Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 28, issue 1, 1976

Partial justification of the Borda count pp. 1-15

Duncan Black

Electoral strategy under open voting: Evidence from England 1832–1880 pp. 17-35

Jeremy Mitchell

A modest proposal for election reform pp. 37-53

Burton Abrams and Russell Settle

Social pressure and contributions to health charities pp. 55-66

Stephen Long

Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice pp. 67-78

Zane Spindler

Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle pp. 79-88

Peter Fishburn and William Gehrlein

The existence of group preference functions pp. 89-98

Bengt Hansson

Polluters' profit and political response: The dynamics of rights creation pp. 99-105

Warren Samuels and Allan Schmid

A comment on “single-peakedness and guttman scales: Concept and measurement” pp. 107-111

Bernard Grofman

Incomplete information, noisy signals, and uncertainty-averse voting in political elections: A note pp. 113-116

Peter Coughlin

A note on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process pp. 117-119

Richard Cebula

Volume 27, issue 1, 1976

The American experiment in constitutional choice pp. 1-12

Vincent Ostrom

Comments on Vincent Ostrom's paper pp. 13-19

William Riker and Vincent Ostrom

Locational logrolling and citizen support of municipal bond proposals pp. 21-39

J. Archer and David Reynolds

Identification of preference for election outcomes from aggregate voting data pp. 41-58

Anthony Barkume

Public sector decision making and the technology of consumption pp. 59-70

Allan Maslove

The effects of industry concentration and regulation on contributions in three 1972 U. S. senate campaigns pp. 71-80

Russell Pittman

The determinants of voter participation: A more general model pp. 81-89

Russell Settle and Burton Abrams

State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors pp. 91-96

W. Crain and Robert Tollison

Collusion in spatial models of party competition pp. 97-99

Reiner Dinkel

The electoral college and the rational vote pp. 101-107

James Kau and Paul Rubin

Rotc service commitments: A comment pp. 109-111

Samuel Kleinman

Rotc service commitments: A reply pp. 113-114

Harold Bierman and L. Thomas

Costs of voting and nonvoting pp. 115-119

Richard Niemi

Turnout, rational abstention and campaign effort pp. 121-126

Leslie Seidle and David Miller

The theory of environmental policy pp. 127-128

Paul Portney

Redistribution and the welfare system pp. 129-130

Alan Reynolds

The economics of crime and law enforcement pp. 131-131

Gordon Tullock

Neighborhood organization and interest group processes pp. 133-134

Barry Keating

Volume 26, issue 1, 1976

Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles pp. 1-18

William Gehrlein and Peter Fishburn

The voter's paradox and the homogeneity of individual preference orders pp. 19-27

R. Abrams

The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions pp. 29-49

Norman Schofield

Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness pp. 51-58

Jean Blin and Mark Satterthwaite

A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action pp. 59-74

John Chamberlin

Further results on path independence, quasitransitivity, and social choice pp. 75-87

Robert Parks

Sequential decision making: A model pp. 89-103

Barbara Deckard

Global and local equilibrium in majority voting pp. 105-106

Amoz Kats and Shmuel Nitzan

A stochastic model of the committee decision process pp. 107-115

P. Rice

Reply to Nicholas R. Miller pp. 117-118

Peter Bernholz

A note on incompetence pp. 119-127

Howard Margolis

Natural equilibrium in the bush-mayer model of anarchy: A dynamic analysis pp. 129-134

Koji Okuguchi

The measurement of power in voting bodies: A comment on Kushner and Urken pp. 135-140

Prafulla Joglekar

Some further comments on modeling power in voting bodies pp. 141-143

Harvey Kushner and Arnold Urken

A note on clique avoidance in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors pp. 145-150

Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld

Volume 25, issue 1, 1976

The impact of decision rules in multi-candidate campaigns pp. 1-17

Richard Joslyn

Voting methods: A simulation pp. 19-30

William Ludwin

Voter's paradox and logrolling pp. 31-44

Terry Sullivan

Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice pp. 45-61

Richard Wagner

Local government policies and migration: Comment pp. 63-64

Robert Kohn

Local government policies and migration: Reply and extension pp. 65-67

Richard Cebula

A comment on the economics of campaign funds pp. 69-73

Jonathan Silberman

A rejoinder to Silberman pp. 75-77

William Welch

Entropy and size, a clarification pp. 79-80

R. Auster

Adam smith on public choice pp. 81-82

James Buchanan

Endogenous bandwagon and underdog effects in a rational choice model pp. 83-89

Manfred Gärtner

Book reviews pp. 91-93

Charles Clotfelter

Book reviews pp. 95-99

David Davies and Gordon Tullock

Book reviews pp. 101-111

David Friedman, Mark Blaug and R. Cunningham