Mathematical Social Sciences
1980 - 2025
Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier
From Elsevier
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Volume 103, issue C, 2020
- Multi-dimensional rules pp. 1-7

- Sébastien Courtin and Annick Laruelle
- Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value pp. 8-14

- Christian Trudeau and Juan Vidal-Puga
- Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences pp. 15-24

- Josue Ortega
- Economic reasoning with demand and supply graphs pp. 25-35

- Ryo Takemura
- Verification theorems for models of optimal consumption and investment with annuitization pp. 36-44

- Seyoung Park
- Demand and equilibrium with inferior and Giffen behaviors pp. 45-50

- Cuong Le Van and Ngoc-Sang Pham
- Network externalities and process R&D: A Cournot–Bertrand comparison pp. 51-58

- Mili Naskar and Rupayan Pal
- On the properties that characterize privacy pp. 59-68

- Gail Gilboa-Freedman and Rann Smorodinsky
- Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions pp. 69-75

- Takaaki Abe
Volume 102, issue C, 2019
- Mixing discount functions: Implications for collective time preferences pp. 1-14

- Nina Anchugina, Matthew Ryan and Arkadii Slinko
- Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model pp. 15-23

- Paan Jindapon and Matthew Van Essen
- When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games pp. 24-34

- Friedel Bolle
- Index-wise comparative statics pp. 35-41

- Caleb M. Koch
- Bubbles, growth and sunspots with credit market frictions pp. 42-47

- Wai-Hong Ho and Lin Zhu
- A discrete model of market interaction in the presence of social networks and price discrimination pp. 48-58

- Rodrigo Harrison, Gonzalo Hernandez and Roberto Muñoz
- Balancedness of social choice correspondences pp. 59-67

- Jerry S. Kelly and Shaofang Qi
- Cake cutting: Explicit examples for impossibility results pp. 68-72

- Guillaume Chèze
- Random consideration and choice: A case study of “default” options pp. 73-84

- Sean Horan
- Future plans and errors pp. 85-92

- Pavlo Blavatskyy
Volume 101, issue C, 2019
- Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information pp. 1-5

- Jong Jae Lee
- Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs pp. 6-19

- Ethem Akyol
- Constrained stochastic cost allocation pp. 20-30

- Maurice Koster and Tim J. Boonen
- The modified Boston mechanism pp. 31-40

- Umut Dur
- Preferences with taste shock representations: Price volatility and the liquidity premium pp. 41-46

- R. Vijay Krishna and Philipp Sadowski
- An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization pp. 47-53

- Yoshifumi Hino
- Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory pp. 54-64

- Adam Galambos
- Piercing numbers in approval voting pp. 65-71

- Francis Edward Su and Shira Zerbib
- Dictatorship versus manipulability pp. 72-76

- Dezső Bednay, Anna Moskalenko and Attila Tasnádi
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains pp. 77-87

- Yuta Nakamura
- Optimal sharing rule for a household with a portfolio management problem pp. 88-98

- O.S. Mbodji, Adrien Nguyen-Huu and T.A. Pirvu
- Apolitical SALT-free Tax Equilibria pp. 99-103

- Van Kolpin
- Envy-freeness in house allocation problems pp. 104-106

- Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong and Alexandros A. Voudouris
- The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution pp. 107-112

- Dominik Karos and Shiran Rachmilevitch
- Comparative statics in an ordinal theory of choice under risk pp. 113-123

- W. Henry Chiu
- Double implementation without no-veto-power pp. 124-130

- Makoto Hagiwara
Volume 100, issue C, 2019
- Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players pp. 1-12

- Aidas Masiliūnas
- How to share a cake with a secret agent pp. 13-15

- Guillaume Chèze
- Households, markets and public choice pp. 16-28

- Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller
- Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games pp. 29-34

- Lan Sun
- On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems pp. 35-45

- Geoffrey R. Grimmett
- Utility and income transfer principles: Interplay and incompatibility pp. 46-56

- Marc Dubois and Stéphane Mussard
Volume 99, issue C, 2019
- An improved algorithm for testing substitutability of weak preferences pp. 1-4

- Susumu Kawanaka and Naoyuki Kamiyama
- Cubic preferences and the character admissibility problem pp. 5-17

- Beth Bjorkman, Sean Gravelle and Jonathan K. Hodge
- Proportional representation with uncertainty pp. 18-23

- Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Elena Manzoni and Carlos Pimienta
- Gibbard–Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules pp. 24-35

- Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, Francesca Rossi and Arkadii Slinko
- Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes pp. 36-42

- Laura Kasper, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen
- The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources pp. 43-48

- Gustavo Bergantiños and A. Navarro-Ramos
- Completeness and transitivity of preferences on mixture sets pp. 49-62

- Tsogbadral Galaabaatar, M. Khan and Metin Uyanık
Volume 98, issue C, 2019
- Computational geometry and the U.S. Supreme Court pp. 1-9

- Noah Giansiracusa and Cameron Ricciardi
- A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets pp. 10-14

- Ata Atay and Marina Núñez
- A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise pp. 15-25

- Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury pp. 26-38

- Pablo Amoros
- Perturbed finitely repeated games pp. 39-46

- Chantal Marlats
- Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions pp. 47-56

- Elnaz Bajoori and Dries Vermeulen