Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 27, issue 3, 2006

Rationalizability of choice functions on general domains without full transitivity pp. 435-458

Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont and Kotaro Suzumura

Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems pp. 459-475

Eliora Hout, Harrie Swart and Annemarie Veer

Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters pp. 477-492

B Pezaleleleg and Hans Peters

Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters pp. 493-493

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Endogenous Voting Agendas pp. 495-530

John Duggan

The Banks Set in Infinite Spaces pp. 531-543

Elizabeth Penn

Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences pp. 545-570

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez

Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims pp. 571-594

Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl

Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets pp. 595-610

Vincent Anesi

Rational Choice and von Neumann– Morgenstern’s Stable Set: The Case of Path-dependent Procedures pp. 611-619

Taradas Bandyopadhyay and Kunal Sengupta

A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting pp. 621-625

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

A Tax and Redistribution Experiment with Subjects that Switch from Risk Aversion to Risk Preference pp. 627-641

Steven Beckman

Volume 27, issue 2, 2006

Protective Properties and the Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Claims Problems: A Note pp. 221-230

Chun-Hsien Yeh

The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems pp. 231-249

Juan Moreno-Ternero and Antonio Villar

A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections pp. 251-261

Kenneth Shotts

On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition pp. 263-277

Geoffrey Pritchard and Arkadii Slinko

Anonymous Single-profile Welfarism pp. 279-287

Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson

Lottery Rather than Waiting-line Auction pp. 289-310

Winston Koh, Zhenlin Yang and Lijing Zhu

The Global Welfare Economics of Immigration pp. 311-325

John Roemer

On the Extension of the Utilitarian and Suppes–Sen Social Welfare Relations to Infinite Utility Streams pp. 327-339

Kuntal Banerjee

Positional Independence in Preference Aggregation: A Remark pp. 341-345

Nicolas Houy

An Interview with Michael Dummett: from Analytical Philosophy to Voting Analysis and Beyond pp. 347-364

Rudolf Fara and Maurice Salles

Coalition Formation and Stability pp. 365-375

Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina

A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems pp. 377-406

Hervé Crès

Population Dynamics and Animal Welfare: Issues Raised by the Culling of Kangaroos in Puckapunyal pp. 407-422

Matthew Clarke and Yew-Kwang Ng

The Politics of Randomness pp. 423-433

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan

Volume 27, issue 1, 2006

Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets pp. 3-24

Hideo Konishi and Utku Unver

Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets pp. 25-28

Fuhito Kojima

On Preference, Freedom and Diversity pp. 29-40

Vito Peragine and Antonio Romero-Medina

Equitable Intergenerational Preferences on Restricted Domains pp. 41-54

Toyotaka Sakai

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention pp. 55-81

Humberto Llavador

Alternate Definitions of the Uncovered Set and Their Implications pp. 83-87

Elizabeth Penn

Single-peaked Compatible Preference Profiles: Some Combinatorial Results pp. 89-102

Sven Berg and Thommy Perlinger

Democratically Elected Aristocracies pp. 103-127

David Heyd and Uzi Segal

The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision pp. 129-154

Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén

Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty Over Voter Behavior pp. 155-172

Kimiko Terai

Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty over Voter Behavior pp. 173-173

Kimiko Terai

Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity pp. 175-187

Dipjyoti Majumdar and Arunava Sen

Seat Biases in Proportional Representation Systems with Thresholds pp. 189-193

Udo Schwingenschlögl and Friedrich Pukelsheim

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies pp. 195-210

Hideyuki Mizobuchi and Shigehiro Serizawa

Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting pp. 211-219

Ipek Ozkal-Sanver and M. Sanver

Volume 26, issue 3, 2006

Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice pp. 435-445

Toyotaka Sakai and Masaki Shimoji

Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests pp. 447-453

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan

Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models pp. 455-470

David Baron and Adam Meirowitz

Population growth and poverty measurement pp. 471-483

Satya Chakravarty, Ravi Kanbur and Diganta Mukherjee

Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules pp. 485-509

Pierre Favardin and Dominique Lepelley

Income Share Elasticity and Stochastic Dominance pp. 511-525

Corrado Benassi and Alessandra Chirco

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control pp. 527-545

Silvia Dominguez-Martinez and Otto Swank

Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions pp. 547-569

Guillermo Owen and Bernard Grofman

Coalition Configurations and the Banzhaf Index pp. 571-596

M. Albizuri and Jesus Aurrekoetxea

On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules pp. 597-601

Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan

The Balinski–Young Comparison of Divisor Methods is Transitive pp. 603-606

Luc Lauwers and Tom Puyenbroeck

Nash implementation via hyperfunctions pp. 607-623

Ipek Ozkal-Sanver and M. Sanver

Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach pp. 625-643

Daniela Ambrosino, Vito Fragnelli and Maria Marina

Book Review: David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, Editors. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks pp. 645-649

Elizabeth Penn

Volume 26, issue 2, 2006

Cyclic Evaluation of Transitivity of Reciprocal Relations pp. 217-238

B. Baets, H. Meyer and B. Schuymer

The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences pp. 239-253

Youngsub Chun

A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences pp. 255-261

Bettina Klaus

General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures pp. 263-283

Franz Dietrich

A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games pp. 285-304

Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan

Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation pp. 305-331

Shigehiro Serizawa

A General Equilibrium Model of Multi-Party Competition pp. 333-361

Marek Kaminski

Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule pp. 363-383

Alejandro Saporiti and Fernando Tohmé

Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates pp. 385-402

Ran Spiegler

Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments pp. 403-419

Francoise Forges

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games pp. 421-433

Dinko Dimitrov, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx and Shao Sung

Volume 26, issue 1, 2006

Majority rip-off in referendum voting pp. 1-21

Klaus Abbink

The modeling and analysis of rotten kids pp. 23-30

Kolpin Van

Measuring autonomy freedom pp. 31-45

Sebastiano Bavetta and Vito Peragine

Efficient nonanthropocentric nature protection pp. 47-74

Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig

Scoring of web pages and tournaments—axiomatizations pp. 75-92

Giora Slutzki and Oscar Volij

A value for games with coalition structures pp. 93-105

Gerard Hamiache

Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner? pp. 107-129

Donald Saari

Robustness of optimal decision rules where one of the team members is exceptionally qualified pp. 131-141

Drora Karotkin and Jacob Paroush

How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election pp. 143-153

Arkadii Slinko

The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production pp. 155-182

Guoqiang Tian

The 2002 Winter Olympics scandal: rent-seeking and committees pp. 183-189

J. Atsu Amegashie

The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences pp. 191-208

William Gehrlein

When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model pp. 209-215

Richard Chisik and Robert Lemke