Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Volume 74, issue C, 2015

Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method pp. 1-7

Alexander Karpov

Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets pp. 8-12

Ryo Kawasaki

Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation: A transition without decay pp. 13-28

Norma Olaizola and Federico Valenciano

Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice pp. 29-33

María D. García-Sanz and José Alcantud

Beatable imitation in symmetric games with perturbed payoffs pp. 34-40

Nikolas Tsakas

Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update pp. 41-59

William Thomson

On incentives, temptation and self-control pp. 60-67

Łukasz Woźny

Continuity, completeness, betweenness and cone-monotonicity pp. 68-72

Edi Karni and Zvi Safra

Multivariate risk sharing and the derivation of individually rational Pareto optima pp. 73-78

Alain Chateauneuf, Mina Mostoufi and David Vyncke

An elementary characterization of the Gini index pp. 79-83

L. Plata-Pérez, Joss Sanchez-Perez and F. Sánchez-Sánchez

Volume 73, issue C, 2015

Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences pp. 1-5

Conal Duddy

Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts pp. 6-12

Eliana Pepa Risma

Social rationality, separability, and equity under uncertainty pp. 13-22

Marc Fleurbaey, Thibault Gajdos and Stéphane Zuber

Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? pp. 23-31

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems pp. 32-39

Ahmed Doghmi and Abderrahmane Ziad

A Hotelling model with production pp. 40-49

Wen-Chung Guo, Fu-Chuan Lai and Dao-Zhi Zeng

A class of symmetric and quadratic utility functions generating Giffen demand pp. 50-54

Massimiliano Landi

Trejos–Wright with a 2-unit bound: Existence and stability of monetary steady states pp. 55-62

Pidong Huang and Yoske Igarashi

Symmetric measures of segregation, segregation curves, and Blackwell’s criterion pp. 63-68

Robert Hutchens

Volume 72, issue C, 2014

Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship pp. 1-6

Haris Aziz and Julián Mestre

Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems pp. 7-13

Takashi Akahoshi

Metric rationalization of social welfare functions pp. 14-23

Nicolas G. Andjiga, Aurelien Y. Mekuko and Issofa Moyouwou

Extended anonymity and Paretian relations on infinite utility streams pp. 24-32

Tsuyoshi Adachi, Sususmu Cato and Kohei Kamaga

Ordering infinite utility streams: Efficiency, continuity, and no impatience pp. 33-40

José Alcantud and Ram Dubey

Optimal risk-sharing under mutually singular beliefs pp. 41-49

Dejian Tian and Weidong Tian

A note on the crowd-in effect of asset bubbles in the perpetual youth model pp. 50-54

Takuma Kunieda

A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations pp. 55-61

Oriol Tejada, Peter Borm and E. Lohmann

Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem pp. 62-66

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Volume 71, issue C, 2014

A characterization of Benford’s law through generalized scale-invariance pp. 1-5

Michał Ryszard Wójcik

Axiomatic characterizations of the weighted solidarity values pp. 6-11

Emilio Calvo Ramón and Esther Gutiérrez-López

Two kinds of Pareto improvements of the economic system: An input–output analysis using the nonnegative matrices theory pp. 12-19

Lisheng Zeng

Social choice violations in rank sum scoring: A formalization of conditions and corrective probability computations pp. 20-29

James Boudreau, Justin Ehrlich, Shane Sanders and Adam Winn

Optimal choice of fiscal policy instruments in a stochastic IS–LM model pp. 30-42

Luca Correani, Fabio Di Dio and S. Patrì

When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? pp. 43-45

Yajing Chen

Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation pp. 46-52

Mehmet Barlo and Özdog˜an, Ayça

On construction of equitable social welfare orders on infinite utility streams pp. 53-60

Ram Dubey and Tapan Mitra

Mathematical structures of simple voting games pp. 61-68

Moshé Machover and Simon D. Terrington

Global indeterminacy of the equilibrium in the Chamley model of endogenous growth in the vicinity of a Bogdanov–Takens bifurcation pp. 69-79

Giovanni Bella and Paolo Mattana

A characterization of the uniform rule based on new robustness properties pp. 80-85

Azar Abizada and Siwei Chen

Identity and fragmentation in networks pp. 86-100

Pritha Dev

A theory of average growth rate indices pp. 101-115

Alexander G. Alexeev and Mikhail Sokolov

Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents pp. 116-121

Florian Biermann, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Tri-Dung Nguyen, Alex Rogers and Nicholas R. Jennings

Technological change, population dynamics, and natural resource depletion pp. 122-136

Andreas Schäfer

Collateral in banking policy: On the possibility of signaling pp. 137-141

Volker Bieta, Udo Broll and Wilfried Siebe

Investment–consumption with regime-switching discount rates pp. 142-150

Traian A. Pirvu and Huayue Zhang

Volume 69, issue C, 2014

Unifying voting theory from Nakamura’s to Greenberg’s theorems pp. 1-11

Donald G. Saari

The Arab Spring: A simple compartmental model for the dynamics of a revolution pp. 12-21

J.C. Lang and H. De Sterck

Longevity, pollution and growth pp. 22-33

Natacha Raffin and Thomas Seegmuller

Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems pp. 34-42

Duygu Nizamogullari and İpek Özkal-Sanver

Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities pp. 43-49

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Optimal portfolio with vector expected utility pp. 50-62

Eric André

A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment pp. 63-68

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games pp. 69-80

Colin Rowat and Manfred Kerber