Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 14, issue 4, 1997

Hansson's theorem for generalized social welfare functions: an extension pp. 471-478

John Duggan

Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case pp. 479-502

John Roemer

Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras pp. 503-512

H. Reiju Mihara

Non-cooperative implementation of the core pp. 513-525

Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra

A note on the existence of progressive tax structures pp. 527-543

Efe Ok

Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition pp. 545-562

Bernard Grofman and Samuel Merrill Iii.

Volume 14, issue 3, 1997

Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions pp. 363-377

K. B. Reid

Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces pp. 379-401

T. Storcken, Hans Peters, H. v. d. Stel and W. Peremans

Rational choice and revealed preference without binariness pp. 403-425

Klaus Nehring

A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation pp. 427-438

Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn

Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria pp. 439-447

Sang-Chul Suh

Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote: A comment pp. 449-464

Randolph Sloof

Book Review: John Broome: Counting the Cost of Global Warming. The White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1992 pp. 465-467

Peter Hammond

Book Review: W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, N.J. Schofield (eds.): Social choice, welfare and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.ISBN 0-521-44340 pp. 468-470

Donald E. Campbell

Volume 14, issue 2, 1997

Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective pp. 147-160

Geoffrey Heal

Market arbitrage, social choice and the core pp. 161-198

Graciela Chichilnisky

Topological and discrete social choice: in a search of a theory pp. 199-209

Yuliy M. Baryshnikov

Informational geometry of social choice pp. 211-232

Donald G. Saari

Topological methods in social choice: an overview pp. 233-243

Paras Mehta

A note on continuous social choice pp. 245-248

Yuqing Zhou

Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps (*) pp. 249-257

Heine Rasmussen

The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*) pp. 259-294

Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal

Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules pp. 295-302

Gleb Koshevoy

Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results pp. 303-318

Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal

Topological aggregation, the case of an infinite population pp. 319-332

Luc Lauwers

Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents pp. 333-343

E. IndurÂin, J. C. Candeal and Graciela Chichilnisky

Continuity and equity with infinite horizons pp. 345-356

Luc Lauwers

A note on weak \infty-Chichilnisky rules pp. 357-358

Luc Lauwers

Some issues related to the topological aggregation of preferences: addendum (*) pp. 359-361

Esteban Induráin, José Uriarte and Juan Carlos Candeal

Volume 14, issue 1, 1996

The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: a game theoretic approach pp. 1-21

Koichi Suga, Akira Okada and Kenichi Sakakibara

Election of vice-president and adding new members to representative bodies pp. 23-45

Andranick S. Tanguiane

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies pp. 47-56

James Schummer

Equitable opportunities in economic environments pp. 57-64

Laurence Kranich

Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems pp. 65-78

John Conley, Simon Wilkie and Richard McLean

Objective interpersonal comparisons of utility pp. 79-96

Kevin Roberts

Opportunity sets and individual well-being pp. 97-112

Walter Bossert

Acyclic sets of linear orders pp. 113-124

Peter Fishburn

Outranking methods for multicriterion decision making: Arrow's and Raynaud's conjecture pp. 125-128

Zachary F. Lansdowne

Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods pp. 129-145

John Harsanyi

Volume 13, issue 4, 1996

Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate pp. 383-395

Ryo-ichi Nagahisa

Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games pp. 397-417

Steven Brams and Peter C. Fishburn

Incomplete information and incentives to free ride pp. 419-432

Mehmet Bac

Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information pp. 433-444

Lu Hong

Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods pp. 445-450

Koichi Tadenuma

Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments pp. 451-455

Michel Le Breton and Guillaume Hollard

Voting power when using preference ballots pp. 457-465

Duncan J. Melville and Deanna B. Haunsperger

Implementation in generic environments pp. 467-478

Arunava Sen and James Bergin

Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules pp. 479-486

Drora Karotkin

Social welfare functions and fairness pp. 487-496

Edi Karni

Volume 13, issue 3, 1996

Majority-consistent preference orderings pp. 259-267

John Craven

A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness pp. 269-274

Drora Karotkin and Shmuel Nitzan

Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments pp. 275-289

Sanjay Srivastava and Michael A. Trick

Improvement indices of well-being (*) pp. 291-303

Kai-yuen Tsui

Transitivity and fuzzy preferences pp. 305-318

Rajat Deb and Manabendra Dasgupta

Reconciling interpersonal comparability and the intensity of preference for the utility sum rule pp. 319-325

Ben Fine

Partially efficient voting by committees pp. 327-342

Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Redistribution and compensation (*) pp. 343-355

Marc Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert

Actions of symmetry groups pp. 357-364

Graciela Chichilnisky

The plurality majority converse under single peakedness pp. 365-380

Thom Bezembinder

Erratum pp. 381-381

Graciela Chichilnisky

Volume 13, issue 2, 1996

Special issue: incommensurability and value pp. 127-127

Maurice Salles

Quasi-orderings and population ethics pp. 129-150

Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson

The theory of justice pp. 151-182

Serge-Christophe Kolm

The nature and measurement of freedom pp. 183-200

Patrick Suppes

Explaining risky choices without assuming preferences pp. 201-213

Chris Starmer

Social choice with procedural preferences pp. 215-230

Sven Hansson

An axiomatic approach to sustainable development pp. 231-257

Graciela Chichilnisky

Volume 13, issue 1, 1996

A robust theory of resource allocation pp. 1-10

Graciela Chichilnisky

A remark on a social choice problem pp. 11-16

Beth Allen

Finite sensibility and utility functions pp. 25-41

Gerhard Sichelstiel and Fritz Söllner

Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting pp. 43-50

Hideo Konishi

New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules pp. 51-59

Nir Dagan

Bargaining with set-valued disagreement pp. 61-74

Kaushik Basu

Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions pp. 75-93

Gilbert Laffond, Jean Lainé and Jean-François Laslier

Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments pp. 95-112

James Redekop

Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods pp. 113-126

Carmen Bevia