Springer Series in Game Theory

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Introduction: Pierre Dehez
Introduction: Pierre von Mouche and Federico Quartieri
Introduction: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion: Steven A. Frank
Strategy and Conflict: Pierre Dehez
On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi: Takeshi Yamazaki
Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist: Rein Haagsma
Game Trees: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses: Nikolai Kukushkin
How to Evolve Cooperation: Christine Taylor and Martin A. Nowak
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment: Richard Cornes and Takashi Sato
Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: Social Norms, Other-Regarding Preferences, and Cooperative Behavior: Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
Pseudotrees and Order Theory: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs: Pierre von Mouche
Extensive Decision Problems: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games: Eric Maskin
Public Good Games with Incentives: The Role of Reputation: Hannelore De Silva and Karl Sigmund
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games: Takuya Iimura and Takahiro Watanabe
Bargaining and Consensus: Pierre Dehez
Extensive Forms: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly: Ferenc Szidarovszky and Akio Matsumoto
Groups and Networks: Their Role in the Evolution of Cooperation: Brian Skyrms
Evolution and Construction of Moral Systems: Jessica C. Flack and David C. Krakauer
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The Exponential Model: Luis Corchon and Lourdes Moreno
Cooperation and Fair Division: Pierre Dehez
Discrete Extensive Forms: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy: Kojun Hamada
Games, Groups, Norms, and Societies: Simon Levin
Evolutionary Theory and Cooperation in Everyday Life: David Sloan Wilson and Daniel Tumminelli O’Brien
Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets: Alexander Vasin and Polina Kartunova
Equilibrium: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
The Error of God: Error Management Theory, Religion, and the Evolution of Cooperation: Dominic D.P. Johnson
Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly: Ngo Long
Moral Motivation: John E. Hare
Explaining Religion: Notes Toward a Research Agenda: Kwame Anthony Appiah
Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities: Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Elena Viganò
Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action: Elinor Ostrom
How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games: Steven Brams and D. Marc Kilgour
Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests: Martin Kaae Jensen
Voting and Power: Pierre Dehez
Two Strategic Issues in Apologizing: Barry O’Neill
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups: Federico Quartieri and Ryusuke Shinohara
Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice: The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships: Robert Sugden
On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests: Takeshi Yamazaki
Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games: Noriaki Matsushima and Takeshi Yamazaki