Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Volume 101, issue C, 2019

Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information pp. 1-5

Jong Jae Lee

Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs pp. 6-19

Ethem Akyol

Constrained stochastic cost allocation pp. 20-30

Maurice Koster and Tim J. Boonen

The modified Boston mechanism pp. 31-40

Umut Dur

Preferences with taste shock representations: Price volatility and the liquidity premium pp. 41-46

R. Vijay Krishna and Philipp Sadowski

An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization pp. 47-53

Yoshifumi Hino

Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory pp. 54-64

Adam Galambos

Piercing numbers in approval voting pp. 65-71

Francis Edward Su and Shira Zerbib

Dictatorship versus manipulability pp. 72-76

Dezső Bednay, Anna Moskalenko and Attila Tasnádi

Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains pp. 77-87

Yuta Nakamura

Optimal sharing rule for a household with a portfolio management problem pp. 88-98

O.S. Mbodji, Adrien Nguyen-Huu and T.A. Pirvu

Apolitical SALT-free Tax Equilibria pp. 99-103

Van Kolpin

Envy-freeness in house allocation problems pp. 104-106

Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong and Alexandros A. Voudouris

The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution pp. 107-112

Dominik Karos and Shiran Rachmilevitch

Comparative statics in an ordinal theory of choice under risk pp. 113-123

W. Henry Chiu

Double implementation without no-veto-power pp. 124-130

Makoto Hagiwara

Volume 100, issue C, 2019

Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players pp. 1-12

Aidas Masiliūnas

How to share a cake with a secret agent pp. 13-15

Guillaume Chèze

Households, markets and public choice pp. 16-28

Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller

Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games pp. 29-34

Lan Sun

On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems pp. 35-45

Geoffrey R. Grimmett

Utility and income transfer principles: Interplay and incompatibility pp. 46-56

Marc Dubois and Stéphane Mussard

Volume 99, issue C, 2019

An improved algorithm for testing substitutability of weak preferences pp. 1-4

Susumu Kawanaka and Naoyuki Kamiyama

Cubic preferences and the character admissibility problem pp. 5-17

Beth Bjorkman, Sean Gravelle and Jonathan K. Hodge

Proportional representation with uncertainty pp. 18-23

Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Elena Manzoni and Carlos Pimienta

Gibbard–Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules pp. 24-35

Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, Francesca Rossi and Arkadii Slinko

Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes pp. 36-42

Laura Kasper, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources pp. 43-48

Gustavo Bergantiños and A. Navarro-Ramos

Completeness and transitivity of preferences on mixture sets pp. 49-62

Tsogbadral Galaabaatar, M. Khan and Metin Uyanık

Volume 98, issue C, 2019

Computational geometry and the U.S. Supreme Court pp. 1-9

Noah Giansiracusa and Cameron Ricciardi

A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets pp. 10-14

Ata Atay and Marina Núñez

A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise pp. 15-25

Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding

Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury pp. 26-38

Pablo Amoros

Perturbed finitely repeated games pp. 39-46

Chantal Marlats

Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions pp. 47-56

Elnaz Bajoori and Dries Vermeulen

Volume 97, issue C, 2019

The exact solution of spatial logit response games pp. 1-10

Tomohiko Konno and Yannis Ioannides

The Cobb–Douglas function as a flexible function pp. 11-17

Frédéric Reynès

All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints pp. 18-23

Chen Cohen, Ofer Levi and Aner Sela

The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup pp. 24-37

Renan Goetz, Yuri Yatsenko, Natali Hritonenko, Angels Xabadia and Awudu Abdulai

Local bifurcations of three and four-dimensional systems: A tractable characterization with economic applications pp. 38-50

Stefano Bosi and David Desmarchelier

Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences pp. 51-60

Norihisa Sato

Volume 96, issue C, 2018

Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability pp. 1-9

Wolfgang Leininger and Hamed M.Moghadam

Natural cycles and pollution pp. 10-20

Stefano Bosi and David Desmarchelier

Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players pp. 21-36

Jörg Rothe, Hilmar Schadrack and Lena Schend

Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results pp. 37-48

Debapriya Sen and Yair Tauman

A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity pp. 49-62

C. Jansen, G. Schollmeyer and T. Augustin

Climate politics: How public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance pp. 63-72

Fabien Prieur and Benteng Zou

Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability pp. 73-84

Kohei Takeda, Toyoki Hosoe, Takayuki Watanabe and Nobuo Matsubayashi

Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests pp. 85-91

Kerim Keskin

Kaplow–Shavell welfarism without continuity pp. 92-96

Wai Chiu Woo