Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Politics, Economics and the McCarran-Ferguson Act pp. 371-83: M F Brinig
Pricing in the Nuclear Power Industry: Public or Private Interest? pp. 385-96: DeLorme, Charles D,, David R Kamerschen and Thompson, Herbert G,
Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors pp. 397-417: Thomas Havrilesky and John A Gildea
Using Threshold Models to Explain International Relations pp. 419-43: William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg
Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet's Theory of Social Choice? pp. 445-57: Iain McLean and Arnold B Urken
An Assessment of Voting System Simulations pp. 459-87: Hannu Nurmi

An Experimental Study of Expressive Voting pp. 251-60: John R Carter and Stephen D Guerette
The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Real Time Revisions pp. 261-82: Robert E Dorsey
Closeness Counts If It Matters for Electoral Victory: Some Empirical Results for the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany pp. 283-99: Gebhard Kirchgässner and Jorg Schimmelpfenning
Institutional Features of Congressional Decisions: The Fight to Prohibit Smoking on Airlines pp. 301-18: James B Larue and Lawrence S Rothenberg
Presidential Campaign Expenditures: Evidence on Allocations and Effects pp. 319-33: Jonathan Nagler and Jan Leighley
A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games pp. 335-50: David Perez-Castrillo and Thierry Verdier
Measuring the Ideological Preferences of U.S. Presidents: A Proposed (Extremely Simple) Method pp. 351-61: Mark A Zupan

Ethics Laws and the Outside Earnings of Politicians: The Case of Alabama's "Legislator-Educators." pp. 135-45: Jim F Couch, Keith E Atkinson and William Shughart
Equilibria in Multi-party Systems pp. 147-65: Hanneke Hermsen and Albert Verbeek
The Distribution of Honoraria Income in the U.S. Congress: Who Gets Rents in Legislatures and Why? pp. 167-81: Glenn R Parker
The Behavior of Congressional Tenure over Time: 1953-1991 pp. 183-203: W. Reed and D Eric Schansberg
Ownership versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise pp. 205-39: Aidan Vining and Anthony Boardman

Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil pp. 1-19: Roger Congleton and Wendell Sweetser
Testing the Satisficing Version of the Political Business Cycle: 1905-1984 pp. 21-35: Lawrence Davidson, Michele Fratianni and Juergen von Hagen
Governments, Trade Unions and the Macroeconomy: An Expository Analysis of the Political Business Cycle pp. 37-53: Carsten Detken and Manfred Gärtner
Frequency of Paradox in a Common n-Winner Voting Scheme pp. 55-69: Douglas W Mitchell and William N Trumbull
Rationality and the Political Business Cycle: The Case of Local Government pp. 71-81: Jacob Rosenberg
Government-Introduced Price Distortions and Growth: Evidence from Twenty-Nine Developing Countries pp. 83-99: Ram D Singh
Precedence, Privilege, Preferences, Plus Pareto Principle: Some Examples on Egalitarian Ethics and Economic Efficiency pp. 101-15: Bengt-Arne Wickstrom
The Endogenous Public Choice Theorist pp. 117-29: Ulrich Witt

Personal Income Taxes, Elasticities and Fiscal Illusion pp. 101-09: Kenneth V Greene and Brian K Hawley
Rent-Seeking in General Equilibrium: A Didactic Illustration pp. 111-29: Hans G Monissen
Success of a Tax Amnesty: At the Polls, for the FISC? pp. 131-65: Werner W Pommerehne and Peter Zweifel
Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy pp. 167-91: Eric Rasmusen and Mark A Zupan
Representative Voter Theorems pp. 193-212: Paul Rothstein
The Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social Choice Theory pp. 213-36: Arnold B Urken

Trade Union Behaviour and Inter-regional Variations in Unemployment Rates pp. 1-12: Vani Borooah
An Intergenerational Transfer Model of State Debt Financing pp. 13-21: James C Clingermayer
Lobbying and the Measurement of Conventional Welfare Cost pp. 23-36: Roger L Faith
The Political Economy of EC Protectionism: National Protectionism Based on Article 115, Treaty of Rome pp. 37-50: Ludger Schuknecht
The Convergence of Fiscal Regimes and the Decline of the Tiebout Effect pp. 51-59: Gerald W Scully
A Positive Model of Tax Reform pp. 61-86: Ben Van Velthoven and Frans van Winden
Does Additional Campaign Spending Really Hurt Incumbents? The Theoretical Importance of Past Investments in Political Brand Name pp. 87-92: Lott, John R,

Duncan Black: The Founding Father. 23 May 1908-14 January 1991 pp. 125-28: Gordon Tullock
Casual Recollections of an Editor pp. 129-39: Gordon Tullock
Gordon Tullock: Creative Maverick of Public Choice pp. 141-48: Gordon L Brady and Robert Tollison
Gordon Tullock: Entrepreneur of Public Choice pp. 149-69: Charles Rowley
Gordon Tullock: His Journal and His Scholarship pp. 171-96: Garey Durden, Larry Ellis and Steven W Millsaps
A European Public Choice Perspective pp. 197-200: Friedrich Schneider
A Changing of the Guard pp. 201-23: Charles Rowley

Approval Voting in Practice pp. 1-17: Steven Brams and Jack H Nagel
Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents pp. 19-31: John M Mbaku
Rational Addiction, Lagged Demands and the Efficiency of Excise Taxes: Revisions of Standard Theory pp. 33-41: Richard B McKenzie
Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules pp. 43-50: Shmuel Nitzan
The Role of Economic Issues in Elections: The Case of the 1988 Chilean Presidential Referendum pp. 51-59: John Panzer and Ricardo Paredes
Rent-Seeking, Rent-Defending, and Rent Dissipation pp. 61-70: Chris Paul and Al Wilhite
The Choice of Municipal Government Structure and Public Expenditures pp. 71-87: Tim Sass
Evidence of Work Related and Incentive Payments in Gubernatorial Pay pp. 89-100: Pradyot K Sen
An Economic Theory of Persuasion pp. 101-15: Akira Yokoyama