Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy pp. 247-256: Marieke Quant, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx and Peter Zwikker
A category theory approach to derived preference relations in some decision making problems pp. 257-273: Victor Rozen and Grigori Zhitomirski
Consensus, communication and knowledge: An extension with Bayesian agents pp. 274-279: Lucie Ménager
Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments pp. 280-300: Domenico Menicucci
Mean consumption representation of consumption externalities pp. 301-310: Mitsunori Noguchi
The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes pp. 311-326: Bonifacio Llamazares
A multigenerational dynamic game of resource extraction pp. 327-336: Andrzej Nowak

The propagation of chaos for interacting individuals in a large population pp. 125-152: Yasuo Tanabe
Strategic advertising: The fat-cat effect and stability pp. 153-161: Hamid Beladi and Reza Oladi
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads pp. 162-170: Toshiyuki Hirai, Takuya Masuzawa and Mikio Nakayama
A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem pp. 171-181: Youngsub Chun
Maximality with or without binariness: Transfer-type characterizations pp. 182-191: José Alcantud
More on the uniform rule: Characterizations without Pareto optimality pp. 192-200: Onur Kesten
Refinements of Muirhead's Lemma and income inequality pp. 201-216: Ronny Aboudi and Dominique Thon
An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues pp. 217-226: Rafael Amer and Jose Miguel Gimenez
The existence of utility functions for weakly continuous preferences on a Banach space pp. 227-237: Maria J. Campion, Juan C. Candeal and Esteban Indurain
A new characterization of the path independent choice functions pp. 238-245: Vladimir Danilov and G. Koshevoy

Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions pp. 1-22: Kin Chung Lo
Utility of income as a random function: Behavioral characterization and empirical evidence pp. 23-57: John Dagsvik, Steinar Strøm and Zhiyang Jia
An axiomatic characterization of value judgments relative to a reference point pp. 58-69: Akos Munnich
The linear cost equivalent rule: A solution procedure for heterogeneous joint production problems pp. 70-80: Carmen Arguedas and Laurence Kranich
Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation pp. 81-89: Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
L S Penrose's limit theorem: Tests by simulation pp. 90-106: Pao-Li Chang, Vincent C.H. Chua and Moshé Machover
Super weak isomorphism of extensive games pp. 107-116: Andre Casajus
Properties of the correlational agreement coefficient: A comment to Unlu and Albert (2004) pp. 117-123: Martin Schrepp

Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility pp. 239-251: Jens Hougaard and Hans Keiding
Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness pp. 252-267: Aviad Heifetz and Ady Pauzner
Location choices under quality uncertainty pp. 268-278: Charalambos Christou and Nikolaos Vettas
The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games pp. 279-297: Sjur Flåm, Guillermo Owen and Martha Saboya
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf pp. 298-303: Marilda Sotomayor
Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms pp. 304-317: Ipek Ozkal-Sanver and Remzi Sanver
Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games pp. 318-330: Josep M. Izquierdo, Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels
Downsian competition with four parties pp. 331-335: Nikolaos Efstathiou Sofronidis
A note on arbitrage and exogenous collateral pp. 336-341: José Fajardo

Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space pp. 127-147: Ross Cressman
Incomplete information, credibility and the core pp. 148-165: Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra
Stakeholders in bilateral conflict pp. 166-180: Paola Manzini and Clara Ponsati
Nash networks with heterogeneous links pp. 181-201: Hans Haller and Sudipta Sarangi
A representation for intransitive indifference relations pp. 202-214: Erkut Ozbay and Emel Filiz-Ozbay
Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation pp. 215-226: Shinji Ohseto
A paradoxical Pareto frontier in the cake-cutting context pp. 227-233: Alan D. Taylor
Lorenz dominance for transformed income distributions: A simple proof pp. 234-237: Tatiana Damjanovic

Editorial pp. 1-2: Jean-François Laslier
Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random pp. 3-11: Rann Smorodinsky
Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games pp. 12-23: Walter Bossert, Jean Derks and Hans Peters
Stable coalitions in a continuous-time model of risk sharing pp. 24-38: Hector Chade and B. Taub
Repeated games with probabilistic horizon pp. 39-60: Iván Arribas and Amparo Urbano
Preference-based belief operators pp. 61-82: Geir Asheim and Ylva Sovik
Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size pp. 83-101: Luba Sapir
Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies pp. 102-126: Theo S.H. Driessen and Holger Meinhardt