Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 39, issue 4, 2012

No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods pp. 697-719

Joseph Ostroy and Uzi Segal

On hierarchies and communication pp. 721-735

Rene van den Brink

Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems pp. 737-749

Juan Cesco

Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective pp. 751-782

Laurent Simula and Alain Trannoy

Targeting and child poverty pp. 783-808

Olivier Bargain and Olivier Donni

Money-metric utilitarianism pp. 809-831

Christopher Chambers and Takashi Hayashi

A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi’s (‘impartial’) observer pp. 833-846

Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak and Zvi Safra

Subgroup independence conditions on preferences pp. 847-853

Juan Candeal

A measure of distance between judgment sets pp. 855-867

Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins

Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis pp. 869-889

Sususmu Cato

Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type pp. 891-905

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko

Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies II pp. 907-918

Dwight Bean

A new old solution for weak tournaments pp. 919-930

Vincent Anesi

The Efron dice voting system pp. 931-959

E. Gilson, C. Cooley, W. Ella, M. Follett and L. Traldi

Volume 39, issue 2, 2012

Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories pp. 253-257

Vincent Merlin, Marc Fleurbaey and Dominique Lepelley

The reach of social choice theory pp. 259-272

Amartya Sen

Confidence in preferences pp. 273-302

Brian Hill

Evaluating sets of objects in characteristics space pp. 303-321

Wulf Gaertner

Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations pp. 323-334

Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura

Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences pp. 335-352

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno

The proximity condition pp. 353-369

Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins

Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules pp. 371-398

Remzi Sanver and William Zwicker

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules pp. 399-429

Hans Peters, Souvik Roy and Ton Storcken

On the influence of a ranking system pp. 431-455

Gabrielle Demange

On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location pp. 457-489

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton and Eugenio Peluso

Sequential legislative lobbying pp. 491-520

Michel Le Breton, Peter Sudhölter and Vera Zaporozhets

The partnered core of a game with side payments pp. 521-536

Philip Reny, Eyal Winter and Myrna Wooders

On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players pp. 537-552

Anindya Bhattacharya and Abderrahmane Ziad

Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach pp. 553-565

Hélène Ferrer, Guillermo Owen and Fabrice Valognes

Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations pp. 567-597

Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen and John Weymark

Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures pp. 599-614

Marc Fleurbaey

The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items pp. 615-631

Steven Brams, D. Kilgour and Christian Klamler

Preserving dominance relations through disaggregation: the evil and the saint pp. 633-647

Eugenio Peluso and Alain Trannoy

Sequential procedures for poverty gap dominance pp. 649-673

Claudio Zoli and Peter Lambert

Equality of opportunity and the distribution of long-run income in Sweden pp. 675-696

Anders Bjorklund, Markus Jantti and John Roemer

Volume 39, issue 1, 2012

Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions pp. 1-22

Luisa Monroy and Francisco Fernández

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests pp. 23-33

Itai Ashlagi and Flip Klijn

Public good and private good valuation for waiting time reduction: a laboratory study pp. 35-57

Tibor Neugebauer and Stefan Traub

Endogenous productivity and equality of opportunity pp. 59-89

Efthymios Athanasiou

Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury pp. 91-125

Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir

Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem pp. 127-140

Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz

A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case pp. 141-170

Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora and Laia Saumell

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany pp. 171-205

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Georg Granic

Elitism and stochastic dominance pp. 207-251

Stephen Bazen and Patrick Moyes

Volume 38, issue 4, 2012

Reconciling normative and behavioural economics: the problems to be solved pp. 553-567

Ben McQuillin and Robert Sugden

When normative and descriptive diverge: how to bridge the difference pp. 569-584

Jose-Luis Pinto-Prades and Jose-Maria Abellan-Perpiñan

Decisions with endogenous frames pp. 585-600

Patricio Dalton and Sayantan Ghosal

Internalities and paternalism: applying the compensation criterion to multiple selves across time pp. 601-615

Eric Rasmusen

How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences pp. 617-634

Ben McQuillin and Robert Sugden

Old wine in new casks: libertarian paternalism still violates liberal principles pp. 635-645

Till Grüne-Yanoff

Informed desire and the ambitions of libertarian paternalism pp. 647-658

Mozaffar Qizilbash

The use of happiness research for public policy pp. 659-674

Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer

Volume 38, issue 3, 2012

The division problem with voluntary participation pp. 371-406

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

Index-number tests and the common-scaling social cost-of-living index pp. 407-429

David Donaldson and Krishna Pendakur

Quaternary dichotomous voting rules pp. 431-454

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

On strategy-proof social choice under categorization pp. 455-471

Shin Sato

Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency pp. 473-480

Kazuhiko Hashimoto and Hiroki Saitoh

The possibility of group choice: pairwise comparisons and merging functions pp. 481-496

Thomas Saaty and Luis Vargas

Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking pp. 497-517

Qiang Fu and Jingfeng Lu

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems pp. 519-529

Rene van den Brink and Youngsub Chun

Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity pp. 531-542

Itai Ashlagi and Shigehiro Serizawa

Flat rate taxes and relative poverty measurement pp. 543-551

Brennan Thompson

Volume 38, issue 2, 2012

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems pp. 187-210

Erik Ansink and Hans-Peter Weikard

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks pp. 211-235

Masashi Umezawa

A generalization of Campbell and Kelly’s trade-off theorem pp. 237-246

Sususmu Cato and Yohei Sekiguchi

Certificates of optimality: the third way to biproportional apportionment pp. 247-268

Paolo Serafini and Bruno Simeone

Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition pp. 269-303

Maria Graziano and Maria Romaniello

On the construction of non-empty choice sets pp. 305-323

Athanasios Andrikopoulos

Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations pp. 325-353

Adam Smith, David Skarbek and Bart Wilson

A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems pp. 355-364

Yan-An Hwang and Chun-Hsien Yeh

A note on the stability of Chen’s Lindahl mechanism pp. 365-370

Matthew Van Essen

Volume 38, issue 1, 2012

The minimal covering set in large tournaments pp. 1-9

Alex Scott and Mark Fey

Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games pp. 11-22

Monisankar Bishnu and Sonali Roy

The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets pp. 23-42

John Conley and Simon Wilkie

Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium pp. 43-57

Jobst Heitzig and Forest Simmons

An interview with Serge-Christophe Kolm pp. 59-83

Peter Lambert

A Matrix Approach to TU Games with Coalition and Communication Structures pp. 85-100

Gerard Hamiache

An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism pp. 101-108

Lee Gibson and Robert Powers

Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: monotonicity versus unanimity on finitely restricted domains pp. 109-119

Shinji Ohseto

Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules pp. 121-136

Mostapha Diss and William Gehrlein

Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects pp. 137-160

Duygu Yengin

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano: Voting and collective decision-making pp. 161-179

Ines Lindner

Marc Fleurbaey: fairness, responsibility, and welfare pp. 181-185

Lars Schwettmann