Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms pp. 243-260: Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding
Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game pp. 261-265: Marilda Sotomayor
Weak isomorphism of extensive games pp. 267-290: Andre Casajus
Best-reply matching in games pp. 291-309: Edward Droste, Michael Kosfeld and Mark Voorneveld
Intransitive indifference and rationalizability of choice functions on general domains pp. 311-326: Taradas Bandyopadhyay and Kunal Sengupta
Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games pp. 327-345: Javier Arin, Jeroen Kuipers and Dries Vermeulen
A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination pp. 347-354: Gerhard J. Woeginger
Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] pp. 355-356: Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber

The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why pp. 103-144: Bernard Monjardet
Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems pp. 145-148: Vladimir Danilov
On the stable b-matching polytope pp. 149-158: Tamas Fleiner
Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities pp. 159-192: Jinpeng Ma and Fusheng Nie
Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games pp. 193-205: Ron Holzman and Law-yone (Lev-tov), Nissan
On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite games with perfect information which may have cycles pp. 207-241: E. Boros and V. Gurvich

Comonotonic book making and attitudes to uncertainty pp. 1-7: Robert Kast and André Lapied
An amendment to final-offer arbitration pp. 9-19: Dao-Zhi Zeng
Sufficiency in Blackwell's theorem pp. 21-25: Agnieszka Bielinska-Kwapisz
Centrality and power in social networks: a game theoretic approach pp. 27-54: Daniel Gomez, Enrique Gonzalez-Aranguena, Conrado Manuel, Guillermo Owen, Monica del Pozo and Juan Tejada
On competitive equilibria with common complementarities pp. 55-62: Katerina Sherstyuk
Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games pp. 63-80: E. Algaba, Jesús Bilbao, J. R. Fernandez Garcia and J. J. Lopez
Partial derivatives, comparative risk behavior and concavity of utility functions pp. 81-99: Fatma Lajeri

Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey pp. 249-297: William Thomson
Transfer principles and relative inequality aversion a majorization approach pp. 299-311: Ronny Aboudi and Dominique Thon
Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games pp. 313-331: Toru Hokari and Özgür Kıbrıs
Continuous representability of homothetic preorders by means of sublinear order-preserving functions pp. 333-341: Gianni Bosi and Magali E. Zuanon
Towards a theory of MCDM: stepping away from social choice theory pp. 343-363: Thierry Marchant

On ranking compact and comprehensive opportunity sets pp. 109-119: Yongsheng Xu
Essential alternatives and set-dependent preferences--an axiomatic approach pp. 121-129: Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan
Efficient and non-deteriorating choice pp. 131-142: Walter Bossert and Yves Sprumont
On constrained dual recoverability theorems pp. 143-154: Kotaro Suzumura and Yongsheng Xu
Fuzzy aggregation in economic environments: I. Quantitative fuzziness, public goods and monotonicity assumptions pp. 155-166: Stephanie Geslin, Maurice Salles and Abderrahmane Ziad
Diversity and dissimilarity in lines and hierarchies pp. 167-183: Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe
On coalition formation: durable coalition structures pp. 185-203: Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber
Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good pp. 205-227: Rajat Deb, Laura Razzolini and Tae Kun Seo
Income inequality, risk, and the transfer principle: A questionnaire-experimental investigation pp. 229-245: Wulf Gaertner and Ceema Namazie

A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions pp. 1-13: Christian List
Consensus-halving via theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker pp. 15-25: Forest W. Simmons and Francis Edward Su
Coalition formation games with separable preferences pp. 27-52: Nadia Burani and William S. Zwicker
Cone conditions in oligopolistic market models pp. 53-73: Anna De Simone and Maria Graziano
A generalization of the Geske formula for compound options pp. 75-82: Elettra Agliardi and Agliardi Rossella
A decentralized market with trading links pp. 83-103: Antoni Calvó-Armengol

Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money pp. 223-233: Marc Meertens, Jos Potters and Hans Reijnierse
Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims pp. 235-252: Christopher Chambers and William Thomson
Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications pp. 253-276: Yoshikatsu Tatamitani
Serial cost sharing in multidimensional contexts pp. 277-299: Cyril Tejedo and Michel Truchon
The conceptual weak hierarchy associated with a dissimilarity measure pp. 301-319: Jean Diatta and Henri Ralambondrainy
Three remarks on "mixed diamond goods and anomalies in consumer theory: upward-sloping compensated demand curves with unchanged diamondness" pp. 321-331: Christian Weber

On the epistemic foundation for backward induction pp. 121-144: Geir Asheim
Strategic properties of heterogeneous serial cost sharing pp. 145-154: Eric J. Friedman
Comparative statics in Cournot free entry equilibrium pp. 155-168: Luis Corchon and Isabel Fradera
Farsighted stability in average return games pp. 169-181: Takeshi Masuda
Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty pp. 183-209: Kin Chung Lo
On probabilistic rationing methods pp. 211-221: Attila Tasnádi

Characterization of symmetrical monotone risk aversion in the RDEU model pp. 1-15: Moez Abouda and Alain Chateauneuf
A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility pp. 17-24: Oscar Volij
Mechanisms supporting the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution pp. 25-36: Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg
Semimetric thresholds for finite posets pp. 37-43: Yutaka Nakamura
Opportunity egalitarianism and income inequality pp. 45-64: Vito Peragine
Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments pp. 65-83: Murat Sertel and Ipek Ozkal-Sanver
Robust multivalued solutions for assignment problems: a note pp. 85-90: Somdeb Lahiri
The stability set as a social choice correspondence pp. 91-113: Mathieu Martin and Vincent Merlin
The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics pp. 115-120: Klaus Zauner