Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Foreword pp. 557-557: Maurice Salles
Coercion, contract and the limits of the market pp. 559-579: Kaushik Basu
Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives pp. 581-608: Claus Beisbart and Luc Bovens
Reaching a consensus pp. 609-632: Richard Bradley
Social choice and the indexing dilemma pp. 633-648: Marc Fleurbaey
Social decisions about risk and risk-taking pp. 649-663: Sven Hansson
The value of opportunities over time when preferences are unstable pp. 665-682: Robert Sugden
Collective, universal, and joint rationality pp. 683-701: Paul Weirich

Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms pp. 353-367: Hannu Vartiainen
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem pp. 369-382: Debasis Mishra and Bharath Rangarajan
Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting pp. 383-404: Kevin Roberts
Comparing degrees of inequality aversion pp. 405-428: Kristof Bosmans
The traveling group problem pp. 429-452: Christian Klamler and Ulrich Pferschy
First and second best voting rules in committees pp. 453-486: Ruth Ben-Yashar and Igal Milchtaich
Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules pp. 487-513: Geoffrey Pritchard and Mark Wilson
Inequality orderings and unit consistency pp. 515-538: Buhong Zheng
Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units pp. 539-555: Yan Yu

On the manipulation of social choice correspondences pp. 175-199: Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez
An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution pp. 201-210: Geoffroy de Clippel
A general concept of scoring rules: general definitions, statistical inference, and empirical illustrations pp. 211-228: Michel Regenwetter and Elena Rykhlevskaia
Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment pp. 229-245: Arnaud Dellis and Mandar Oak
Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity pp. 247-269: Stefan Maus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
The Moulin–Shenker rule pp. 271-293: Maurice Koster
Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms pp. 295-315: Sebastian Bervoets
Citizen candidates under uncertainty pp. 317-331: Jon Eguia
Nash implementation and the bargaining problem pp. 333-351: Hannu Vartiainen

Political election on legal retirement age pp. 1-17: Juan Lacomba and Francisco Lagos
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation pp. 19-33: Franz Dietrich and Christian List
Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods pp. 35-53: Justin Leroux
Robustness against inefficient manipulation pp. 55-67: Eyal Baharad and Zvika Neeman
Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives pp. 69-82: Donald Campbell and Jerry Kelly
Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives pp. 83-104: Donald Campbell and Jerry Kelly
A note on natural correspondences that satisfy exclusion pp. 105-106: Jack Graver
Distribution-neutral provision of public goods pp. 107-124: Udo Ebert and Georg Tillmann
Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle pp. 125-147: Sidartha Gordon
Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters pp. 149-173: John Patty

A generalised model of judgment aggregation pp. 529-565: Franz Dietrich
Variable-population extensions of social aggregation theorems pp. 567-589: Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
Fairness and voting pp. 591-605: Volker Hahn
Fairness and voting pp. 607-607: Volker Hahn
Social welfare functions with a reference income pp. 609-636: Horst Zank
Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras pp. 637-647: Kari Saukkonen
The limits of epistemic democracy pp. 649-666: Martin Hees
Utility function of fuzzy preferences on a countable set under max-*-transitivity pp. 667-683: Louis Fono and Nicolas Andjiga
The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games pp. 685-703: Yuan Ju, Peter Borm and Pieter Ruys

The mere addition paradox, parity and critical-level utilitarianism pp. 361-361: Mozaffar Qizilbash
The Number of Times an Anonymous Rule Violates Independence in the 3 × 3 Case pp. 363-373: Robert Powers
Intersecting Lorenz Curves, the Degree of Downside Inequality Aversion, and Tax Reforms pp. 375-399: W. Chiu
Equal representation in two-tier voting systems pp. 401-420: Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives pp. 421-437: Özgür Kıbrıs and Murat Sertel
Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem? pp. 439-442: Murat Çengelci and Remzi Sanver
Local autonomy and interregional equality pp. 443-460: Alexander Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden
Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty pp. 461-490: Norman Schofield
A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets pp. 491-506: John Duggan
Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters pp. 507-528: Daniel Berend and Luba Sapir

On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members pp. 181-207: Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin and Jean-Louis Rouet
Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Opportunity Sets pp. 209-230: Erwin Ooghe, Erik Schokkaert and Dirk Van de gaer
The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited pp. 231-253: M. Braham and Frank Steffen
Utility-gap Dominances and Inequality Orderings pp. 255-280: Buhong Zheng
Lorenz Dominance and Non-welfaristic Redistribution pp. 281-302: Roland Luttens and Dirk Van de gaer
Arrow’s Axiom and Full Rationality for Fuzzy Choice Functions pp. 303-319: Irina Georgescu
‘One and a Half Dimensional’ Preferences and Majority Rule pp. 321-335: Tim Groseclose
Psychology Implies Paternalism? Bounded Rationality may Reduce the Rationale to Regulate Risk-Taking pp. 337-359: Nathan Berg and Gerd Gigerenzer

Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods pp. 1-18: Murat Atlamaz and Bettina Klaus
An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities pp. 19-40: Nicolás Porteiro
Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU pp. 41-60: Francesco Passarelli and Jason Barr
Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation pp. 61-76: Ugur Ozdemir and Remzi Sanver
Dynamic Measures of Individual Deprivation pp. 77-88: Walter Bossert and Conchita D’Ambrosio
Stochastic Dominance and Absolute Risk Aversion pp. 89-110: Jordi Caballe and Joan Esteban
Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms pp. 111-125: Olivier Bochet
Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences pp. 127-141: Marc Vorsatz
Sabotaging Potential Rivals pp. 143-162: J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel
Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes pp. 163-179: Bhaskar Dutta, Hans Peters and Arunava Sen