Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 62, issue 4, 2024

Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations pp. 629-642

Kensei Nakamura

Approval-based voting with mixed goods pp. 643-677

Xinhang Lu, Jannik Peters, Haris Aziz, Xiaohui Bei and Warut Suksompong

Correction: Approval-based voting with mixed goods pp. 679-679

Xinhang Lu, Jannik Peters, Haris Aziz, Xiaohui Bei and Warut Suksompong

Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians? pp. 681-738

Maxime Menuet, Hugo Oriola and Patrick Villieu

Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems pp. 739-759

Marina Núñez and Francisco Robles

Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention pp. 761-783

Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho and Bill Proces Tsague

Christian Klamler’s ”A distance measure for choice functions” [Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2008) 419–425]: a correction pp. 785-788

Davide Carpentiere, Alfio Giarlotta and Stephen Watson

A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility pp. 789-797

Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama

Forms of new democracy pp. 799-837

Hans Gersbach

Berge equilibrium, altruism and social welfare pp. 839-860

Hans Haller

Volume 62, issue 3, 2024

To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths pp. 443-464

Stefan Wintein

Animals and social welfare pp. 465-504

Romain Espinosa

The Quintilian School in the history of Social Choice: an early tentative step from plurality rule to pairwise comparisons pp. 505-517

Jorge Urdánoz and Josep M. Colomer

Robustness to manipulations in school choice pp. 519-548

Alexander Nesterov, Olga Rospuskova and Sofia Rubtcova

Consistent social ranking solutions pp. 549-569

Takahiro Suzuki and Masahide Horita

Relative measures of economic insecurity pp. 571-581

Walter Bossert and Conchita D’Ambrosio

Redistributive politics under ambiguity pp. 583-607

Javier Donna

Dorm augmented college assignments pp. 609-627

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Volume 62, issue 2, 2024

Technological advance, social fragmentation and welfare pp. 197-232

Steven Bosworth and Dennis J. Snower

The expressive power of voting rules pp. 233-273

Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and João V. Ferreira

Ordinal utility differences pp. 275-287

Jean Baccelli

A dynamic model of endogenous development: the role of pioneers pp. 289-320

Alexander Usvitskiy

Cost intervention in delinquent networks pp. 321-344

Yifan Xiong, Youze Lang and Ziyan Li

Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences pp. 345-365

Agustín Bonifacio

Inequality measurement with coarse data pp. 367-396

Xiangyu Qu

Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index pp. 397-418

Chun-Ting Chen, Wei-Torng Juang and Ching-jen Sun

Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare pp. 419-441

Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Volume 62, issue 1, 2024

Ties pp. 1-35

Federico Revelli, Tsung-Sheng Tsai and Cheng-Tai Wu

Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study pp. 37-66

Kenneth Chan, Vivian Lei and Filip Vesely

Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes pp. 67-88

Tamás Solymosi

Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values pp. 89-108

Aditya Vikram

The largest Condorcet domain on 8 alternatives pp. 109-116

Charles Leedham-Green, Klas Markström and Søren Riis

Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants pp. 117-152

Stefano Barbieri and Marco Serena

The “invisible hand” of vote markets pp. 153-165

Dimitrios Xefteris and Nicholas Ziros

Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model pp. 167-196

Sarvesh Bandhu, Abhinaba Lahiri and Anup Pramanik

Volume 61, issue 4, 2023

Cesàro average utilitarianism in relativistic spacetime pp. 733-761

Marcus Pivato

On efficiency in disagreement economies pp. 763-799

Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen and Johan Walden

Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations pp. 801-816

Kazuya Kikuchi

The behavioral economics of dynamically inconsistent behavior: a critical assessment pp. 817-833

Sebastian Krügel and Matthias Uhl

Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency pp. 835-852

Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato and Kohei Kamaga

On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax pp. 853-882

Simone Pellegrino and Achille Vernizzi

Tailored recommendations on a matching platform pp. 883-917

Gunhaeng Lee

Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity pp. 919-936

Gustav Alexandrie

Volume 61, issue 3, 2023

Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification pp. 455-488

Geoffrey A. Chua, Gaoji Hu and Fang Liu

Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule pp. 489-510

Mostapha Diss, Clinton Gubong Gassi and Issofa Moyouwou

Manipulation of moves in sequential contests pp. 511-535

Konstantinos Protopappas

Citizen preferences and the architecture of government pp. 537-585

Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Marie-Laure Breuillé

Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis pp. 587-624

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Flip Klijn and Marc Vorsatz

How does exposure to COVID-19 influence health and income inequality aversion? pp. 625-647

Miqdad Asaria, Joan Costa-Font and Frank Cowell

Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents pp. 649-683

Jin Xi and Haitian Xie

Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity pp. 685-712

Jing Yu and Martin Kocher

On the safety of group manipulation pp. 713-732

Hans Peters and Yuliya Veselova

Volume 61, issue 2, 2023

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures pp. 221-262

Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

Mechanism design with model specification pp. 263-276

Pathikrit Basu

Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions pp. 277-309

Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez and Jahn Franklin Leal

Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy pp. 311-337

Thomas Aronsson, Sugata Ghosh and Ron Wendner

Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments pp. 339-364

Michael Kurschilgen

Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option pp. 365-383

Antonio J. Morales and Javier Rodero-Cosano

Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains pp. 385-411

Miho Hong and Semin Kim

Centrality measures in networks pp. 413-453

Francis Bloch, Matthew Jackson and Pietro Tebaldi

Volume 61, issue 1, 2023

A topological characterization of generalized stable sets pp. 1-9

Athanasios Andrikopoulos

Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions pp. 11-34

Sumit Goel and Wade Hann-Caruthers

Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river pp. 35-59

Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu and René van den Brink

On the political economy of economic integration pp. 61-100

Rabah Amir, Hend Ghazzai and Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population pp. 101-129

Dean Spears and Stéphane Zuber

Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton pp. 131-154

Michele Gori

Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads pp. 155-197

Julien Jacob, Eve-Angeline Lambert, Mathieu Lefebvre and Sarah Driessche

Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members pp. 199-219

Daniel Cardona, Jenny Freitas and Antoni Rubí-Barceló