Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 60, issue 4, 2023

Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games pp. 523-543

Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada

On Sugden’s normative economics and the comparison of non-nested opportunity sets pp. 545-559

Bertrand Crettez

Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty pp. 561-578

Aroon Narayanan

Universalization and altruism pp. 579-594

Jean-François Laslier

The blocker postulates for measures of voting power pp. 595-623

Arash Abizadeh and Adrian Vetta

Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice? pp. 625-645

Kira Pronin and Jonathan Woon

Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences pp. 647-669

Fumiya Inoue and Hirofumi Yamamura

Volume 60, issue 3, 2023

Borda-optimal taxation of labour income pp. 331-364

Asen Ivanov

The theory of straight ticket voting pp. 365-381

Olga Gorelkina, Ioanna Grypari and Erin Hengel

Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice pp. 383-396

Aram Grigoryan

Robust dissimilarity comparisons with categorical outcomes pp. 397-437

Francesco Andreoli and Claudio Zoli

Electoral turnout with divided opposition pp. 439-475

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz and Alexei Zakharov

The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem pp. 477-501

Sang-Chul Suh and Yuntong Wang

Implementation in strong core by codes of rights pp. 503-515

Michele Lombardi, Foivos Savva and Nikolas Zivanas

On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) pp. 517-521

Satoshi Nakada and Ryo Shirakawa

Volume 60, issue 1, 2023

Special Issue in Honour of John A. Weymark pp. 1-3

Craig Brett, Claude d’Aspremont and Maurice Salles

Ordinal allocation pp. 5-14

Christopher Chambers and Michael Richter

Tailored recommendations pp. 15-34

Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos and Jean-Marc Tallon

Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems pp. 35-46

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

New perspectives on the Gini and Bonferroni indices of inequality pp. 47-64

Satya Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar

Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain pp. 65-74

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno and Antonio Nicolo'

A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism pp. 75-101

Benoit Decerf

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects pp. 103-120

Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction pp. 121-134

Peter Hammond

Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approach pp. 135-164

Laurence Jacquet and Etienne Lehmann

Taxation behind the veil of ignorance pp. 165-181

Biung-Ghi Ju and Juan Moreno-Ternero

Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations pp. 183-235

Darong Dai and Guoqiang Tian

Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules pp. 237-263

Laurent Simula and Alain Trannoy

Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based pp. 265-297

Eun Jeong Heo

The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives pp. 299-311

Maurice Salles

Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis pp. 313-330

William Thomson

Volume 59, issue 4, 2022

Need, equity, and accountability pp. 769-814

Alexander Max Bauer, Frauke Meyer, Jan Romann, Mark Siebel and Stefan Traub

Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games pp. 815-861

David Lowing and Kevin Techer

The average-of-awards rule for claims problems pp. 863-888

Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo and Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

Preference aggregation for couples pp. 889-923

Rouzbeh Ghouchani and Szilvia Pápai

Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution pp. 925-967

Julián Costas-Fernández and Simón Lodato

Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting pp. 969-988

Josue Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi

Effects of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation: a public good experimental study pp. 989-1008

Hui-Chun Peng

Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium pp. 1009-1028

Saptarshi Mukherjee and Hans Peters

Volume 59, issue 3, 2022

Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests pp. 495-523

Kyung Baik, Jong Hwa Lee and Seokho Lee

Round-robin tournaments with limited resources pp. 525-583

Dmitry Dagaev and Andrey Zubanov

Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information pp. 585-604

Shashwat Khare and Ton Storcken

Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment pp. 605-635

Benjamin Ouvrard, Stefan Ambec, Arnaud Reynaud, Stéphane Cezera and Murudaiah Shivamurthy

On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions pp. 637-668

Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez and Anne van den Nouweland

Habit formation and the pareto-efficient provision of public goods pp. 669-681

Thomas Aronsson and Ronnie Schöb

Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters pp. 683-733

Costel Andonie and Daniel Diermeier

The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model pp. 735-768

Marco Rogna

Volume 59, issue 2, 2022

Social identity and risky leisure activities: implications for welfare and policy pp. 251-285

Andrea Mannberg and Tomas Sjögren

Stable preference aggregation with infinite population pp. 287-304

Susumu Cato

Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections pp. 305-333

Umut Keskin, Remzi Sanver and H. Berkay Tosunlu

Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives pp. 335-359

Xu Lang

Institutional reform, technology adoption and redistribution: a political economy perspective pp. 361-400

Radhika Lahiri and Zivanemoyo Chinzara

Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index pp. 401-422

Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack

Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting pp. 423-466

Benoît R. Kloeckner

One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? pp. 467-493

Roy Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan and Erel Segal-Halevi

Volume 59, issue 1, 2022

Childlessness, childfreeness and compensation pp. 1-35

Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere

Optimal lobbying pricing pp. 37-61

Konstantinos Protopappas

Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation pp. 63-91

Stefan Wintein and Conrad Heilmann

A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget pp. 93-118

Rodrigo A. Velez

Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments pp. 119-137

Deren Çağlayan, Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules pp. 139-173

Hiroki Saitoh

Compromise in combinatorial vote pp. 175-206

Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

Voter conformism and inefficient policies pp. 207-249

Cécile Aubert and Huihui Ding