Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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The role of reconstructability analysis in social science research pp. 205-225: George J. Klir
Cybernetic causality II: Causal recursion in goal-directed systems, with applications to evolution dynamics and economics pp. 227-264: Arvid Aulin
Strategic market game: A dynamic programming application to money, banking and insurance pp. 265-278: Martin Shubik
Bilateral price-setting in a bilateral monopoly model pp. 279-301: Haruo Imai

The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results pp. 105-137: Mamoru Kaneko and Myrna Wooders
The capacity of a committee pp. 139-157: Ron Holzman
Taxonomy approach to a cabinet formation problem pp. 159-167: Jacek Mercik and Waldemar Kolodziejczyk
Stability analysis for profit-responsive selection mechanisms pp. 169-183: Gregory Dow
Axioms for consensus functions based on lower bounds in posets pp. 185-190: William H. E. Day, F. R. McMorris and David B. Meronk
United States policy toward Latin America: A study of proactive versus reactive hypotheses pp. 191-198: Hector Correa and W. Vassar

Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences pp. 1-7: Peter C. Fishburn and Robert Rosenthal
Extensions of solution concepts by means of multiplicative [var epsilon]-tax games pp. 9-20: Stef H. Tijs and Theo S. H. Driessen
Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value pp. 21-30: Norman L. Kleinberg and Jeffrey H. Weiss
Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules pp. 31-46: Mark Gradstein and Shmuel Nitzan
On nonlinear theories of economic cycles and the persistence of business cycles pp. 47-76: Willi Semmler
Scale type, meaningfulness, and the possible psychophysical laws pp. 77-95: Fred S. Roberts and Zangwill Rosenbaum
Game theory in the social sciences: Martin Shubik, Boston & London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1984, 514 pages, $17.50 pp. 101-101: K. H. Kim
Social system accounts: Karl A. Fox, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985, 221 pages, $29.00 pp. 101-102: F. W. Roush

Voting operators in the space of choice functions pp. 201-242: M. A. Aizerman and Fuad Aleskerov
What can lattices do for experimental designs? pp. 243-281: V. Duquenne
Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach pp. 283-294: Werner Guth
Ordinal ranking and preference strength pp. 295-306: Wade D. Cook and Moshe Kress

Generalized Nash's choice pp. 101-107: Algis Morkeliunas
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria pp. 109-127: Salvador Barberà and Bhaskar Dutta
Time and cost budgets pp. 129-138: Paul Van Moeseke
A strategic market game with transactions costs pp. 139-160: J. Rogawski and Martin Shubik
New measures of association for numerical variables pp. 161-182: Michael Smithson and Kenneth Knibb
On the practical possibility of a `no show paradox' under the single transferable vote pp. 183-189: Depankar Ray
On Thon's axiomatization of the Gini index pp. 191-194: Alain Trannoy
On lexicographic probability relations pp. 195-199: Uzi Segal

Modeling eco-behavioral systems pp. 1-31: Jati K. Sengupta
Complete ignorance and independence axiom: Optimism, pessimism, indecisiveness pp. 33-51: Claude Toulet
Exact choice and fuzzy preferences pp. 53-68: Bhaskar Dutta, Santosh Panda and Prasanta K. Pattanaik
Properties of the expected value of the leontief inverse: Some further results pp. 69-82: Sajal Lahiri and Steve Satchell
A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution pp. 83-87: Bezalel Peleg
A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms pp. 89-92: Zvi Ritz
Computational group theory: M. Atkinson, ed., New York: Academic Press, 1984, 375 pages, $60.00 pp. 93-94: F. W. Roush
The Umbral Calculus: Steven Roman, Orlando: Academic Press, 1983, 193 pages, $39.00 pp. 94-95: K. H. Kim
Mathematical ideas and sociological theory: I.J. Fararo, ed., New York: Gordon and Breach, 1984, 185 pages, $24.00 pp. 95-96: F. W. Roush
Polyhedral combinatorics and the acyclic subdigraph problem: M. Junger, Berlin: Heldermann Verlag, 1985, 128 pages, $36.00 pp. 96-97: F. W. Roush
Competitive economics: Equilibrium and Arbitration: Al Hang Kim and Fred W. Roush, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983, 300 pages, DFl.160 pp. 97-98: David Mayston

The Condorcet criterion and committee selection pp. 199-209: William V. Gehrlein
Complex structures and composite models -- An essay on methodology pp. 211-246: Alain A. Lewis
Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II pp. 247-262: Pradeep Dubey and Mamoru Kaneko
Price adjustment in an economy with Markov disturbance pp. 263-267: K. H. Kim and F. W. Roush
Fitting the lognormal distribution to censored labour wastage data pp. 269-274: G. K. Agrafiotis
Hedonic price functions and progressive neighborhood improvement: A theoretical exploration pp. 275-279: Diane Whalley
Management of inexact reasoning and uncertainty in expert systems pp. 281-282: Edward H. Shortliffe
Thermodynamic theory as mathematical economics could have discovered it pp. 281-281: Paul Samuelson
The super-additive solution and the concession rate solution for the nash bargaining game pp. 282-282: Michael Maschler
New methods for the analysis of two-way contigency tables: An alternative to Diaconis and Efron pp. 283-290: Leo A. Goodman
Strategy, structure and procedure in legislatures pp. 283-283: Kenneth A. Shepsle
Statistical assessments as evidence in the courts pp. 290-291: Stephen E. Fienberg
The analysis of discrete public goods problems within a social dilemma and half-dilemma framework pp. 291-292: Robyn M. Dawes
Weakness of will and the free-rider problem pp. 293-294: Jon Elster

Cybernetic causality: A unitary theory of causal recursion in natural and social systems pp. 103-130: Arvid Aulin
Statistical issues in measurement pp. 131-153: G. Iverson and J. -C. Falmagne
The desirability relation of simple games pp. 155-168: Ezra Einy
Characterization and statistical test using truncated expectations for a class of skew distributions pp. 169-178: Andras Telcs, W. Glanzel and A. Schubert
The minimum degree of recursively representable choice functions pp. 179-188: Alain A. Lewis
Social influence models with ranking alternatives and local election rules pp. 189-198: Svatoplukk Poljak and Daniel Turzik

Fundamentals of expertise: II. Communication pp. 1-42: Maria Nowakowska
On effectively computable realizations of choice functions: Dedicated to Professors Kenneth J. Arrow and Anil Nerode pp. 43-80: Alain A. Lewis
Tax evasion and the prisoner's dilemma pp. 81-89: Daniel Gottlieb
A problem in poverty measurement pp. 91-97: Michael Lipton
Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study: Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner London: Reidel, 1981, 165 pages, $26 pp. 99-99: H. K. Kim
Topoi: Robert Goldblatt, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984, 552 pages, $69.25 pp. 99-101: F. W. Roush