Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2025

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
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Volume 21, issue 3, 2003

Obituary pp. 385-385

John Broome

The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles pp. 387-398

Ilia Tsetlin, Michel Regenwetter and Bernard Grofman

Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval pp. 399-431

Josep Freixas and William S. Zwicker

Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees pp. 433-454

Thomas C. Ratliff

Probabilistic Borda rule voting pp. 455-468

Jac Heckelman

A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings pp. 469-499

Biung-Ghi Ju

Optimal commodity taxation for reduction of envy pp. 501-527

Yukihiro Nishimura

Book review pp. 529-530

Donald E. Campbell

Volume 21, issue 2, 2003

Foreword pp. 179-180

Claude d'Aspremont and Francois Maniquet

Equal rights to trade and mediate pp. 181-193

Peter Hammond

On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods pp. 195-205

William Thomson

Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in different cultures pp. 207-242

Erik Schokkaert and Kurt Devooght

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian pp. 243-263

Marc Fleurbaey and Alain Trannoy

Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems pp. 265-280

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus

Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives pp. 281-310

Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation pp. 311-322

Frédéric Gaspart

Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information pp. 323-346

Francois Maniquet

On the informational basis of social choice pp. 347-384

Marc Fleurbaey

Volume 21, issue 1, 2003

Political culture and monopoly price determination pp. 1-19

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan

Recoverability of choice functions and binary relations: some duality results pp. 21-37

Kotaro Suzumura and Yongsheng Xu

Farsighted stability in hedonic games pp. 39-61

Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Licun Xue

Extending an order to the power set: The Leximax Criterion pp. 63-71

Miguel Ballester and Juan R. De Miguel

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications pp. 73-93

Biung-Ghi Ju

Impartiality and interpersonal comparisons of variations in well-being pp. 95-111

Edi Karni

Appropriate discounting of future utilities need not be the dictatorship of the present: A note on Chichilnisky pp. 113-116

Yew-Kwang Ng

Justifiable preferences over opportunity sets pp. 117-129

Somdeb Lahiri

The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo pp. 131-148

Sam Bucovetsky

General concepts of value restriction and preference majority pp. 149-173

Michel Regenwetter, A.A.J. Marley and Bernard Grofman

Book review pp. 175-178

Walter Kanning and Arnald J. Kanning

Volume 20, issue 3, 2003

Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis pp. 353-362

Özgür Kıbrıs

Positional independence in preference aggregation pp. 363-370

Antonio Quesada

Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices pp. 371-385

Szilvia Pápai

The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games pp. 387-403

Vincent C. H. Chua and H. C. Huang

Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies pp. 405-428

Gaël Giraud and Céline Rochon

Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma pp. 429-441

Drora Karotkin and Jacob Paroush

Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: An impossibility and some proposals pp. 443-456

Yew-Kwang Ng, Guang-Zhen Sun and Guang-Zhen Sun

How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations pp. 457-465

Fabio Maccheroni, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Massimo Marinacci

Flipping and ex post aggregation pp. 467-475

Matthias Hild, Richard Jeffrey and Mathias Risse

Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners pp. 477-494

Baris Kaymak and Remzi Sanver

Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain pp. 495-507

Semih Koray and Bulent Unel

How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox pp. 509-522

Marco Haan and Peter Kooreman

Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize pp. 523-528

Gerhard J. Woeginger

Volume 20, issue 2, 2003

Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain pp. 177-187

Zvi Safra and Einat Weissengrin

Decomposition properties of dual choice functionals pp. 189-201

S. David Promislow and Virginia R. Young

On fairness and welfare analysis under uncertainty pp. 203-228

Jean-Paul Chavas and Jay Coggins

Analysing a preference and approval profile pp. 229-242

Jean-François Laslier

Representing an ordering when the population varies pp. 243-246

John Broome

Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation pp. 247-259

Stephen J. Willson

Aggregated statistical rankings are arbitrary pp. 261-272

Deanna B. Haunsperger

On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems pp. 273-281

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

On the probabilities of correct or incorrect majority preference relations pp. 283-306

Ilia Tsetlin and Michel Regenwetter

From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics pp. 307-350

Yew-Kwang Ng

Volume 20, issue 1, 2003

Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice pp. 3-25

Shasikanta Nandeibam

A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules pp. 27-32

Mark Fey

Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria pp. 33-39

Sang-Chul Suh

Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain pp. 41-48

John Bone

Finite decentralization in a Tiebout economy with crowding types pp. 49-75

John Conley and Stefani Cheri Smith

On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result pp. 77-83

Koji Takamiya

Power, prosperity and social choice: A review pp. 85-118

Norman Schofield

A signaling model of peaceful political change pp. 119-136

Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi

Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model pp. 137-154

Mauricio Soares Bugarin

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars pp. 155-166

Flavio Menezes

An axiomatic approach to intergenerational equity pp. 167-176

Toyotaka Sakai