Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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The Electoral College, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting pp. 577-593: Andrew Jorgenson and Martin Saavedra
The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results pp. 595-619: Leonardo Becchetti, Vittorio Pelligra and Francesco Salustri
The flow network method pp. 621-656: Daniela Bubboloni and Michele Gori
Composite indices, alternative weights, and comparison robustness pp. 657-679: Suman Seth and Mark McGillivray
Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? pp. 681-716: Tjaša Bjedov, Simon Lapointe, Thierry Madiès and Marie Claire Villeval
On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy pp. 717-735: Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins
A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation pp. 737-752: Nan Li
On single-peaked domains and min–max rules pp. 753-772: Gopakumar Achuthankutty and Souvik Roy

The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game pp. 381-414: Bo Chen and Rajat Deb
Income inequality measurement: a fresh look at two old issues pp. 415-435: Brice Magdalou
Working time regulation, unequal lifetimes and fairness pp. 437-464: Marie-Louise Leroux and Gregory Ponthiere
Cost asymmetry and incomplete information in a volunteer’s dilemma experiment pp. 465-491: Andrew J. Healy and Jennifer Pate
A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting pp. 493-512: Francesco De Sinopoli and Claudia Meroni
Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives pp. 513-550: Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon
Increasing discriminatory power in well-being analysis using convex stochastic dominance pp. 551-561: Gordon Anderson and Thierry Post
Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence pp. 563-575: Justin Kruger and Remzi Sanver

Extending tournament solutions pp. 193-222: Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein
The socially acceptable scoring rule pp. 223-233: Muhammad Mahajne and Oscar Volij
Transitions in poverty and its deprivations pp. 235-258: Nicolai Suppa
Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules pp. 259-279: Dodge Cahan and Arkadii Slinko
Revealed votes pp. 281-296: Andrei Gomberg
Polling in a proportional representation system pp. 297-312: Christos Mavridis and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
Optimal taxation in the presence of income-dependent relative income effects pp. 313-335: Donald Bruce and Langchuan Peng
The bargaining correspondence: when Edgeworth meets Nash pp. 337-359: Ching-jen Sun
How to rank rankings? Group performance in multiple-prize contests pp. 361-380: Alejandro Corvalan

Cosine similarity and the Borda rule pp. 1-11: Yoko Kawada
Talents, preferences and income inequality pp. 13-50: Udo Ebert and Patrick Moyes
Almost Lorenz dominance pp. 51-63: Buhong Zheng
Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism pp. 65-77: Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehito Masuda and Takafumi Yamakawa
Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts pp. 79-103: Beatriz Millán and Eliana Pepa Risma
Fair division with uncertain needs pp. 105-136: Jingyi Xue
Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach pp. 137-162: Wonki Cho
Deciding about human lives: an experimental measure of risk attitudes under prospect theory pp. 163-192: Emmanuel Kemel and Corina Paraschiv

Allocating group housing pp. 581-596: Justin Burkett, Francis X. Flanagan and Amanda L. Griffith
Inequality, participation, and polarization pp. 597-624: Razvan Vlaicu
Estimating capabilities with random scale models: women’s freedom of movement pp. 625-661: L. Andreassen and M. L. Tommaso
Optimal taxation under a consumption target pp. 663-676: Junichi Minagawa and Thorsten Upmann
Selections from ordered sets pp. 677-703: Daniele Checchi, Gianni De Fraja and Stefano Verzillo
Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects pp. 705-719: Yan Long
Electoral competition under costly policy implementation pp. 721-739: Dimitrios Xefteris and Galina Zudenkova

Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence pp. 387-423: Klaus Abbink, David Masclet and Daniel Mirza
Power at general equilibrium pp. 425-455: Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller
Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms pp. 457-479: Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan and Erel Segal-Halevi
Can religion explain cross-country differences in inequality? A global perspective pp. 481-518: Amjad Naveed and Cong Wang
On the redistributive power of pensions pp. 519-546: Philippe Choné and Guy Laroque
Privacy in implementation pp. 547-580: Ronen Gradwohl

Fairness, social norms and the cultural demand for redistribution pp. 191-212: Gilles Le Garrec
Adding noise to the institution: an experimental welfare investigation of the contribution-based grouping mechanism pp. 213-245: Heinrich H. Nax, Stefano Balietti, Ryan O. Murphy and Dirk Helbing
An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy pp. 247-264: Kristof Bosmans and Emel Öztürk
Generalized rawlsianism pp. 265-279: Kui Ou-Yang
Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems pp. 281-303: Margherita Negri
Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence pp. 305-328: Sususmu Cato
The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet pp. 329-352: Raúl Pérez-Fernández and Bernard De Baets
The price of ‘one person, one vote’ pp. 353-385: Yaron Azrieli

Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules pp. 1-33: Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou and Hatem Smaoui
Combining rights and welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives pp. 35-64: Ngo Long and Vincent Martinet
The class of ASN-position values pp. 65-99: Julia Belau
Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods pp. 101-122: Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister and Jörg Rothe
Salience and limited attention pp. 123-146: Yukinori Iwata
A simple budget-balanced mechanism pp. 147-170: Debasis Mishra and Tridib Sharma
Coincidence of Condorcet committees pp. 171-189: Eric Kamwa and Vincent Merlin