Social Choice and Welfare
1984 - 2025
Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe From: Springer The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC. Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 25, issue 2, 2005
- Foreword pp. 229-230

- Maurice Salles
- De jure naturae et gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf's contribution to social choice theory and economics pp. 231-241

- Wulf Gaertner
- Condorcet's Social Mathematic, A Few Tables pp. 243-285

- Pierre Crépel and Nicolas Rieucau
- “Axiom, theorem, corollary &c.”: Condorcet and mathematical economics pp. 287-302

- Emma Rothschild
- The intellectual contribution of Condorcet to the founding of the US Republic 1785–1800 pp. 303-318

- Norman Schofield
- The pre-history of Kenneth Arrow's social choice and individual values pp. 319-326

- Patrick Suppes
- An interview with Paul Samuelson: welfare economics, “old” and “new”, and social choice theory pp. 327-356

- Kotaro Suzumura
- An interview with I. M.D. Little pp. 357-368

- Prasanta Pattanaik and Maurice Salles
- Little and Bergson on Arrow's concept of social welfare pp. 369-379

- Prasanta Pattanaik
- The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated pp. 381-418

- Marc Fleurbaey and Philippe Mongin
- The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union pp. 419-431

- Fuad Aleskerov
- Social choice theory and the “Centre de Mathématique Sociale”: some historical notes pp. 433-456

- Bernard Monjardet
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting pp. 457-474

- Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn
- The work and life of Robin Farquharson pp. 475-483

- Michael Dummett
- Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention pp. 485-506

- Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
- Distribution and politics: a brief history and prospect pp. 507-525

- John Roemer
- Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism pp. 527-555

- John Weymark
- The launching of ‘social choice and welfare’ and the creation of the ‘society for social choice and welfare’ pp. 557-564

- Maurice Salles
Volume 25, issue 1, 2005
- On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates pp. 1-29

- Georges Casamatta and Philippe De Donder
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules pp. 31-42

- Orhan Erdem and Remzi Sanver
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study pp. 43-73

- Ayça Giritligil and Murat Sertel
- Poverty measurement: the critical comparison value pp. 75-84

- Bertil Tungodden
- On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions pp. 85-93

- Hannu Salonen and Kari Saukkonen
- Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet pp. 95-113

- Mathias Risse
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election pp. 115-125

- Bernardo Moreno and M. Socorro Puy
- Coalitional economies with public projects pp. 127-139

- Achille Basile, Anna Simone and Maria Graziano
- The replacement principle in bargaining pp. 141-154

- Youngsub Chun
- Can faster income growth reduce well-being? pp. 155-171

- Basant Kapur
- The inverse plurality rule—an axiomatization pp. 173-178

- Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan
- Characterizing Paretian preferences pp. 179-186

- Vicki Knoblauch
- Anonymity in large societies pp. 187-205

- Andrei Gomberg, Cesar Martinelli and Ricard Torres
- The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures pp. 207-220

- Winston Koh
- Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem pp. 221-226

- Antonio Quesada
- Multi_profile welfarism: a generalization pp. 227-228

- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
Volume 24, issue 3, 2005
- Correction to: ‘Information and preference aggregation’ pp. 395-396

- Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
- Optimal sequential decision architectures and the robustness of hierarchies and polyarchies pp. 397-411

- Winston Koh
- The mere addition paradox, parity and critical-level utilitarianism pp. 413-431

- Mozaffar Qizilbash
- Absorbing and generalized stable sets pp. 433-437

- Elena Inarra, Jeroen Kuipers and Norma Olaizola
- The positional power of nodes in digraphs pp. 439-454

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard Laan and Adolphus Talman
- Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences pp. 455-473

- Koichi Tadenuma
- Factorization of fuzzy preferences pp. 475-496

- Bonifacio Llamazares
- Condorcet choice functions and maximal elements pp. 497-508

- Begoña Subiza and Josep E. Peris
- Welfare, freedom of choice and composite utility in the logit model pp. 509-525

- Sven Erlander
- Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with and without claims pp. 527-541

- Anke Gerber
- Monk business: An example of the dynamics of organizations pp. 543-556

- Luis Corchon
- Social welfare rankings of income distributions A new parametric concept of intermediate inequality pp. 557-574

- Tateo Yoshida
- Positional information and preference aggregation pp. 575-583

- Robert Powers
Volume 24, issue 2, 2005
- Subcyclic sets of linear orders pp. 199-210

- Peter C. Fishburn
- Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom pp. 211-220

- Tyler Cowen and Amihai Glazer
- Bayesian utilitarianism and probability homogeneity pp. 221-251

- Richard Bradley
- Multi-profile welfarism: A generalization pp. 253-267

- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
- On power distribution in weighted voting pp. 269-282

- Francesc Carreras and Josep Freixas
- Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or somebody else? An experimental investigation of distributive justice pp. 283-309

- Stefan Traub, Christian Seidl, Ulrich Schmidt and Maria Levati
- The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation pp. 311-341

- Marc Fleurbaey, Kotaro Suzumura and Koichi Tadenuma
- When is a goal rational? pp. 343-361

- Karin Edvardsson and Sven Hansson
- How to reach legitimate decisions when the procedure is controversial pp. 363-393

- Franz Dietrich
Volume 24, issue 1, 2005
- The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions pp. 3-32

- Christian List
- Responsibility and redistribution: The case of first best taxation pp. 33-44

- Bertil Tungodden
- Existence of homogeneous representations of interval orders on a cone in a topological vector space pp. 45-61

- Gianni Bosi, Juan Carlos Candeal, Esteban Induráin and Margarita Zudaire
- The equity-efficiency trade-off reconsidered pp. 63-81

- Georg Tillmann
- Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem pp. 83-92

- Daniel Berend and Luba Sapir
- Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills pp. 93-127

- Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
- A new model of coalition formation pp. 129-154

- Agnieszka Rusinowska, Harrie de Swart and Jan-Willem van der Rijt
- Yardstick competition and political agency problems pp. 155-169

- Paul Belleflamme and Jean Hindriks
- Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations pp. 171-197

- Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
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