Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

From Elsevier
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Volume 93, issue C, 2018

On random exchange-stable matchings pp. 1-13

Boris Pittel

Expected utility without parsimony pp. 14-21

Antoine Billot and Vassili Vergopoulos

Longevity and welfare in general equilibrium pp. 22-36

Laurent Brembilla

Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition pp. 37-46

Soumendu Sarkar

Null preference and the resolution of the topological social choice paradox pp. 47-51

Mark Greenfield and Jun Zhang

Luce rule with limited consideration pp. 52-56

Alonso Ahumada and Levent Ülkü

A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection pp. 57-66

Andreas Darmann

The perception-adjusted Luce model pp. 67-76

Federico Echenique, Kota Saito and Gerelt Tserenjigmid

Studying malapportionment using α-divergence pp. 77-89

Junichiro Wada and Yuta Kamahara

Partially cooperative games pp. 90-100

Tomohiko Kawamori

Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences pp. 101-113

B. Smeulders

Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: Two ways how to allocate the surplus pp. 114-122

Oriol Tejada and Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

Oligopolistic price competition with a continuous demand pp. 123-131

Pavlo Blavatskyy

Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games pp. 132-140

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Continuity and completeness of strongly independent preorders pp. 141-145

David McCarthy and Kalle Mikkola

Beyond neutrality: Extended difference of votes rules pp. 146-152

Sarah Schulz King and Robert C. Powers

Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted pp. 153-158

Kyohei Marutani

Collective identity functions with status quo pp. 159-166

José Alcantud and Annick Laruelle

Volume 92, issue C, 2018

Affirmative action in school choice: A new solution pp. 1-9

Yan Ju, Deguang Lin and Dazhong Wang

Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games pp. 10-15

Flavio Delbono and Luca Lambertini

Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility pp. 16-21

Bas Dietzenbacher

A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations pp. 22-34

Tim Friehe and Avraham Tabbach

All-pay contests with performance spillovers pp. 35-39

Jun Xiao

Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents pp. 40-47

Warut Suksompong

Competition for the access to and use of information in networks pp. 48-63

Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura

Monotone decomposition of 2-additive Generalized Additive Independence models pp. 64-73

Michel Grabisch and Christophe Labreuche

Risk apportionment and multiply monotone targets pp. 74-77

Michel M. Denuit

Volume 91, issue C, 2018

Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game pp. 1-5

Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton and Jörgen Weibull

Common belief in approximate rationality pp. 6-16

Angie Mounir, Andrés Perea and Elias Tsakas

A new methodology for surveys and its application to forced response pp. 17-24

Timothy Flannery

What is an appropriate welfare measure for efficiency of local public policies inducing migration? pp. 25-35

Tatsuhito Kono and Akio Kishi

A Simple optimality-based no-bubble theorem for deterministic sequential economies with strictly monotone preferences pp. 36-41

Takashi Kamihigashi

Mutually best matches pp. 42-50

Hannu Salonen and Mikko A.A. Salonen

Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts pp. 51-55

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide pp. 56-61

Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra and Nicolás Figueroa

Inferring probability comparisons pp. 62-70

Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday and Thomas F. Icard

An improvement to Jensen’s inequality and its application to mating market clearing when paternity is uncertain pp. 71-74

Dirk Bethmann

Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice pp. 75-84

Kui Ou-Yang

Invariance axioms and functional form restrictions in structural models pp. 85-95

John K. Dagsvik

Volume 90, issue C, 2017

Growth of dimension in complete simple games pp. 2-8

O’Dwyer, Liam and Arkadii Slinko

Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity pp. 9-17

Matias Nuñez and Remzi Sanver

Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving pp. 18-27

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Dominik Peters

The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains pp. 28-34

Abhishek Gaurav, Jérémy Picot and Arunava Sen

Mutual rankings pp. 35-42

Gabrielle Demange

Consistent bilateral assignment pp. 43-55

Herve Moulin

On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties pp. 56-62

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino and Utku Unver

Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers pp. 63-72

Suchan Chae and Jaehee Song

Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities pp. 73-79

Francis Bloch

Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object pp. 80-92

Hee-In Chang and Youngsub Chun

Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line pp. 93-99

Haris Aziz, Jens Hougaard, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal

Divide and compromise pp. 100-110

Antonio Nicolo' and Rodrigo Velez

Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems pp. 111-118

Shyam Chandramouli and Jay Sethuraman

Fairness and well-being measurement pp. 119-126

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

Addendum to “Fairness and well-being measurement” pp. 127-128

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

Immunity to credible deviations from the truth pp. 129-140

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno

A lemma in open sequential voting by veto pp. 141-144

Natalia M. Novikova and Irina I. Pospelova

Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed pp. 145-149

Hervé Crès and Utku Unver

Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model pp. 150-159

Abhinaba Lahiri, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter pp. 160-181

Maria Gallego and Norman Schofield

Growth in Illyria: The role of meritocracy in the accumulation of human capital pp. 182-190

Carmen Bevia and Luis Corchon

Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game pp. 191-207

Rosemarie Nagel, Christoph Bühren and Björn Frank