Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 18, issue 4, 2001

An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions pp. 619-653

Salvador Barberà

A crash course in implementation theory pp. 655-708

Matthew Jackson

The probability of ties with scoring methods: Some results pp. 709-735

Thierry Marchant

Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations pp. 737-746

Ruth Ben-Yashar and Jacob Paroush

The political viability of a negative income tax pp. 747-757

Jon R. Neill

Core concepts for share vectors pp. 759-784

Gerard van der Laan and Rene van den Brink

Strategyproof single unit award rules pp. 785-798

Szilvia Pápai

Horizontal inequity comparisons pp. 799-816

Valentino Dardanoni and Peter Lambert

Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto pp. 817-822

Robert C. Powers

Using elections to represent preferences pp. 823-831

Vicki Knoblauch

Volume 18, issue 3, 2001

An interview with John C. Harsanyi pp. 389-401

Peter Hammond and Claude d'Aspremont

A nail-biting election pp. 409-414

Steven Brams and Peter C. Fishburn

Analyzing a nail-biting election pp. 415-430

Donald G. Saari

The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting pp. 431-464

Moshé Machover and Dan S. Felsenthal

The value of a player in n-person games pp. 465-483

Kjell Hausken and Matthias Mohr

Review of Ethics out of Economics by John Broome pp. 485-495

Nicolas Gravel

Welfare-reducing growth despite individual and government optimization pp. 497-506

Siang Ng and Yew-Kwang Ng

Aggregation of coarse preferences pp. 507-525

Hervé Crès

Locating libraries on a street pp. 527-541

Eiichi Miyagawa

Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof pp. 543-553

H. Reiju Mihara

Stable sets and standards of behaviour pp. 555-570

Robert Delver and Herman Monsuur

Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review pp. 571-600

Norman Schofield

The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences pp. 601-616

Joaquín Pérez

Volume 18, issue 2, 2001

Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus pp. 213-226

Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding

On the topological social choice problem pp. 227-250

Charles D. Horvath

A linear algebra approach to non-transitive expected utility pp. 251-267

Vesna Omladic and Matjaz Omladic

A cognitive model of individual well-being pp. 269-288

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures pp. 289-301

Peter Klibanoff

Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information pp. 303-326

John Nachbar

On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation pp. 327-386

William Thomson

Volume 18, issue 1, 2001

From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives pp. 1-22

Thomas Schwartz

Ranking opportunity sets: An approach based on the preference for flexibility pp. 23-36

Ricardo Arlegi and Jorge Nieto

Strategy-proofness and markets pp. 37-58

Mark A. Satterthwaite

Social Welfare Functions which preserve distances pp. 59-64

Fritz Grafe and Julius Grafe

Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments pp. 65-78

Michel Le Breton and John Duggan

A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule pp. 79-89

Thomas C. Ratliff

A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action pp. 91-105

Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi

A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem pp. 107-112

Valentino Dardanoni

Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework pp. 113-127

Josep E. Peris and M. Carmen Sánchez

A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions pp. 129-134

Sylvain J. Durand

Core in a simple coalition formation game pp. 135-153

Tayfun Sönmez, Suryapratim Banerjee and Hideo Konishi

The robustness of optimal organizational architectures: A note on hierarchies and polyarchies pp. 155-163

Ruth Ben-Yashar and Shmuel Nitzan

Poverty orderings: A graphical illustration pp. 165-178

Buhong Zheng

More on preference and freedom pp. 179-191

Antonio Romero-Medina

Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference pp. 193-205

Fabrice Valognes and William V. Gehrlein

Volume 17, issue 4, 2000

A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies pp. 571-599

Naoki Yoshihara

Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation pp. 601-627

Philippe De Donder

Extended preferences and freedom of choice pp. 629-637

Shmuel Nitzan and Eyal Baharad

Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions pp. 639-653

Rolf Aaberge

Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule pp. 655-672

Francesco De Sinopoli

Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean pp. 673-690

José Luis García-Lapresta and Bonifacio Llamazares

Changes that cause changes pp. 691-705

Donald G. Saari and Vincent Merlin

A historical introduction to normative economics pp. 707-738

Serge-Christophe Kolm

Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales pp. 739-748

John Weymark and Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Volume 17, issue 3, 2000

Does the Borda rule provide more than a ranking? pp. 381-391

Thierry Marchant

Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives pp. 393-402

H. Reiju Mihara

A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule pp. 403-438

Donald G. Saari and Vincent Merlin

When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus pp. 439-461

Otto Swank, Wilko Letterie and Hendrik van Dalen

Institutional innovation, contingency and war: A review pp. 463-479

Norman Schofield

Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions pp. 481-506

Antonio Quesada

Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems pp. 507-521

Youngsub Chun

Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy pp. 523-532

Sungwhee Shin and Sang-Chul Suh

Negatively interdependent preferences pp. 533-558

Efe Ok and Levent KoÚkesen

A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set pp. 559-565

Mathieu Martin

Book review pp. 567-569

Maurice Salles

Volume 17, issue 2, 2000

A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem pp. 189-199

Ruth Ben-Yashar and Jacob Paroush

An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money pp. 201-215

Flip Klijn

Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games pp. 217-222

Indrajit Ray

Intermediate inequality and welfare pp. 223-239

Coral del Rio Otero and Javier Ruiz-Castillo

Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox pp. 241-246

Hans Gersbach

Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity pp. 247-267

Steven Brams and Peter C. Fishburn

Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives pp. 269-282

Jean-François Laslier

Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies pp. 283-292

Jean-François Laslier

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach pp. 293-320

Nicolas Gravel, Jean-François Laslier and Alain Trannoy

Welfarism and information invariance pp. 321-336

Walter Bossert

Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society pp. 337-365

A. S. Tangian

Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences pp. 367-375

Klaus Nehring

Volume 17, issue 1, 2000

Information and preference aggregation pp. 3-24

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Public information and social choice pp. 25-31

Hans Gersbach

On the structure of simple preference-based choice functions pp. 33-43

Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Kunal Sengupta

Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution pp. 45-53

Marco Mariotti

An optimal auction perspective on lobbying pp. 55-68

Richard Boylan

Collusion, renegotiation and implementation pp. 69-83

Sandeep Baliga and Sandro Brusco

Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized pp. 85-93

John Duggan and Thomas Schwartz

Interpersonal comparisons of utility and the policy paralysis problem pp. 95-115

Michael Mandler

The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis pp. 117-124

Jon R. Neill

Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism pp. 125-141

Guoqiang Tian

Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition pp. 143-155

H. C. Huang and Vincent C. H. Chua

Representatives and districts pp. 157-178

Brendan O'Flaherty

Book Review pp. 179-188

Donald G. Saari