Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 16, issue 4, 1999

Comparison functions and choice correspondences pp. 513-532

Bhaskar Dutta and Jean-François Laslier

Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model pp. 533-555

Richard Ball

Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods pp. 557-567

Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation pp. 569-583

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

No-envy and Arrow's conditions pp. 585-597

Vincenzo Denicolo'

The distribution problem and Rawlsian reasoning pp. 599-614

Bertil Tungodden

The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable pp. 615-627

Bilge Yilmaz and Murat Sertel

On rationalizability of choice functions: A characterization of the median pp. 629-638

Wulf Gaertner and Yongsheng Xu

Manipulability measures of common social choice functions pp. 639-661

David A. Smith

Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model pp. 663-672

David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks

Book Review pp. 673-674

John Nachbar

Volume 16, issue 3, 1999

On the power of poverty orderings pp. 349-371

Buhong Zheng

Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions pp. 373-394

William Thomson

Rationalizable solutions to pure population problems pp. 395-407

Walter Bossert, David Donaldson and Charles Blackorby

On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes pp. 409-427

Roger Lagunoff and Gerhard Glomm

On the separability of assembly preferences pp. 429-439

Jean-Pierre BenoÏt and Lewis A. Kornhauser

Pareto's compensation principle pp. 441-444

Murray Kemp and Paul Pezanis-Christou

The C1 topology on the space of smooth preference profiles pp. 445-470

Norman Schofield

Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition pp. 471-490

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach pp. 491-512

Iñaki García, Esther Gutiérrez and Emilio Calvo Ramón

Volume 16, issue 2, 1999

The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings pp. 171-182

Adrian Van Deemen

Intersecting generalized Lorenz curves and the Gini index pp. 183-196

Claudio Zoli

Utility, informed preference, or happiness: Following Harsanyi's argument to its logical conclusion pp. 197-216

Yew-Kwang Ng

Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments pp. 217-231

Josep E. Peris and Begoña Subiza

Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions pp. 233-258

Udo Ebert

Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: Some characterizations pp. 259-272

Kunal Sengupta

A characterization of utilitarianism without the transitivity axiom pp. 273-278

Vincenzo Denicolo'

Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness pp. 279-320

Herve Moulin

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes pp. 321-336

Alejandro Neme, Jordi Masso and Salvador Barberà

Arbitrage and global cones: Another counterexample pp. 337-346

Frank Page, Myrna Wooders and Paulo Monteiro

Volume 16, issue 1, 1999

Economic development and the transition to democracy a formal model pp. 1-16

Baizhu Chen and Yi Feng

Consequences, opportunities, and procedures pp. 17-40

Kotaro Suzumura

On the multi-preference approach to evaluating opportunities pp. 41-63

Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe

Aggregation of individuals' preference intensities into social preference intensity pp. 65-79

Charles M. Harvey

Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences pp. 81-97

M. Carmen SÂnchez and Josep E. Peris

Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets pp. 99-119

Guoqiang Tian

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good pp. 121-136

Shinji Ohseto

A smallest tournament for which the Banks set and the Copeland set are disjoint pp. 137-143

Olivier Hudry

Multidimensional inequality and multidimensional generalized entropy measures: An axiomatic derivation pp. 145-157

Kai-yuen Tsui

An extension of a theorem on the aggregation of separable preferences pp. 159-167

Laurent Vidu

Volume 15, issue 4, 1998

When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid? pp. 481-488

Daniel Berend and Jacob Paroush

Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates pp. 489-508

Susan O. Griffin, Joyendu Bhadury, Lakshmi S. Narasimhan and Paul M. Griffin (*),

An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result pp. 509-519

Shasikanta Nandeibam

Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism pp. 521-542

Amrita Dhillon

Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods pp. 543-558

Yves Sprumont

The number of weak orderings of a finite set pp. 559-562

Ralph Bailey

Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem pp. 563-566

Vincenzo Denicolo'

Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value pp. 567-582

Gerard van der Laan and Rene van den Brink

Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle pp. 583-592

Jerry S. Kelly and Donald E. Campbell

Volume 15, issue 3, 1998

An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem pp. 321-332

Edi Karni and John Weymark

Voting paradoxes and referenda pp. 333-350

Hannu Nurmi

The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules pp. 351-358

William V. Gehrlein

The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications pp. 359-369

Gregory Richardson

Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty pp. 371-382

Nicolas Gravel

Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions pp. 383-411

Bezalel Peleg and Peter SudhÃlter

Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite pp. 413-421

Marco Mariotti

Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering pp. 423-443

Bernard Grofman and Michel Regenwetter

Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions pp. 445-454

Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin and Anke Gerber

Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions pp. 455-467

Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding

Volume 15, issue 2, 1998

Aggregation of smooth preferences pp. 161-185

Norman Schofield

Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result pp. 187-199

Gerhard Glomm and B Ravikumar

Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules pp. 201-209

Susan H. Gensemer, Lu Hong and Jerry S. Kelly

The paradox of multiple elections pp. 211-236

Steven Brams, William S. Zwicker and D. Marc Kilgour

A strong paradox of multiple elections pp. 237-238

Marco Scarsini

Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems pp. 239-261

Donald G. Saari

The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach pp. 263-287

Efe Ok and Laurence Kranich

The Borda count and agenda manipulation pp. 289-296

Michael Dummett

Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments pp. 297-311

Bettina Klaus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

book review: Book Review pp. 313-319

Marc Fleurbaey

Volume 15, issue 1, 1997

The Lorenz zonotope and multivariate majorizations pp. 1-14

Gleb Koshevoy

Stay away from fair coins: A Condorcet jury theorem pp. 15-20

Jacob Paroush

Equity, continuity, and myopia: A generalization of Diamond's impossibility theorem pp. 21-30

Tomoichi Shinotsuka

Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition pp. 31-56

Shlomo Weber

The replacement principle in economies with indivisible goods pp. 57-66

William Thomson

Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights pp. 67-80

Bezalel Peleg

Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics pp. 81-93

David Epstein

Objective measures of well-being and the cooperative production problem pp. 95-112

Frédéric Gaspart

Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims pp. 113-119

Carmen Herrero

Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence pp. 121-139

Dimitrios Diamantaras and Robert P. Gilles

An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions pp. 141-159

Pierre de Trenqualye