Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 33, issue 4, 2009

Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity pp. 521-532

Pablo Amoros

Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionnaire study of cuts in earnings and pensions pp. 533-557

Kristof Bosmans and Erik Schokkaert

Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation pp. 559-574

Marcus Pivato

Does income support increase abortions? pp. 575-599

Hal Snarr and Jeffrey Edwards

A general equilibrium analysis of the Laffer argument pp. 601-615

Alan Krause

Liberal political equality implies proportional representation pp. 617-627

Eliora Hout and Anthony McGann

Measurement of income mobility: a re-examination pp. 629-645

Kai-yuen Tsui

Natural implementation in public goods economies pp. 647-664

Takeshi Suzuki

Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption pp. 665-690

Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller

More on the stable, generalized stable, absorbing and admissible sets pp. 691-698

Nicolas Houy

Volume 33, issue 3, 2009

An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences pp. 343-359

José Jimeno, Joaquín Pérez and Estefanía García

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core pp. 361-381

Brennan Platt

Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket pp. 383-403

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

$${\mathcal{Q}}$$ -anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams pp. 405-413

Kohei Kamaga and Takashi Kojima

The NIP graph of a social welfare function pp. 415-421

Lee Gibson and Robert Powers

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods pp. 423-447

Kentaro Hatsumi and Shigehiro Serizawa

The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences pp. 449-476

Luc Lauwers

Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms pp. 477-494

Miguel Ballester and Pedro Rey-Biel

Smallest tournaments not realizable by $${\frac{2}{3}}$$ -majority voting pp. 495-503

Dylan Shepardson and Craig Tovey

Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations pp. 505-515

John Hatfield

On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study pp. 517-519

Carmen Herrero, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Giovanni Ponti

Volume 33, issue 2, 2009

Measuring influence in command games pp. 177-209

Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

What’s so special about Euclidean distance? pp. 211-233

Marcello D’Agostino and Valentino Dardanoni

Ranking intersecting Lorenz curves pp. 235-259

Rolf Aaberge

Media competition and information disclosure pp. 261-280

Ascension Andina-Diaz

Measuring disproportionality, volatility and malapportionment: axiomatization and solutions pp. 281-286

Moshe Koppel and Abraham Diskin

On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties pp. 287-309

Michel Breton and Vera Zaporozhets

Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting pp. 311-333

Christopher Hanusa

Discontinuous transformations, Lorenz curves and transfer policies pp. 335-342

Johan Fellman

Volume 33, issue 1, 2009

On the volume-ranking of opportunity sets in economic environments pp. 1-24

Ernesto Savaglio and Stefano Vannucci

Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low? pp. 25-50

Sayantan Ghosal and Ben Lockwood

Competition of politicians for wages and office pp. 51-71

Hans Gersbach

Sophisticated preference aggregation pp. 73-86

Remzi Sanver and Özer Selçuk

Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets pp. 87-99

Elette Boyle and Federico Echenique

Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An impartial spectator analysis of justice pp. 101-127

James Konow

The wellbeing implications of a change in the sex-ratio of a population pp. 129-150

D. Jayaraj and S. Subramanian

Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule pp. 151-158

Masashi Umezawa

Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach pp. 159-171

Remzi Sanver

Louis Kaplow: The theory of taxation and public economics pp. 173-176

Marc Fleurbaey

Volume 32, issue 4, 2009

Competition of politicians for wages and office pp. 533-553

Hans Gersbach

Taking empirical studies seriously: the principle of concentration and the measurement of welfare and inequality pp. 555-574

Udo Ebert

Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation pp. 575-601

Michael Miller and Daniel Osherson

Framing the rabbit to snare the votes pp. 603-634

Tomer Blumkin and Ehud Menirav

Is a continuous rational social aggregation impossible on continuum spaces? pp. 635-686

Wu-Hsiung Huang

Minimal covering set solutions pp. 687-695

Michele Lombardi

Donald G. Saari: Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes; social choice analysis pp. 697-700

Feng Zhang

Norman Schofield: The political economy of democracy and tyranny pp. 701-704

Michael Laver

Media competition and information disclosure pp. 705-705

Ascension Andina-Diaz

Volume 32, issue 3, 2009

Contest with attack and defense: does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout? pp. 337-353

Raphael Soubeyran

Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking pp. 355-365

Lowell Anderson, Helena Dandurova, James Falk and Lana Yeganova

The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games pp. 367-387

Ryusuke Shinohara

Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games pp. 389-406

Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen

Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem pp. 407-423

Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’alem and Noam Nisan

On probabilistic rationalizability pp. 425-437

Shasikanta Nandeibam

Voting on redistribution with tax evasion pp. 439-454

Rainald Borck

A fair solution to the compensation problem pp. 455-478

Giacomo Valletta

A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting pp. 479-492

Z. Landau, O. Reid and I. Yershov

On the probability of breakdown in participation games pp. 493-511

Pim Heijnen

Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains pp. 513-531

Yukinori Iwata

Volume 32, issue 2, 2009

Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation pp. 171-179

Francesca Busetto and Giulio Codognato

A new and easy-to-use measure of literacy, its axiomatic properties and an application pp. 181-196

Kaushik Basu and Travis Lee

Moral hazard and free riding in collective action pp. 197-219

Vincent Anesi

Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas pp. 221-241

Elad Dokow and Ron Holzman

Intergenerational equity: sup, inf, lim sup, and lim inf pp. 243-252

Christopher Chambers

Deprivation, welfare and inequality pp. 253-273

Brice Magdalou and Patrick Moyes

Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences pp. 275-298

Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno

To be or not to be involved: a questionnaire-experimental view on Harsanyi’s utilitarian ethics pp. 299-316

Yoram Amiel, Frank Cowell and Wulf Gaertner

Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox pp. 317-333

Gilbert Laffond and Jean Lainé

On strategy-proof social choice correspondences pp. 335-336

Shin Sato

Volume 32, issue 1, 2009

Networks and outside options pp. 1-13

André Casajus

Marriage matching and gender satisfaction pp. 15-27

Vicki Knoblauch

On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment pp. 29-35

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez

What is “Pro-Poor”? pp. 37-58

Jean-Yves Duclos

Nonpaternalistic altruism and functional interdependence of social preferences pp. 59-77

Hajime Hori

Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution pp. 79-92

Marcus Pivato

Still more on the Tournament Equilibrium Set pp. 93-99

Nicolas Houy

Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets pp. 101-121

Özgür Kıbrıs and Serkan Küçükşenel

‘Non-interference’ implies equality pp. 123-128

Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani

A prudent characterization of the Ranked Pairs Rule pp. 129-155

Claude Lamboray

Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case pp. 157-168

Haldun Evrenk

Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case pp. 169-169

Haldun Evrenk