Mathematical Social Sciences

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): J.-F. Laslier

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On the possible merging functions pp. 205-243: Janos Aczel and Fred S. Roberts
A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing pp. 245-261: Youngsub Chun
Some characterizations of lower probabilities and other monotone capacities through the use of Mobius inversion pp. 263-283: Alain Chateauneuf and Jean-Yves Jaffray
Bargaining solutions and relative guarantees pp. 285-295: Youngsub Chun and William Thomson
On the existence of utility functions pp. 297-313: G. Herden
A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game pp. 315-328: Joseph Harrington
Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree pp. 329-334: Michael A. Trick

Pseudocriteria and pseudocriterial choice pp. 97-129: M. A. Aizerman and B. M. Litvakov
Homogeneous games with countably many players pp. 131-159: Joachim Rosenmuller
On the natural fluctuation of the economy pp. 161-175: Amos Golan
A new informational base for social choice pp. 177-188: Jerry S. Kelly
Kelly's conjecture pp. 189-194: K. H. Kim and Fred W. Roush
From unemployment to golden age capital accumulation in a two-sector growth model pp. 195-200: Kern O. Kymn
Les arbres et les representations des proximites: J.-P. Barthelemy and A. Guenoche, Paris: Masson, 1988, 236 pages, 160 francs pp. 201-202: F. W. Roush
Fractional programming: B.D. Craven, Berlin: Helderman Verlag, 1988, 143 pages, $29 pp. 201-201: F. W. Roush
Modelling household formation and dissolution: Nico Keilman, Anton Kuijsten and Ad Vossen, eds., Oxford: Clarendon, 1988, 298 ages, [UK pound]30 pp. 202-203: K. H. Kim
Applied mathematical letters: volume 1, issue 1, Oxford: Pergamon press, 1988, 104 pages, 280 DM per year pp. 203-203: F. W. Roush

Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem pp. 1-16: Guillermo Owen, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld
On fuzzy quantity and fuzzy isoquant pp. 17-31: Guo-quan Chen and Eden Yu
Determination of all generalized Hicks-neutral production functions pp. 33-45: J. Aczel and W. Gehrig
A nash type equilibrium in games without transitive preferences pp. 47-56: Juan Cesco and Alejandro Neme
We eventually agree pp. 57-66: James Bergin
The probability of intransitivity of pairwise comparisons in individual preference pp. 67-75: William V. Gehrlein
Context analysis in the sentence using rough relations pp. 77-96: Zbigniew M. Wojcik

Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development pp. 223-266: Reinhard Selten
Dominating sets in social network graphs pp. 267-279: Laura L. Kelleher and Margaret B. Cozzens
A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma pp. 281-287: Jean-Pierre Benoit
Symmetric equilibrium with random entry pp. 289-303: Lanny Arvan
Stochastic dominance and Friedman-Savage utility functions pp. 305-317: Dominique Thon and Lars Thorlund-Petersen

Unique finite conjoint measurement pp. 107-143: Peter C. Fishburn and Fred S. Roberts
Equitable distribution of indivisible objects pp. 145-158: Stephen Demko and Theodore P. Hill
Dynamics of the cournot oligopoly with multi-product firms pp. 159-169: Koji Okuguchi and Ferenc Szidarovszky
Trade creation, trade diversion and elastic labor supply pp. 171-179: Amar K. Parai
Estimation of the Leontief inverse from the practitioner's point of view pp. 181-187: Erik Dietzenbacher
Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice pp. 189-201: Nicolas G. Andjiga and Joel Moulen
Choice, hull, continuity and fidelity pp. 203-206: Murat Sertel
Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings pp. 207-209: Ahmet Alkan

Lower bounds on degrees of game-theoretic structures pp. 1-39: Alain A. Lewis
An infinite version of arrow's theorem in the effective setting pp. 41-48: Alain A. Lewis
Population growth and economic development in the very long run: a simulation model of three revolutions pp. 49-63: Gunter Steinmann and John Komlos
The harmonic Gini coefficient and affluence indexes pp. 65-76: Pranab Kumar Sen
Optimal license fees for a new product pp. 77-106: Morton I. Kamien, Yair Tauman and Israel Zang

A model of a sudden-death field-goal football game as a sequential duel pp. 205-215: S. Sahi and Martin Shubik
The Structure of SSB utilities for decision under uncertainty pp. 217-230: P. C. Fishburn and I. H. LaValle
The proportional solution for rights problems pp. 231-246: Youngsub Chun
Strategic irrationality in extensive games pp. 247-260: Kaushik Basu
Induced social welfare functions pp. 261-276: M. F. Janowitz
On numerical representations of semiorders pp. 277-286: Susan H. Gensemer
The bargaining problem with an uncertain conflict outcome pp. 287-302: Zvi A. Livne
Partial and multiple match tournaments pp. 303-306: Wade D. Cook and Moshe Kress
Characterization of monotonicity and neutrality for binary Paretian social decision rules pp. 307-312: Satish Jain

Strategic tariff equilibrium and optimal tariffs pp. 105-134: K. H. Kim and F. W. Roush
Some general theorems on the existence of order-preserving functions pp. 135-143: Ghanshyam Mehta
An alternate approach to axiomatizations of the von Neumann/Morgenstern characteristic function pp. 145-156: Alain A. Lewis and Rangarajan Sundaram
The apartheid malady pp. 157-177: R. Starkermann
The Euclidean distance construction of order homomorphisms pp. 179-188: Douglas S. Bridges
Coalitions in competitive bribery games pp. 189-196: Da-Hsiang Donald Lien
Testing for causality in the Richardson arms race model pp. 197-203: De-piao Tang and David C. H. Yang

The shapley value on some lattices of monotonic games pp. 1-10: Ezra Einy
Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics pp. 11-27: Youngsub Chun and William Thomson
Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods pp. 29-49: Myrna Wooders
Core-like solutions for games with probabilistic choice of strategies pp. 51-60: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points pp. 61-72: Luis Quintas
Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle pp. 73-80: Ruvin Gekker
Extension of an order on a set to the power set: some further observations pp. 81-85: Taradas Bandyopadhyay
Evaluation of the Catalonian Parliament, 1980-1984 pp. 87-92: Francesc Carreras and Guillermo Owen
Characterizing fidelity for reflexive choices pp. 93-95: Murat Sertel
A mathematical organization theory: R.F. Drenick. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 1986, 261 pages pp. 101-101: F. W. Roush
Systems eeconomies: K.A. Fox and D.G. Miles, eds., Ames:Iowa State University Press, 1987, 252 pages, $24.50 pp. 102-102: K. H. Kim