Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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Voting theory and preference modeling pp. 289-291: Fred Roberts and Alexis Tsoukis
A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions pp. 292-303: Olivier Hudry
Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains pp. 304-324: Jrme Lang and Lirong Xia
Removal independent consensus methods for closed [beta]-systems of sets pp. 325-332: Gary D. Crown, Melvin F. Janowitz and Robert C. Powers
Consensus rules based on decisive families: The case of hierarchies pp. 333-338: F.R. McMorris and Robert C. Powers
Who has the power in the EU? pp. 339-366: Jason Barr and Francesco Passarelli
Representing interval orders by weighted bases: Some complexity results pp. 367-388: Pierre Marquis and Meltem Öztürk
A characterization of the prudent order preference function pp. 389-405: Claude Lamboray

Cooperative production and efficiency pp. 143-154: Carmen Bevia and Luis Corchon
A note on the group bargaining solution pp. 155-160: Xiaodong Zhang
Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models pp. 161-176: Andreas Knabe
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets pp. 177-187: Claus-Jochen Haake
Informational requirements of social choice rules pp. 188-198: Shin Sato
Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes pp. 199-212: Michel Truchon and Stephen Gordon
An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes pp. 213-222: Serguei Kaniovski
Opinion dynamics using majority functions pp. 223-244: Paulin Melatagia Yonta and René Ndoundam
Scott-Suppes representability of semiorders: Internal conditions pp. 245-261: Francisco J. Abrísqueta, Juan C. Candeal, Esteban Induráin and Margarita Zudaire
A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples pp. 262-278: Xavier Ruiz del Portal
[alpha]-maxmin solutions to fair division problems and the structure of the set of Pareto utility profiles pp. 279-281: F. Hüsseinov
The complexity of computing the Muirhead-Dalton distance pp. 282-284: Vladimir G. Deineko, Bettina Klinz and Gerhard J. Woeginger
Erratum to: "Marginalist and efficient values for TU games" [Math. Social. Sci. 38 (1) (1999) 45-54] pp. 285-286: Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries pp. 1-15: Thomas Demuynck and Luc Lauwers
On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value pp. 16-25: Anirban Kar, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami
Committees and reciprocity pp. 26-47: Volker Hahn and Felix Mühe
Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes pp. 48-57: Shin Sato
Reason-based choice correspondences pp. 58-66: Michele Lombardi
Updating our beliefs about inconsistency: The Monty-Hall case pp. 67-95: Jean Baratgin
A general extension result with applications to convexity, homotheticity and monotonicity pp. 96-109: Thomas Demuynck
Endogenous link strength in directed communication networks pp. 110-116: Frédéric Deroïan
The problem of meaningfulness: Weber's law, Guilford's power law, and the near-miss-to-Weber's law pp. 117-130: Thomas Augustin
A characterization of compactness through preferences pp. 131-133: José Manuel Gutiérrez
Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects pp. 134-142: Fuhito Kojima

Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games pp. 303-313: Sylvain Béal, Jacques Durieu and Philippe Solal
Coalition formation in games without side payments pp. 314-320: Francesca Centrone and C. Meo
Potential approach and characterizations of a Shapley value in multi-choice games pp. 321-335: Yan-An Hwang and Yu-Hsien Liao
Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures pp. 336-349: Yoshio Kamijo
Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited pp. 350-354: Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Voting with preferences over margins of victory pp. 355-365: Humberto Llavador
Committees, sequential voting and transparency pp. 366-385: Volker Hahn
On the non-equivalence of weak and strict preference pp. 386-388: Martin Rechenauer
Utility representation of lower separable preferences pp. 389-394: Özgür Yılmaz
Codification schemes and finite automata pp. 395-409: Penelope Hernandez and Amparo Urbano
Licensing of a quality-improving innovation pp. 410-438: Giorgos Stamatopoulos and Yair Tauman
A note on Boiteux' surplus function and dual Pareto efficiency pp. 439-447: Jean-Michel Courtault, Bertrand Crettez and Naila Hayek
Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs pp. 448-455: Antonio Miralles

Cubical token systems pp. 149-165: Sergei Ovchinnikov
Divisor methods for proportional representation systems: An optimization approach to vector and matrix apportionment problems pp. 166-184: Norbert Gaffke and Friedrich Pukelsheim
Exact capacities and star-shaped distorted probabilities pp. 185-194: Zaier Aouani and Alain Chateauneuf
Maximizing an interval order on compact subsets of its domain pp. 195-206: Nikolai Kukushkin
Playing off-line games with bounded rationality pp. 207-223: Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala
An axiomatic characterization of the Hirsch-index pp. 224-232: Gerhard J. Woeginger
Benchmarking the effective literacy rate pp. 233-239: Travis Lee
Apportionment methods pp. 240-253: Horst F. Niemeyer and Alice C. Niemeyer
Computing the minimal covering set pp. 254-268: Felix Brandt and Felix Fischer
A general procedure to compute mixed modified semivalues for cooperative games with structure of coalition blocks pp. 269-282: Rafael Amer and José Miguel Giménez
Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected? pp. 283-295: Michael McBride
The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games pp. 296-300: Sonali Roy

Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction pp. 1-26: Andrés Perea
Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium pp. 27-43: Yannick Viossat
Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals pp. 44-74: Jérôme Renault, Sergio Scarlatti and Marco Scarsini
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences pp. 75-95: Andrea Attar, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolás Porteiro
Production-inventory games and PMAS-games: Characterizations of the Owen point pp. 96-108: Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca and Justo Puerto
Productive public expenditures, expectation formations and nonlinear dynamics pp. 109-126: Hung-Ju Chen and Ming-Chia Li
Monotonicity properties of wholesale price contracts pp. 127-143: Vera Tilson
Corrigendum to "A note on the Loewenstein-Prelec theory of intertemporal choice" [Math. Social Sci. 52 (1) (2006) 99-108] pp. 144-147: Ali al-Nowaihi and Sanjit Dhami