Mathematical Social Sciences
1980 - 2025
Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 92, issue C, 2018
- Affirmative action in school choice: A new solution pp. 1-9

- Yan Ju, Deguang Lin and Dazhong Wang
- Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games pp. 10-15

- Flavio Delbono and Luca Lambertini
- Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility pp. 16-21

- Bas Dietzenbacher
- A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations pp. 22-34

- Tim Friehe and Avraham Tabbach
- All-pay contests with performance spillovers pp. 35-39

- Jun Xiao
- Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents pp. 40-47

- Warut Suksompong
- Competition for the access to and use of information in networks pp. 48-63

- Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura
- Monotone decomposition of 2-additive Generalized Additive Independence models pp. 64-73

- Michel Grabisch and Christophe Labreuche
- Risk apportionment and multiply monotone targets pp. 74-77

- Michel M. Denuit
Volume 91, issue C, 2018
- Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game pp. 1-5

- Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton and Jörgen Weibull
- Common belief in approximate rationality pp. 6-16

- Angie Mounir, Andrés Perea and Elias Tsakas
- A new methodology for surveys and its application to forced response pp. 17-24

- Timothy Flannery
- What is an appropriate welfare measure for efficiency of local public policies inducing migration? pp. 25-35

- Tatsuhito Kono and Akio Kishi
- A Simple optimality-based no-bubble theorem for deterministic sequential economies with strictly monotone preferences pp. 36-41

- Takashi Kamihigashi
- Mutually best matches pp. 42-50

- Hannu Salonen and Mikko A.A. Salonen
- Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts pp. 51-55

- Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela
- Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide pp. 56-61

- Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra and Nicolás Figueroa
- Inferring probability comparisons pp. 62-70

- Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday and Thomas F. Icard
- An improvement to Jensen’s inequality and its application to mating market clearing when paternity is uncertain pp. 71-74

- Dirk Bethmann
- Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice pp. 75-84

- Kui Ou-Yang
- Invariance axioms and functional form restrictions in structural models pp. 85-95

- John K. Dagsvik
Volume 90, issue C, 2017
- Growth of dimension in complete simple games pp. 2-8

- O’Dwyer, Liam and Arkadii Slinko
- Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity pp. 9-17

- Matias Nuñez and Remzi Sanver
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving pp. 18-27

- Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Dominik Peters
- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains pp. 28-34

- Abhishek Gaurav, Jérémy Picot and Arunava Sen
- Mutual rankings pp. 35-42

- Gabrielle Demange
- Consistent bilateral assignment pp. 43-55

- Herve Moulin
- On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties pp. 56-62

- Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino and Utku Unver
- Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers pp. 63-72

- Suchan Chae and Jaehee Song
- Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities pp. 73-79

- Francis Bloch
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object pp. 80-92

- Hee-In Chang and Youngsub Chun
- Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line pp. 93-99

- Haris Aziz, Jens Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal
- Divide and compromise pp. 100-110

- Antonio Nicolo' and Rodrigo Velez
- Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems pp. 111-118

- Shyam Chandramouli and Jay Sethuraman
- Fairness and well-being measurement pp. 119-126

- Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
- Addendum to “Fairness and well-being measurement” pp. 127-128

- Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth pp. 129-140

- Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno
- A lemma in open sequential voting by veto pp. 141-144

- Natalia M. Novikova and Irina I. Pospelova
- Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed pp. 145-149

- Hervé Crès and Utku Unver
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model pp. 150-159

- Abhinaba Lahiri, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
- Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter pp. 160-181

- Maria Gallego and Norman Schofield
- Growth in Illyria: The role of meritocracy in the accumulation of human capital pp. 182-190

- Carmen Bevia and Luis Corchon
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game pp. 191-207

- Rosemarie Nagel, Christoph Bühren and Björn Frank
Volume 89, issue C, 2017
- Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance pp. 1-9

- Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: A comparison and a generalization pp. 10-19

- Mathieu Martin, Zephirin Nganmeni and Bertrand Tchantcho
- Network formation when players seek confirmation of information pp. 20-31

- Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Jurjen Kamphorst and Sudipta Sarangi
- On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players pp. 32-42

- Youcef Askoura
- The reverse Talmud family of rules for bankruptcy Problems: A characterization pp. 43-49

- J. Arin, J. Benito-Ostolaza and Elena Inarra
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies pp. 50-60

- A. van den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders
- Monotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregation pp. 61-69

- Mehdi Shadmehr and Dan Bernhardt
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation pp. 70-82

- Issofa Moyouwou and Hugue Tchantcho
- Sustainable growth and environmental catastrophes pp. 83-91

- J. Aznar-Márquez and José Ruiz-Tamarit
- On the existence of the Dutta–Ray’s egalitarian solution pp. 92-99

- Francesc Llerena and Llúcia Mauri
- Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups pp. 100-108

- Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong
- Advances in the attraction model for inter-group relations pp. 109-118

- Zbigniew Karpiński
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