Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 48, issue 4, 2017

Professor Kenneth Joseph Arrow (1921–2017) pp. 703-705

Wulf Gaertner

Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox pp. 707-715

Guillaume Chèze

On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences pp. 717-745

Marie-Louise Lackner and Martin Lackner

Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas pp. 747-786

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach pp. 787-814

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games pp. 815-835

Jia Liu and Yohanes Riyanto

A counterexample to Dhillon (1998) pp. 837-843

Tilman Börgers and Yan-Min Choo

On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration pp. 845-856

Alan Krause

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness pp. 857-875

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

On Quine on Arrow pp. 877-886

Maurice Salles

Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism pp. 887-900

Amihai Glazer and Stef Proost

Volume 48, issue 3, 2017

Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity pp. 487-503

Robert Sugden

Revealed preferences with plural motives: axiomatic foundations of normative assessments in non-utilitarian welfare economics pp. 505-517

Sebastian Silva-Leander and Suman Seth

Conformity in voting pp. 519-543

Bernardo Moreno and Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited pp. 545-572

Inacio Bo and C.-Philipp Heller

Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship pp. 573-598

Shino Takayama and Akira Yokotani

Properties of multiwinner voting rules pp. 599-632

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron and Arkadii Slinko

First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments pp. 633-658

Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish and Aner Sela

Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining pp. 659-678

Martin Kocher, Odile Poulsen and Daniel Zizzo

Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system pp. 679-701

Lê Nguyên Hoang

Volume 48, issue 2, 2017

John A. Weymark: President-elect of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare 2006–2007, President 2008–2009 pp. 267-268

Marc Fleurbaey

Conundrums for nonconsequentialists pp. 269-294

John Weymark

Inequality and isoelastic equivalence scales: restrictions and implications pp. 295-326

Udo Ebert and Patrick Moyes

A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties pp. 327-356

Jérôme Lang, Gabriella Pigozzi, Marija Slavkovik, Leendert Torre and Srdjan Vesic

On the maximization of menu-dependent interval orders pp. 357-366

Juan P. Aguilera and Levent Ülkü

Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments pp. 367-383

André Berger, Rudolf Müller and Seyed Hossein Naeemi

A comment on Koh’s “The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision threshold and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures” pp. 385-392

Min Zhu, Chang Liu and You-Gan Wang

New axioms for deferred acceptance pp. 393-408

Yajing Chen

The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough pp. 409-432

Jiehua Chen, Kirk R. Pruhs and Gerhard J. Woeginger

The prediction value pp. 433-460

Maurice Koster, Sascha Kurz, Ines Lindner and Stefan Napel

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting pp. 461-485

Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Edith Elkind, Rupert Freeman and Toby Walsh

Volume 48, issue 1, 2017

Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson pp. 1-4

Paulo Barelli, Youngsub Chun and John Duggan

Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria pp. 5-30

Eun Jeong Heo and Vikram Manjunath

Efficient lottery design pp. 31-57

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino and Alexander Nesterov

Sharing an increase of the rent fairly pp. 59-80

Rodrigo Velez

No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects pp. 81-108

Duygu Yengin

Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints pp. 109-131

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem pp. 133-152

Youngsub Chun and Boram Park

Taxation and poverty pp. 153-175

Christopher Chambers and Juan Moreno-Ternero

Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice pp. 177-195

Paula Jaramillo

Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results pp. 197-220

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

Distributions of the budget sets: an axiomatic analysis pp. 221-237

Koichi Tadenuma and Yongsheng Xu

Historical discrimination and optimal remediation pp. 239-265

Laurence Kranich

Volume 47, issue 4, 2016

The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences pp. 763-789

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

In front of and behind the veil of ignorance: an analysis of motivations for redistribution pp. 791-824

David Bjerk

The development and happiness of very young children pp. 825-851

Paul Anand and Laurence Roope

Essentiality and convexity in the ranking of opportunity sets pp. 853-877

Matthew Ryan

Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting pp. 879-903

Orestis Troumpounis and Dimitrios Xefteris

A contest success function for rankings pp. 905-937

Alberto Vesperoni

Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests pp. 939-957

Jingfeng Lu and Zhewei Wang

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction pp. 959-971

Subhasish Chowdhury and Iryna Topolyan

Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties pp. 973-984

Antoine Billot and Vassili Vergopoulos

A bargaining model of endogenous procedures pp. 985-1012

Daniel Diermeier, Carlo Prato and Razvan Vlaicu

Freedom, responsibility and economics of the person, by Jérôme Ballet, Damien Bazin, Jean-Luc Dubois and François-Régis Mahieu, Routledge, 2014 pp. 1013-1019

Dirk Neumann

Volume 47, issue 3, 2016

Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents pp. 501-510

Sophie Bade

On the uniqueness of the yolk pp. 511-518

Mathieu Martin, Zéphirin Nganmeni and Craig A. Tovey

A characterization of the Gini segregation index pp. 519-529

Carmen Puerta and Ana Urrutia

Characterizations of the cumulative offer process pp. 531-542

Mustafa Afacan

Proportional Borda allocations pp. 543-558

Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler

Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates pp. 559-587

Jean-François Laslier and Karine Straeten

A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods pp. 589-606

Keisuke Bando and Kenzo Imamura

Accounting for the spouse when measuring inequality of opportunity pp. 607-631

Andreas Peichl and Martin Ungerer

Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences pp. 633-663

Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa

Non-bossiness pp. 665-696

William Thomson

Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game pp. 697-727

Sourav Bhattacharya

Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s Law pp. 729-759

Ronald Peeters, Rene Saran and Ayşe Müge Yüksel

Rationalizability of Plott consistent choice functions: a corrigendum pp. 761-762

Dan Qin and Matthew Ryan

Volume 47, issue 2, 2016

Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity pp. 245-264

Grisel Ayllón and Diego M. Caramuta

A note on extended stable sets pp. 265-275

Weibin Han, Adrian Deemen and D. Ary A. Samsura

A decomposition of strategy-proofness pp. 277-294

Nozomu Muto and Shin Sato

Weak independence and the Pareto principle pp. 295-314

Sususmu Cato

The political economy of (De)centralization with complementary public goods pp. 315-348

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism pp. 349-358

Xiangyu Qu

Democracy and resilient pro-social behavioral change: an experimental study pp. 359-378

Kenju Kamei

Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice pp. 379-386

Nava Kahana and Doron Klunover

Corruption and bicameral reforms pp. 387-411

Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa

Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing pp. 413-429

Marco Faravelli, Priscilla Man and Bang Dinh Nguyen

Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules pp. 431-458

Marcus Pivato

Decision sciences and the new case for paternalism: three welfare-related justificatory challenges pp. 459-480

Roberto Fumagalli

Limit representations of intergenerational equity pp. 481-500

Toyotaka Sakai

Volume 47, issue 1, 2016

Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model pp. 1-24

Anup Pramanik and Arunava Sen

Subjective beliefs about the income distribution and preferences for redistribution pp. 25-61

Lionel Page and Daniel Goldstein

Erratum to: The role of subjective beliefs in preferences for redistribution pp. 63-63

Lionel Page and Daniel Goldstein

The inverse problem for power distributions in committees pp. 65-88

Sascha Kurz

On surplus-sharing in partnerships pp. 89-111

Özgür Kıbrıs and Arzu Kıbrıs

A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda’s rule pp. 113-125

Jerry S. Kelly and Shaofang Qi

A spatial analogue of May’s Theorem pp. 127-139

Richard Lee Brady and Christopher Chambers

The greatest unhappiness of the least number pp. 187-205

Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura

Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size pp. 207-232

Kohei Kamaga