Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Volume 95, issue C, 2018

Decomposing bivariate dominance for social welfare comparisons pp. 1-8

Tina Gottschalk Marling, Troels Martin Range, Peter Sudhölter and Lars Peter Østerdal

Symmetric games revisited pp. 9-18

Zhigang Cao and Xiaoguang Yang

Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting pp. 19-30

Erel Segal-Halevi and Balázs Sziklai

Sustainability with endogenous discounting when utility depends on consumption and amenities pp. 31-36

John M. Hartwick and Ngo Long

Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure pp. 37-46

Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir

Non-deterministic group contest with private information pp. 47-53

Jean-François Mercier

Bifurcation analysis of the rock–paper–scissors game with discrete-time logit dynamics pp. 54-65

Yosuke Umezuki

Volume 94, issue C, 2018

von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: The existence proof pp. 1-12

Toshiyuki Hirai and Naoki Watanabe

Efficiency analysis with respect to the unit cost objectives in scheduling games pp. 13-18

Song-Song Li

Sustainable social choice under risk pp. 19-31

Mitri Kitti

Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility pp. 32-34

Justin Kruger and Remzi Sanver

Fairness in group identification pp. 35-40

Wonki Cho

When do utilitarianism and egalitarianism agree on evaluation? An intersection approach pp. 41-48

Kohei Kamaga

Economic growth and factor substitution with elastic labor supply pp. 49-57

Manuel Gómez

Incomplete decision-making and Arrow’s impossibility theorem pp. 58-64

Sususmu Cato

Education choices, longevity and optimal policy in a Ben-Porath economy pp. 65-81

Yukihiro Nishimura, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere

Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game pp. 82-86

Brishti Guha

Voting and conformity: Russia, 1993–2016 pp. 87-95

Stephen Coleman

Volume 93, issue C, 2018

On random exchange-stable matchings pp. 1-13

Boris Pittel

Expected utility without parsimony pp. 14-21

Antoine Billot and Vassili Vergopoulos

Longevity and welfare in general equilibrium pp. 22-36

Laurent Brembilla

Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition pp. 37-46

Soumendu Sarkar

Null preference and the resolution of the topological social choice paradox pp. 47-51

Mark Greenfield and Jun Zhang

Luce rule with limited consideration pp. 52-56

Alonso Ahumada and Levent Ülkü

A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection pp. 57-66

Andreas Darmann

The perception-adjusted Luce model pp. 67-76

Federico Echenique, Kota Saito and Gerelt Tserenjigmid

Studying malapportionment using α-divergence pp. 77-89

Junichiro Wada and Yuta Kamahara

Partially cooperative games pp. 90-100

Tomohiko Kawamori

Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences pp. 101-113

B. Smeulders

Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: Two ways how to allocate the surplus pp. 114-122

Oriol Tejada and Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

Oligopolistic price competition with a continuous demand pp. 123-131

Pavlo Blavatskyy

Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games pp. 132-140

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Continuity and completeness of strongly independent preorders pp. 141-145

David McCarthy and Kalle Mikkola

Beyond neutrality: Extended difference of votes rules pp. 146-152

Sarah Schulz King and Robert C. Powers

Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted pp. 153-158

Kyohei Marutani

Collective identity functions with status quo pp. 159-166

José Alcantud and Annick Laruelle

Volume 92, issue C, 2018

Affirmative action in school choice: A new solution pp. 1-9

Yan Ju, Deguang Lin and Dazhong Wang

Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games pp. 10-15

Flavio Delbono and Luca Lambertini

Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility pp. 16-21

Bas Dietzenbacher

A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations pp. 22-34

Tim Friehe and Avraham Tabbach

All-pay contests with performance spillovers pp. 35-39

Jun Xiao

Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents pp. 40-47

Warut Suksompong

Competition for the access to and use of information in networks pp. 48-63

Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura

Monotone decomposition of 2-additive Generalized Additive Independence models pp. 64-73

Michel Grabisch and Christophe Labreuche

Risk apportionment and multiply monotone targets pp. 74-77

Michel M. Denuit

Volume 91, issue C, 2018

Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game pp. 1-5

Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton and Jörgen Weibull

Common belief in approximate rationality pp. 6-16

Angie Mounir, Andrés Perea and Elias Tsakas

A new methodology for surveys and its application to forced response pp. 17-24

Timothy Flannery

What is an appropriate welfare measure for efficiency of local public policies inducing migration? pp. 25-35

Tatsuhito Kono and Akio Kishi

A Simple optimality-based no-bubble theorem for deterministic sequential economies with strictly monotone preferences pp. 36-41

Takashi Kamihigashi

Mutually best matches pp. 42-50

Hannu Salonen and Mikko A.A. Salonen

Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts pp. 51-55

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide pp. 56-61

Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra and Nicolás Figueroa

Inferring probability comparisons pp. 62-70

Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday and Thomas F. Icard

An improvement to Jensen’s inequality and its application to mating market clearing when paternity is uncertain pp. 71-74

Dirk Bethmann

Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice pp. 75-84

Kui Ou-Yang

Invariance axioms and functional form restrictions in structural models pp. 85-95

John K. Dagsvik