Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 61, issue 4, 2023

Cesàro average utilitarianism in relativistic spacetime pp. 733-761

Marcus Pivato

On efficiency in disagreement economies pp. 763-799

Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen and Johan Walden

Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations pp. 801-816

Kazuya Kikuchi

The behavioral economics of dynamically inconsistent behavior: a critical assessment pp. 817-833

Sebastian Krügel and Matthias Uhl

Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency pp. 835-852

Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato and Kohei Kamaga

On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax pp. 853-882

Simone Pellegrino and Achille Vernizzi

Tailored recommendations on a matching platform pp. 883-917

Gunhaeng Lee

Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity pp. 919-936

Gustav Alexandrie

Volume 61, issue 3, 2023

Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification pp. 455-488

Geoffrey A. Chua, Gaoji Hu and Fang Liu

Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule pp. 489-510

Mostapha Diss, Clinton Gubong Gassi and Issofa Moyouwou

Manipulation of moves in sequential contests pp. 511-535

Konstantinos Protopappas

Citizen preferences and the architecture of government pp. 537-585

Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Marie-Laure Breuillé

Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis pp. 587-624

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Flip Klijn and Marc Vorsatz

How does exposure to COVID-19 influence health and income inequality aversion? pp. 625-647

Miqdad Asaria, Joan Costa-Font and Frank Cowell

Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents pp. 649-683

Jin Xi and Haitian Xie

Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity pp. 685-712

Jing Yu and Martin Kocher

On the safety of group manipulation pp. 713-732

Hans Peters and Yuliya Veselova

Volume 61, issue 2, 2023

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures pp. 221-262

Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

Mechanism design with model specification pp. 263-276

Pathikrit Basu

Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions pp. 277-309

Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez and Jahn Franklin Leal

Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy pp. 311-337

Thomas Aronsson, Sugata Ghosh and Ron Wendner

Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments pp. 339-364

Michael Kurschilgen

Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option pp. 365-383

Antonio J. Morales and Javier Rodero-Cosano

Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains pp. 385-411

Miho Hong and Semin Kim

Centrality measures in networks pp. 413-453

Francis Bloch, Matthew Jackson and Pietro Tebaldi

Volume 61, issue 1, 2023

A topological characterization of generalized stable sets pp. 1-9

Athanasios Andrikopoulos

Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions pp. 11-34

Sumit Goel and Wade Hann-Caruthers

Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river pp. 35-59

Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu and René van den Brink

On the political economy of economic integration pp. 61-100

Rabah Amir, Hend Ghazzai and Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population pp. 101-129

Dean Spears and Stéphane Zuber

Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton pp. 131-154

Michele Gori

Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads pp. 155-197

Julien Jacob, Eve-Angeline Lambert, Mathieu Lefebvre and Sarah Driessche

Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members pp. 199-219

Daniel Cardona, Jenny Freitas and Antoni Rubí-Barceló

Volume 60, issue 4, 2023

Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games pp. 523-543

Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada

On Sugden’s normative economics and the comparison of non-nested opportunity sets pp. 545-559

Bertrand Crettez

Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty pp. 561-578

Aroon Narayanan

Universalization and altruism pp. 579-594

Jean-François Laslier

The blocker postulates for measures of voting power pp. 595-623

Arash Abizadeh and Adrian Vetta

Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice? pp. 625-645

Kira Pronin and Jonathan Woon

Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences pp. 647-669

Fumiya Inoue and Hirofumi Yamamura

Volume 60, issue 3, 2023

Borda-optimal taxation of labour income pp. 331-364

Asen Ivanov

The theory of straight ticket voting pp. 365-381

Olga Gorelkina, Ioanna Grypari and Erin Hengel

Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice pp. 383-396

Aram Grigoryan

Robust dissimilarity comparisons with categorical outcomes pp. 397-437

Francesco Andreoli and Claudio Zoli

Electoral turnout with divided opposition pp. 439-475

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz and Alexei Zakharov

The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem pp. 477-501

Sang-Chul Suh and Yuntong Wang

Implementation in strong core by codes of rights pp. 503-515

Michele Lombardi, Foivos Savva and Nikolas Zivanas

On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) pp. 517-521

Satoshi Nakada and Ryo Shirakawa

Volume 60, issue 1, 2023

Special Issue in Honour of John A. Weymark pp. 1-3

Craig Brett, Claude d’Aspremont and Maurice Salles

Ordinal allocation pp. 5-14

Christopher Chambers and Michael Richter

Tailored recommendations pp. 15-34

Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos and Jean-Marc Tallon

Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems pp. 35-46

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

New perspectives on the Gini and Bonferroni indices of inequality pp. 47-64

Satya Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar

Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain pp. 65-74

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno and Antonio Nicolo'

A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism pp. 75-101

Benoit Decerf

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects pp. 103-120

Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction pp. 121-134

Peter Hammond

Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approach pp. 135-164

Laurence Jacquet and Etienne Lehmann

Taxation behind the veil of ignorance pp. 165-181

Biung-Ghi Ju and Juan Moreno-Ternero

Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations pp. 183-235

Darong Dai and Guoqiang Tian

Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules pp. 237-263

Laurent Simula and Alain Trannoy

Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based pp. 265-297

Eun Jeong Heo

The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives pp. 299-311

Maurice Salles

Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis pp. 313-330

William Thomson