Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players pp. 1-12: Aidas Masiliūnas
How to share a cake with a secret agent pp. 13-15: Guillaume Chèze
Households, markets and public choice pp. 16-28: Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller
Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games pp. 29-34: Lan Sun
On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems pp. 35-45: Geoffrey R. Grimmett
Utility and income transfer principles: Interplay and incompatibility pp. 46-56: Marc Dubois and Stéphane Mussard

An improved algorithm for testing substitutability of weak preferences pp. 1-4: Susumu Kawanaka and Naoyuki Kamiyama
Cubic preferences and the character admissibility problem pp. 5-17: Beth Bjorkman, Sean Gravelle and Jonathan K. Hodge
Proportional representation with uncertainty pp. 18-23: Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Elena Manzoni and Carlos Pimienta
Gibbard–Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules pp. 24-35: Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, Francesca Rossi and Arkadii Slinko
Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes pp. 36-42: Laura Kasper, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen
The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources pp. 43-48: Gustavo Bergantiños and A. Navarro-Ramos
Completeness and transitivity of preferences on mixture sets pp. 49-62: Tsogbadral Galaabaatar, M. Khan and Metin Uyanık

Computational geometry and the U.S. Supreme Court pp. 1-9: Noah Giansiracusa and Cameron Ricciardi
A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets pp. 10-14: Ata Atay and Marina Núñez
A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise pp. 15-25: Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding
Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury pp. 26-38: Pablo Amoros
Perturbed finitely repeated games pp. 39-46: Chantal Marlats
Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions pp. 47-56: Elnaz Bajoori and Dries Vermeulen

The exact solution of spatial logit response games pp. 1-10: Tomohiko Konno and Yannis Ioannides
The Cobb–Douglas function as a flexible function pp. 11-17: Frédéric Reynès
All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints pp. 18-23: Chen Cohen, Ofer Levi and Aner Sela
The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup pp. 24-37: Renan Goetz, Yuri Yatsenko, Natali Hritonenko, Angels Xabadia and Awudu Abdulai
Local bifurcations of three and four-dimensional systems: A tractable characterization with economic applications pp. 38-50: Stefano Bosi and David Desmarchelier
Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences pp. 51-60: Norihisa Sato

Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability pp. 1-9: Wolfgang Leininger and Hamed M.Moghadam
Natural cycles and pollution pp. 10-20: Stefano Bosi and David Desmarchelier
Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players pp. 21-36: Jörg Rothe, Hilmar Schadrack and Lena Schend
Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results pp. 37-48: Debapriya Sen and Yair Tauman
A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity pp. 49-62: C. Jansen, G. Schollmeyer and T. Augustin
Climate politics: How public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance pp. 63-72: Fabien Prieur and Benteng Zou
Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability pp. 73-84: Kohei Takeda, Toyoki Hosoe, Takayuki Watanabe and Nobuo Matsubayashi
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests pp. 85-91: Kerim Keskin
Kaplow–Shavell welfarism without continuity pp. 92-96: Wai Chiu Woo

Decomposing bivariate dominance for social welfare comparisons pp. 1-8: Tina Gottschalk Marling, Troels Martin Range, Peter Sudhölter and Lars Peter Østerdal
Symmetric games revisited pp. 9-18: Zhigang Cao and Xiaoguang Yang
Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting pp. 19-30: Erel Segal-Halevi and Balázs Sziklai
Sustainability with endogenous discounting when utility depends on consumption and amenities pp. 31-36: John M. Hartwick and Ngo Long
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure pp. 37-46: Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir
Non-deterministic group contest with private information pp. 47-53: Jean-François Mercier
Bifurcation analysis of the rock–paper–scissors game with discrete-time logit dynamics pp. 54-65: Yosuke Umezuki

von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: The existence proof pp. 1-12: Toshiyuki Hirai and Naoki Watanabe
Efficiency analysis with respect to the unit cost objectives in scheduling games pp. 13-18: Song-Song Li
Sustainable social choice under risk pp. 19-31: Mitri Kitti
Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility pp. 32-34: Justin Kruger and Remzi Sanver
Fairness in group identification pp. 35-40: Wonki Cho
When do utilitarianism and egalitarianism agree on evaluation? An intersection approach pp. 41-48: Kohei Kamaga
Economic growth and factor substitution with elastic labor supply pp. 49-57: Manuel Gómez
Incomplete decision-making and Arrow’s impossibility theorem pp. 58-64: Sususmu Cato
Education choices, longevity and optimal policy in a Ben-Porath economy pp. 65-81: Yukihiro Nishimura, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere
Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game pp. 82-86: Brishti Guha
Voting and conformity: Russia, 1993–2016 pp. 87-95: Stephen Coleman