Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources pp. 1-7: Nanyang Bu
On a new class of continuous indices of inequality pp. 8-23: Terence Chan
Intermittency and electricity retailing: An incomplete market approach pp. 24-36: Jean-Henry Ferrasse, Nandeeta Neerunjun and Hubert Stahn
Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies pp. 37-49: X. Wang and Jingang Zhao
Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade pp. 50-65: Akihiko Matsui and Megumi Murakami
When is intergroup herding beneficial? pp. 66-77: Xiaoli Guo and Dmitry Ryvkin
Risk allocation and financial intermediation pp. 78-84: Arnaud Goussebaïle
Essential stationary equilibria of mean field games with finite state and action space pp. 85-91: Berenice Anne Neumann
Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity pp. 92-106: Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello and Alba Roviello
The market for lemons and information theory pp. 107-112: Robert Mamada
King-chicken choice correspondences pp. 113-118: Matheus Costa and Gil Riella

Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective pp. 1-10: Stéphane Gonzalez and Fatma Zahra Rostom
Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness pp. 11-30: Andrés Perea
Unawareness of decision criteria in multicriteria games pp. 31-40: Yasuo Sasaki
On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation pp. 41-55: Álvaro Romaniega Sancho
Present-biased optimization pp. 56-67: Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud and Petr A. Golovach
Walrasian equilibrium without homogeneity and Walras’ Law pp. 68-75: D’Agata, Antonio
Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities pp. 76-90: Denis Sokolov
Input price discrimination, pricing contract and social welfare pp. 91-96: Xingtang Wang
The complex interplay between COVID-19 and economic activity pp. 97-107: Roy Cerqueti, Fabio Tramontana and Marco Ventura
Negligence rules coping with hidden precaution pp. 108-117: Urs Schweizer
Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit pp. 118-137: Werner Kirsch and Gabor Toth

Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences pp. 1-11: Ricardo Arlegi and Miriam Teschl
Social desirability of entry in a bilateral oligopoly—The implications of (non) sunk costs pp. 12-19: Arijit Mukherjee and Chenhang Zeng
The generalised anti-inverse elasticity rule: A concise result pp. 20-21: Junichi Minagawa and Thorsten Upmann
Divisionalization with asymmetric production costs pp. 22-29: Ramon Fauli-Oller
A tale of two Rawlsian criteria pp. 30-35: Thai Ha-Huy
Present bias in partially sophisticated and assisted agents pp. 36-47: Seth A. Meyer, Jessica Pomplun and Joshua Schill

Lexicographic criteria for ranking opportunity sets with similarities pp. 1-5: Carmen Vázquez
The lexicographic complexity of asymmetric binary relations pp. 6-12: Vicki Knoblauch
General equilibrium cryptocurrency pricing in an OLG model pp. 13-19: Bertrand Crettez and Lisa Morhaim
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings pp. 20-29: Agustín Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo
Lemons and peaches: Multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil’s Menu pp. 30-46: Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada
Organizational form and excess burden of taxation in a multiproduct mixed oligopoly pp. 47-60: Kangsik Choi
On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game pp. 61-68: Bertrand Crettez, Rabia Nessah and Tarik Tazdaït
Fairness in plurality systems with implications for detecting partisan gerrymandering pp. 69-90: Jeffrey T. Barton
The river sharing problem with incomplete information pp. 91-100: Yuntong Wang
On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations pp. 101-108: Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh

Deepest voting: A new way of electing pp. 1-16: Jean-Baptiste Aubin, Irène Gannaz, Samuela Leoni and Antoine Rolland
Pairwise consensus and the Borda rule pp. 17-21: Muhammad Mahajne and Oscar Volij
Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization pp. 22-31: Rajendra Kundu and Harshil Kaur
Gainers and losers from market integration pp. 32-39: Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller
A weak α-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities pp. 40-46: Zhe Yang and Qingping Song
How to reverse a negative asymmetric labor productivity shock in the European Union? A directed technical change analysis with fiscal and monetary policies pp. 47-67: Oscar Afonso and Mafalda Pinho
An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters pp. 68-84: Matthew Harrison-Trainor
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof pp. 85-91: Achille Basile, Surekha Rao and K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao

Dominance criteria on grids for measuring competitive balance in sports leagues pp. 1-10: Marc Dubois
The interactive dynamics of autonomous and heteronomous motives pp. 11-26: Seongill Kang
Evaluation of decision power in multi-dimensional rules pp. 27-36: Sébastien Courtin
Dropping rational expectations pp. 37-46: Lionel de Boisdeffre
Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games pp. 47-51: Masato Tanaka and Tomomi Matsui
On dynamic adjustment and comparative statics via the implicit function theorem pp. 52-57: Anne-Christine Barthel and Eric Hoffmann
On the use of public goods pp. 58-63: Marta Faias and Emma Moreno-García
Contagion in networks: Stability and efficiency pp. 64-77: Spiros Bougheas
Mixing solutions for claims problems pp. 78-87: Jose Alcalde and Josep E. Peris
Reference-dependent choice under plurality rule pp. 88-98: Hassan Nosratabadi