Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Weighted position values pp. 157-163: Amandine Ghintran
Voting chances instead of voting weights pp. 164-173: Paolo Di Giannatale and Francesco Passarelli
Power measures derived from the sequential query process pp. 174-180: Geoffrey Pritchard, Reyhaneh Reyhani and Mark C. Wilson
Weightedness and structural characterization of hierarchical simple games pp. 181-189: Tatiana Gvozdeva, Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko
Collective approval pp. 190-194: Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins
Is the solidarity value close to the equal split value? pp. 195-202: Tadeusz Radzik
De-synchronized clocks in preemption games with risky prospects pp. 203-216: Andrei Barbos
Diagonal dominance and global stability pp. 217-221: Donald Keenan and Taewon Kim
Leading, learning and herding pp. 222-231: Daniel Stone and Steven J. Miller
A note on the paper ‘Single machine scheduling problems with financial resource constraints: Some complexity results and properties’ by E.R. Gafarov et al pp. 232-232: Evgeny R. Gafarov, Alexander Lazarev and Frank Werner

Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness revisited pp. 73-84: Joseph Halpern and Leandro C. Rêgo
(λ,ϵ)-stable model and essential equilibria pp. 85-91: Yusuke Miyazaki and Hiromi Azuma
Production efficiency and excess supply pp. 92-100: Leslie Reinhorn
A hardness result for core stability in additive hedonic games pp. 101-104: Gerhard J. Woeginger
On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value pp. 105-111: Tadeusz Radzik and Theo Driessen
Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence pp. 112-117: Ryuji Sano
Undiscounted optimal growth with consumable capital and capital-intensive consumption goods pp. 118-135: Sherif Khalifa
Update monotone preference rules pp. 136-149: Burak Can and Ton Storcken
Equilibrium in a discrete Downsian model given a non-minimal valence advantage and linear loss functions pp. 150-153: Dimitrios Xefteris
A human relations paradox pp. 154-156: Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller

Rational self-sabotage pp. 1-4: Oliver Gürtler and Johannes Münster
A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts pp. 5-9: Nabil Al-Najjar and Alvaro Sandroni
An extension of the Becker proposition to non-expected utility theory pp. 10-20: Sanjit Dhami and Ali al-Nowaihi
Quasiconcave preferences on the probability simplex: A nonparametric analysis pp. 21-30: Jan Heufer
Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice pp. 31-35: Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
Sex ratio at birth: A model based approach pp. 36-39: R.C. Yadava, Anup Kumar and U. Srivastava
Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules pp. 40-47: Sususmu Cato
Majority decision on median semilattices pp. 48-51: F.R. McMorris and R.C. Powers
Market thickness, prices and honesty: A quality demand trap pp. 52-59: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
Golden rule optimality in stochastic OLG economies pp. 60-66: Eisei Ohtaki
Impact of second-order uncertainty on the efficiency of the 0.5-double auction pp. 67-71: Kang Rong

Carrots, sticks and fog during insurgencies pp. 203-213: Michael P. Atkinson, Moshe Kress and Roberto Szechtman
The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions pp. 214-224: Juan Vidal-Puga
Consumption externalities and equilibrium dynamics with heterogeneous agents pp. 225-233: Kazuo Mino and Yasuhiro Nakamoto
Endogenous time preference, investment externalities, and equilibrium indeterminacy pp. 234-241: Taketo Kawagishi
Expected multi-utility representations pp. 242-246: Tsogbadral Galaabaatar and Edi Karni
Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication pp. 247-257: Stefan Napel, Andreas Nohn and José Maria Alonso-Meijide
Product filters, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency pp. 258-262: Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura
There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think pp. 263-265: Donald E. Campbell, Jack Graver and Jerry S. Kelly
An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations pp. 266-271: Anne van den Nouweland and Marco Slikker
The voracity effect revisited pp. 272-276: Holger Strulik
Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma pp. 277-289: Joseph E. Harrington and Wei Zhao

Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion pp. 103-118: Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea and Hans Peters
Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism pp. 119-126: Adam Dominiak, Jürgen Eichberger and Jean-Philippe Lefort
Minimal exact balancedness pp. 127-135: E. Lohmann, Peter Borm and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Sequential contributions rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 136-143: Youngsub Chun and Joosung Lee
Weighted component fairness for forest games pp. 144-151: Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
Existence of Nash networks and partner heterogeneity pp. 152-158: Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi
Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent pp. 159-165: Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi
Network extension pp. 166-172: Hans Haller
Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation pp. 173-192: Hans Gersbach and Maik Schneider
Complexity and organizational architecture pp. 193-202: Yannis Ioannides

On the computation of median linear orders, of median complete preorders and of median weak orders pp. 2-10: Olivier Hudry
Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings pp. 11-27: Davide P. Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Andrew Mackenzie, Ari Morse, Nikhil Srivastava and William S. Zwicker
Experiments with Kemeny ranking: What works when? pp. 28-40: Alnur Ali and Marina Meilă
The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: Impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates pp. 41-47: Frederik Herzberg and Daniel Eckert
Committee selection under weight constraints pp. 48-56: Christian Klamler, Ulrich Pferschy and Stefan Ruzika
An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules pp. 57-66: Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, Vincent Merlin and Hatem Smaoui
On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives pp. 67-73: Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Remzi Sanver and Vyacheslav Yakuba
New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates pp. 74-88: Yann Chevaleyre, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Jérôme Monnot and Lirong Xia
Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention pp. 89-99: Josep Freixas
Should social network structure be taken into account in elections? pp. 100-102: Vincent Conitzer