Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Volume 105, issue C, 2020

The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs pp. 1-13

Florian Navarro

Social acceptability of Condorcet committees pp. 14-27

Mostapha Diss and Muhammad Mahajne

Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value pp. 28-33

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown pp. 34-40

Guangjing Yang, Hao Sun, Dongshuang Hou and Genjiu Xu

On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium pp. 41-47

Bertrand Crettez and Rabia Nessah

Volume 104, issue C, 2020

An evolutionary model of prenatal and postnatal discrimination against females pp. 1-14

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Rebeca Echávarri and Javier Husillos

Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value pp. 15-22

Sylvain Béal, Issofa Moyouwou, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Weak pseudo-rationalizability pp. 23-28

Rush T. Stewart

Multi-issue social learning pp. 29-39

Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz

Ramsey model with non-constant population growth pp. 40-46

Viktória Kajanovičová, Branislav Novotný and Michal Pospíšil

Anticompetitive traps and voting pp. 47-59

Miguel González-Maestre and Diego Peñarrubia

Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions pp. 60-67

Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama

A model of sales with a large number of sellers pp. 68-70

Evangelos Rouskas

Intra-brand patent licensing with inter-brand competition pp. 71-77

Jiyun Cao and Uday Sinha

Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences pp. 78-87

Ivan Balbuzanov

Volume 103, issue C, 2020

Multi-dimensional rules pp. 1-7

Sébastien Courtin and Annick Laruelle

Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value pp. 8-14

Christian Trudeau and Juan Vidal-Puga

Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences pp. 15-24

Josue Ortega

Economic reasoning with demand and supply graphs pp. 25-35

Ryo Takemura

Verification theorems for models of optimal consumption and investment with annuitization pp. 36-44

Seyoung Park

Demand and equilibrium with inferior and Giffen behaviors pp. 45-50

Cuong Le Van and Ngoc-Sang Pham

Network externalities and process R&D: A Cournot–Bertrand comparison pp. 51-58

Mili Naskar and Rupayan Pal

On the properties that characterize privacy pp. 59-68

Gail Gilboa-Freedman and Rann Smorodinsky

Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions pp. 69-75

Takaaki Abe

Volume 102, issue C, 2019

Mixing discount functions: Implications for collective time preferences pp. 1-14

Nina Anchugina, Matthew Ryan and Arkadii Slinko

Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model pp. 15-23

Paan Jindapon and Matthew Van Essen

When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games pp. 24-34

Friedel Bolle

Index-wise comparative statics pp. 35-41

Caleb M. Koch

Bubbles, growth and sunspots with credit market frictions pp. 42-47

Wai-Hong Ho and Lin Zhu

A discrete model of market interaction in the presence of social networks and price discrimination pp. 48-58

Rodrigo Harrison, Gonzalo Hernandez and Roberto Muñoz

Balancedness of social choice correspondences pp. 59-67

Jerry S. Kelly and Shaofang Qi

Cake cutting: Explicit examples for impossibility results pp. 68-72

Guillaume Chèze

Random consideration and choice: A case study of “default” options pp. 73-84

Sean Horan

Future plans and errors pp. 85-92

Pavlo Blavatskyy

Volume 101, issue C, 2019

Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information pp. 1-5

Jong Jae Lee

Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs pp. 6-19

Ethem Akyol

Constrained stochastic cost allocation pp. 20-30

Maurice Koster and Tim J. Boonen

The modified Boston mechanism pp. 31-40

Umut Dur

Preferences with taste shock representations: Price volatility and the liquidity premium pp. 41-46

R. Vijay Krishna and Philipp Sadowski

An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization pp. 47-53

Yoshifumi Hino

Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory pp. 54-64

Adam Galambos

Piercing numbers in approval voting pp. 65-71

Francis Edward Su and Shira Zerbib

Dictatorship versus manipulability pp. 72-76

Dezső Bednay, Anna Moskalenko and Attila Tasnádi

Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains pp. 77-87

Yuta Nakamura

Optimal sharing rule for a household with a portfolio management problem pp. 88-98

O.S. Mbodji, Adrien Nguyen-Huu and T.A. Pirvu

Apolitical SALT-free Tax Equilibria pp. 99-103

Van Kolpin

Envy-freeness in house allocation problems pp. 104-106

Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong and Alexandros A. Voudouris

The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution pp. 107-112

Dominik Karos and Shiran Rachmilevitch

Comparative statics in an ordinal theory of choice under risk pp. 113-123

W. Henry Chiu

Double implementation without no-veto-power pp. 124-130

Makoto Hagiwara