Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Cumulative prospect theory and imprecise risk pp. 237-263: Fabrice Philippe
The reflection effect for constant risk averse agents pp. 265-276: Rann Smorodinsky
Separable and additive representations of binary gambles of gains pp. 277-295: R. Duncan Luce and A. A. J. Marley
Characterizing properties of approximate solutions for optimization problems pp. 297-311: Henk Norde, Fioravante Patrone and Stef Tijs
Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion pp. 313-325: Jörg Naeve
Multi-attribute decision-making in individual and social choice pp. 327-339: Walter Bossert and Hans Peters
A value for multichoice games pp. 341-354: Emilio Calvo Ramón and Juan Carlos Santos

On diversity and freedom of choice pp. 123-130: Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu
'Hydraulic' rationing pp. 131-155: Marek M. Kaminski
Economies with a measure space of agents and a separable commodity space pp. 157-173: Mitsunori Noguchi
Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations pp. 175-189: Guoqiang Tian
Cumulative dominance and probabilistic sophistication pp. 191-196: Rakesh Sarin and Peter Wakker
Imitation and the dynamics of norms pp. 197-213: John Conlisk, Jyh-Chyi Gong and Ching H. Tong
Easy weighted majority games pp. 227-235: Nilotpal Chakravarty, Anand Goel and Trilochan Sastry

Topological social choice pp. 1-39: Luc Lauwers
Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates pp. 41-62: Martin Osborne
Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures pp. 63-84: Shasikanta Nandeibam
Choosing from a weighted tournament1 pp. 85-109: Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton and Michel Truchon
The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations pp. 111-121: Flip Klijn, Marco Slikker, Stef Tijs and José Zarzuelo

Consistent aggregation of simply scalable families of choice probabilities pp. 241-262: Janos Aczel, Attila Gilanyi, Gyula Maksa and Anthony A. J. Marley
Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability pp. 263-275: Joseph Abdou
Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms pp. 277-301: Hans van der Stel
Fair-negotiation procedures pp. 303-322: Matthias G. Raith
Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games pp. 323-348: Stephen J. Willson
The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems pp. 349-365: Haruo Imai and Hannu Salonen

Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness pp. 109-118: Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander and Lars-Erik Oller
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market pp. 119-132: Marilda Sotomayor
Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining pp. 133-174: Norman Schofield and Robert Parks
Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs pp. 175-194: Endre Boros and Vladimir Gurvich
A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game pp. 195-206: Yasuhito Tanaka
Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of [epsi]-contaminated beliefs pp. 207-234: Kin Chung Lo
A generalization of Moulin's Pareto extension theorem pp. 235-240: John Weymark

Expected utility and case-based reasoning pp. 1-12: Akihiko Matsui
On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games pp. 13-20: William Stanford
Price volatility and risk with non-separability of preferences pp. 21-34: Burkhard Drees and Bernhard Eckwert
Representation in majority tournaments pp. 35-53: Gilbert Laffond and Jean Lainé
Potential maximizers and network formation pp. 55-70: Marco Slikker, Bhaskar Dutta, Anne van den Nouweland and Stef Tijs
On the competitive effects of divisionalization pp. 71-79: Luis Corchon and Miguel González-Maestre
Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions pp. 81-107: Lev A. Sholomov

Foreword pp. 241-246: A. Author
A theorem on parallel processing models with a generalized stopping rule pp. 247-258: Hans Colonius
Assessing dependence among subjects' responses pp. 259-274: Francesca Cristante and Egidio Robusto
A Boolean approach to the measurement of group processes and attitudes: The concept of integration as an example pp. 275-293: Rudi Janssens
Modelling the dynamics of visual classification learning pp. 295-313: Alexander Unzicker, Martin Juttner and Ingo Rentschler
Constraints in vision: Outline of a set-theoretic approach pp. 315-341: Luigi Burigana
Prior expectations in cross-modality matching pp. 343-359: Donald Laming
On the empirical construction of implications between bi-valued test items pp. 361-375: Martin Schrepp
Global structure of visual space as a united entity pp. 377-392: Tarow Indow

Introduction pp. 103-103: A. Author
Epistemic considerations of decision making in games pp. 105-137: Mamoru Kaneko
Non-Archimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games pp. 139-156: Peter Hammond
Hierarchies of knowledge: an unbounded stairway pp. 157-170: Aviad Heifetz and Dov Samet
A modal logic of intentional communication pp. 171-196: Marco Colombetti
Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence pp. 197-213: Klaus Nehring
Group knowledge is not always distributed (neither is it always implicit) pp. 215-240: Wiebe van der Hoek, Bernd van Linder and John-Jules Meyer

Optimal job search in a changing world pp. 1-9: Lones Smith
Qualitative probabilities on [lambda]-systems pp. 11-20: Jiankang Zhang
Variable intervals model pp. 21-33: Marc-Arthur Diaye
Choice functions and abstract convex geometries pp. 35-44: Gleb A. Koshevoy
Marginalist and efficient values for TU games pp. 45-54: Anna B. Khmelnitskaya
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem pp. 55-70: Marilda Sotomayor
Slot allocation: A model of competition between firms when consumers are procedurally rational pp. 71-81: Gianni De Fraja and Indrajit Ray
Airport problems and consistent allocation rules pp. 83-102: Jos Potters and Peter Sudhölter