Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 141, issue 3, 2009

The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif pp. 273-275

Avner Greif

Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence pp. 277-290

Oleg Smirnov

The political economy of smoking regulation and taxation pp. 291-303

Aloys Prinz

Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence pp. 305-317

Klarita Gërxhani and Arthur Schram

Earning through learning in legislatures pp. 319-333

Glenn Parker and Suzanne Parker

Productivity growth and funding of public service broadcasting pp. 335-349

Paul Fenn, David Paton and Leighton Vaughan Williams

Buying supermajorities in a stochastic environment pp. 351-369

Patrick Hummel

Hostile takeover and costly merger control pp. 371-389

Oliver Gürtler and Matthias Kräkel

Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas pp. 391-403

Gonzalo Córdoba and Alberto Penadés

Colonial experience and postcolonial underdevelopment in Africa pp. 405-419

Nobuhiro Mizuno and Ryosuke Okazawa

Outsourcing in US cities, ambulances and elderly voters pp. 421-445

Matthew Holian

Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature pp. 447-465

Benoît Le Maux

War and peace—cyclical phenomena? pp. 467-480

Adam Jacobsson

Governance as a strategy in state-of-nature games pp. 481-491

Jason Briggeman

Reporting for sale: the market for news coverage pp. 493-508

John Gasper

Where have all the heroes gone? A rational-choice perspective on heroism pp. 509-522

Stephen Blomberg, Gregory Hess and Yaron Raviv

Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States pp. 523-525

Peter Leeson

James T. Bennett. Stifling Political Competition: How Government Has Rigged the System to Benefit Demopublicans and Exclude Third Parties pp. 527-529

Claudia Williamson

Volume 141, issue 1, 2009

Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government pp. 1-4

Arye Hillman

Hobbes’s Samuel pp. 5-12

Geoffrey Brennan

Hobbes and Samuel: reply pp. 13-15

Arye Hillman

A behavioral power index pp. 17-29

Serguei Kaniovski and Dennis Leech

Bargaining in the shadow of the ballot box: causes and consequences of local voter initiatives pp. 31-48

Tracy Gordon

Tullock’s contest with reimbursements pp. 49-63

Alexander Matros and Daniel Armanios

Vertical transfers and the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy: the case of Brazilian state governments pp. 65-85

Nelson Marconi, Paulo Arvate, João Moura Neto and Paulo Palombo

Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy pp. 87-101

Nicholas Weller

Does economic freedom cause prosperity? An IV approach pp. 103-127

Hugo Faria and Hugo Montesinos

Political pressure deflection pp. 129-150

James Anderson and Maurizio Zanardi

Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results pp. 151-165

Irem Batool and Gernot Sieg

Intergenerational transfers of public sector jobs: a shred of evidence on nepotism pp. 167-188

Vincenzo Scoppa

Governance choice on a serial network pp. 189-212

Feng Xie and David Levinson

Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition pp. 213-232

Thomas Jensen

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence pp. 233-267

Axel Dreher

Steven J. Brams: Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures pp. 269-271

Nicolaus Tideman

Volume 140, issue 3, 2009

The curious citation practices of Avner Greif: Janet Landa comes to grief pp. 275-285

Charles Rowley

On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009 pp. 287-317

Roger Congleton

Financial and world economic crisis: What did economists contribute? pp. 319-327

Friedrich Schneider and Gebhard Kirchgässner

Deregulation despite transitional gains pp. 329-340

Diana Thomas

Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests pp. 341-356

Wolfgang Leininger

How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising pp. 357-377

Thomas Stratmann

Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition pp. 379-394

Johannes Becker, Andreas Peichl and Johannes Rincke

Modeling the influence of polls on elections: a population dynamics approach pp. 395-420

Juan Restrepo, Rosalyn Rael and James Hyman

A principal-agent approach to a self-administered organization with an elected principal pp. 421-429

Robert Dehm and Berthold Wigger

The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment pp. 431-461

Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt

Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin pp. 463-478

Eugenia Belova and Paul Gregory

Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis pp. 479-500

Hartley Furtom, Johannes Sauer and Maria Jensen

Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis pp. 501-501

Hartley Furtan, Johannes Sauer and Maria Jensen

Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey pp. 503-538

Benjamin Powell and Edward Stringham

Donald G. Saari, Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes: Social Choice Analysis pp. 539-542

Michael Munger

Glenn R. Parker. Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills pp. 543-545

Justin Buchler

Volume 140, issue 1, 2009

Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses pp. 1-13

Walter Block and William Barnett

Empirical investigations and their normative interpretations: A reply to Barnett and Block pp. 15-20

Elodie Bertrand

Political influence on historical ESA listings by state: a count data analysis pp. 21-42

Bonnie Harllee, Myungsup Kim and Michael Nieswiadomy

Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion pp. 43-58

Christian Traxler

Can foreign aid reduce income inequality and poverty? pp. 59-84

Alberto Chong, Mark Gradstein and María Calderón

A basic tool set for a generalized directional model pp. 85-104

Eric Linhart and Susumu Shikano

Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries pp. 105-124

Niklas Potrafke

Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment pp. 125-143

Ganna Pogrebna and Pavlo Blavatskyy

Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action pp. 145-160

Kim Sønderskov

The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach pp. 161-184

J. Aronson, James Dearden and Vincent Munley

Leviathan resists: the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance pp. 185-204

Kerim Arin and Mehmet Ulubasoglu

Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy pp. 205-221

Per Fredriksson and Herman R.J. Vollebergh

Attitude-dependent altruism, turnout and voting pp. 223-244

Julio Rotemberg

The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions pp. 245-265

Axel Dreher and Lars-Hinrich Siemers

David M. Primo, Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions pp. 267-270

Michael New

William A. Niskanen. Reflections of a Political Economist: Selected Articles on Government Policies and Political Processes pp. 271-273

Philip Porter