International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
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Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-Based Allocation and Weighted Division pp. 1-14: Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada
Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior pp. 1-16: Jiabin Wu
Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core pp. 1-16: Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon and T. S. H. Driessen
Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating pp. 1-23: David Yeung and Ovanes Petrosian
A Duopoly with Common Renewable Resource and Incentives pp. 1-20: Luca Grilli and Michele Bisceglia
Games with Costly Winnings pp. 1-9: Irit Nowik and Tahl Nowik
Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels pp. 1-18: Volker Benndorf, Dorothea KÃ¼bler and Hans-Theo Normann

On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games pp. 1-13: Rabia Nessah and Raluca Parvulescu
On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values pp. 1-36: Pierre Dehez
A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games pp. 1-15: Ahmad Nahhas and H. W. Corley
High-Dimensional Nash Equilibria Problems and Tensors Applications pp. 1-25: J. E. Abdou, E. Safatly, B. Nakhle and A. El Khoury
Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games pp. 1-8: O. V. Baskov
A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries pp. 1-21: Rashid Farooq and Ayesha Mahmood

Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader pp. 1-14: Brishti Guha
Experimental Gaming Comparison of Resource Allocation Rules in Case of Transferable Utilities pp. 1-11: N. A. Korgin and V. O. Korepanov
On Maximal Vector Spaces of Finite Noncooperative Games pp. 1-7: Victoria Kreps
Information Sharing Among Cyber Hackers in Successive Attacks pp. 1-33: Kjell Hausken
An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities pp. 1-12: Julio RodrÃguez-Segura and Joss SÃ¡nchez-PÃ©rez
Optimal Fair Division for Measures with Piecewise Linear Density Functions pp. 1-12: Jerzy Legut

Equilibria in Dynamic Multicriteria Games pp. 1-21: Anna Rettieva
Academic Research and the Strategic Interaction of Scholars and Editors: A Two-Stage Game pp. 1-16: Damien Besancenot, Joao Faria and Franklin Mixon
Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence pp. 1-7: Marina Sandomirskaia
Existence of Dominant Players and their Role in the Formation of a Cabinet Coalition pp. 1-9: Artyom Jelnov
Is a Good Offensive Always the Best Defense? pp. 1-12: J. Quetzalcoatl Toledo-Marin, Rogelio Diaz-Mendez and Marcelo Del Castillo Mussot
Nash Bargaining Solution Allocation is Not Suitable for Datacenter Jobs pp. 1-22: Ilya Nikolaevskiy, Andrey Lukyanenko and Andrei Gurtov

Procurement (Reverse) Auctions Where Service Providers have Official Ratings pp. 1-10: Yigal Gerchak
Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction pp. 1-36: Fouad El Ouardighi, Gary Erickson, Dieter Grass and Steffen JÃ¸rgensen
Economic Problems with Constraints: How Efficiency Relates to Equilibrium pp. 1-19: Jacek Krawczyk and Mabel Tidball
The Need for Permission, the Power to Enforce, and Duality in Cooperative Games with a Hierarchy pp. 1-12: Frank Huettner and Harald Wiese
Chaos Propagation in Games of Control for Energy-Efficient Wireless Communications pp. 1-21: Hana Baili
Intrinsic Comparative Statics of a Nash Bargaining Solution pp. 1-11: Michael Caputo

An Equivalence Result on the Reduction of Games with Unawareness pp. 1-27: Yasuo Sasaki
How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? pp. 1-17: Emily Tanimura and Sylvie Thoron
Euro White and Euro Yolk: Sovereign Debt Structure Stability in the Eurozone pp. 1-15: Robert Joliet and Rabia Nessah
Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions pp. 1-10: Anat Lerner and Rica Gonen
Texas Holdâ€™em: A Game of Skill pp. 1-13: Ben van der Genugten and Peter Borm
How Risky is it to Deviate from Nash Equilibrium? pp. 1-24: Irit Nowik

Competitive Traffic Assignment in a Green Transit Network pp. 1-14: Alexander Y. Krylatov and Victor V. Zakharov
Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games pp. 1-14: Petrosian Ovanes
A Differential Game Model for The Extraction of Nonrenewable Resources with Random Initial Times â€” The Cooperative and Competitive Cases pp. 1-19: Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova and JosÃ© Daniel LÃ³pez-Barrientos
Optimal Strategies in Best-Choice Game with Incomplete Information â€” The Voice Show pp. 1-18: Vladimir V. Mazalov, Anna A. Ivashko and Elena N. Konovalchikova
Preface pp. 1-1: Vladimir Mazalov and David Yeung
Price Competition on the Market of Counterfeiting Software pp. 1-10: Nikolay Zenkevich and Margarita Gladkova
Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player pp. 1-20: Elena Parilina and Artem Sedakov
A Cooperative Dynamic Environmental Game of Subgame Consistent Clean Technology Development pp. 1-23: David W. K. Yeung and Leon A. Petrosyan
Strategic Support of Node-Consistent Cooperative Outcomes in Dynamic Games Played Over Event Trees pp. 1-16: Elena Parilina and Georges Zaccour

Existence of Equilibrium Points for Bimatrix Game with Interval Payoffs pp. 1-13: Ajay Kumar Bhurjee
Viscosity Solutions of Hybrid Game Problems with Unbounded Cost Functionals pp. 1-26: Dharmatti Sheetal
Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem pp. 1-19: V. V. Mazalov and A. V. Melnik
How Elections are Impacted by Production, Economic Growth and Conflict pp. 1-29: Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube
Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU Games by Associated Consistency: Simple Proofs Using the Jordan Normal Form pp. 1-21: Sylvain BÃ©al, Eric RÃ©mila and Philippe Solal
Two-Player Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers pp. 1-31: Valentin Goranko and Paolo Turrini