Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
CONSISTENCY FOR PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS pp. 343-356: Elena Yanovskaya

NASH EQUILIBRIA IN LOAD BALANCING IN DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS pp. 91-100: Eitan Altman, Hisao Kameda and Yoshihisa Hosokawa
EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION pp. 101-118: Jacques Thépot
COORDINATION GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS pp. 119-126: G. Schoenmakers, J. Flesch and F. Thuijsman
A GAME MODEL OF IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY pp. 127-140: Pauli Murto and Jussi Keppo
ONE-SELLER/TWO-BUYER MARKETS WITH BUYER EXTERNALITIES AND (IM)PERFECT COMPETITION pp. 141-164: Gerard van der Laan and Harold Houba
STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION pp. 165-172: Anindya Bhattacharya and Amit K. Biswas
QUASI-ASSIGNMENT COOPERATIVE GAMES pp. 173-182: I. Auriol and E. Marchi

THE DYNAMICS OF COOPERATION pp. 1-16: Fouad El Ouardighi
A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION pp. 17-31: Josef Hofbauer and Gerhard Sorger
CAN HERDING EXPLAIN CYCLIC CO-MOVEMENT? pp. 33-51: Bernd Süssmuth
FISH WARS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A STRADDLING STOCK COMPETITION MODEL pp. 53-69: Robert W. McKelvey, Leif Sandal and Stein I. Steinshamn
A DYNAMIC GAME OF OFFENDING AND LAW ENFORCEMENT pp. 71-89: Thomas Fent, Gustav Feichtinger and Gernot Tragler