Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

From Elsevier
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On efficient firm formation pp. 1-12: Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller
Strictly strategy-proof auctions pp. 13-16: Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander
On the representation and construction of equitable social welfare orders pp. 17-22: Ram Dubey, Giorgio Laguzzi and Francesco Ruscitti
Quota rules for incomplete judgments pp. 23-36: Zoi Terzopoulou
Loss sharing: Characterizing a new class of rules pp. 37-40: Wulf Gaertner and Yongsheng Xu
Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games pp. 41-45: Liang Mao

Cournot equilibrium revisited pp. 1-10: Luis Corchon and Ramon Torregrosa
Production in advance versus production to order: Equilibrium and social surplus pp. 11-18: Attila Tasnádi
Fixed fee discounts and Bertrand competition in vertically related markets pp. 19-26: Maria Alipranti and Emmanuel Petrakis
Excessive vs. insufficient entry in spatial models: When product design and market size matter pp. 27-35: Miguel González-Maestre and Lluís M. Granero
Cartel formation with quality differentiation pp. 36-50: Iwan Bos, Marco Marini and Riccardo Saulle
Exploiting separability in a multisectoral model of oligopolistic competition pp. 51-59: d’Aspremont, Claude and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira
Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: How does firm entry shape managerial incentives? pp. 60-77: Kaniṣka Dam and Alejandro Robinson-Cortés
Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the Arm’s Length Principle pp. 78-90: Ana B. Lemus and Diego Moreno
The simple economics of white elephants pp. 91-100: Juan-José Ganuza and Gerard Llobet
Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination pp. 101-111: Camille Cornand and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs pp. 1-13: Florian Navarro
Social acceptability of Condorcet committees pp. 14-27: Mostapha Diss and Muhammad Mahajne
Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value pp. 28-33: Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena
A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown pp. 34-40: Guangjing Yang, Hao Sun, Dongshuang Hou and Genjiu Xu
On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium pp. 41-47: Bertrand Crettez and Rabia Nessah

An evolutionary model of prenatal and postnatal discrimination against females pp. 1-14: Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Rebeca Echávarri and Javier Husillos
Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value pp. 15-22: Sylvain Béal, Issofa Moyouwou, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
Weak pseudo-rationalizability pp. 23-28: Rush T. Stewart
Multi-issue social learning pp. 29-39: Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz
Ramsey model with non-constant population growth pp. 40-46: Viktória Kajanovičová, Branislav Novotný and Michal Pospíšil
Anticompetitive traps and voting pp. 47-59: Miguel González-Maestre and Diego Peñarrubia
Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions pp. 60-67: Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama
A model of sales with a large number of sellers pp. 68-70: Evangelos Rouskas
Intra-brand patent licensing with inter-brand competition pp. 71-77: Jiyun Cao and Uday Sinha
Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences pp. 78-87: Ivan Balbuzanov

Multi-dimensional rules pp. 1-7: Sébastien Courtin and Annick Laruelle
Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value pp. 8-14: Christian Trudeau and Juan Vidal-Puga
Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences pp. 15-24: Josue Ortega
Economic reasoning with demand and supply graphs pp. 25-35: Ryo Takemura
Verification theorems for models of optimal consumption and investment with annuitization pp. 36-44: Seyoung Park
Demand and equilibrium with inferior and Giffen behaviors pp. 45-50: Cuong Le Van and Ngoc-Sang Pham
Network externalities and process R&D: A Cournot–Bertrand comparison pp. 51-58: Mili Naskar and Rupayan Pal
On the properties that characterize privacy pp. 59-68: Gail Gilboa-Freedman and Rann Smorodinsky
Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions pp. 69-75: Takaaki Abe

Mixing discount functions: Implications for collective time preferences pp. 1-14: Nina Anchugina, Matthew Ryan and Arkadii Slinko
Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model pp. 15-23: Paan Jindapon and Matthew Van Essen
When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games pp. 24-34: Friedel Bolle
Index-wise comparative statics pp. 35-41: Caleb M. Koch
Bubbles, growth and sunspots with credit market frictions pp. 42-47: Wai-Hong Ho and Lin Zhu
A discrete model of market interaction in the presence of social networks and price discrimination pp. 48-58: Rodrigo Harrison, Gonzalo Hernandez and Roberto Muñoz
Balancedness of social choice correspondences pp. 59-67: Jerry S. Kelly and Shaofang Qi
Cake cutting: Explicit examples for impossibility results pp. 68-72: Guillaume Chèze
Random consideration and choice: A case study of “default” options pp. 73-84: Sean Horan
Future plans and errors pp. 85-92: Pavlo Blavatskyy