Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 127, issue 3, 2006

The normative turn in public choice pp. 245-250

Steven Brams

An economic analysis of voting in Sweden pp. 251-265

Henrik Jordahl

Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies pp. 267-284

Miltiadis Makris

Voting power and voting blocs pp. 285-303

Dennis Leech and Robert Leech

Information is important to Condorcet jurors pp. 305-319

Ruth Ben-Yashar

Political geography pp. 321-343

Federico Etro

Political competition when media create candidates’ charisma pp. 345-366

Ascension Andina-Diaz

Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen pp. 367-383

Brian Goff

Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy pp. 385-405

Peter Nedergaard

The Effects of Regional Sizing on Growth pp. 407-427

Santiago Lago-Peñas and Bruno Ventelou

Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997 pp. 429-441

John Bradbury and Joseph Johnson

Government Size and Unemployment: Evidence from Industrial Countries pp. 443-459

Horst Feldmann

The impact of closeness on turnout: An empirical relation based on a study of a two-round ballot pp. 461-483

Christine Fauvelle-Aymar and Abel François

Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya pp. 485-489

Michael Munger

The Encyclopedia of Public Choice pp. 491-494

Edward Tower

Volume 127, issue 1, 2006

William C. Mitchell: In memoriam pp. 1-3

Randy Simmons

The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe pp. 5-30

Roger Congleton

Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief pp. 31-53

William Shughart

Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis pp. 55-73

Russell Sobel and Peter Leeson

Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs pp. 75-95

Rune Sørensen

Presidential Power over Supreme Court Decisions pp. 97-121

Joseph Whitmeyer

Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information pp. 123-132

Lambert Schoonbeek and Barbara Winkel

Leviathan in the Crosshairs pp. 133-145

Laurie Bates and Rexford Santerre

Can the two new aid-growth models be replicated? pp. 147-175

Peter Jensen and Martin Paldam

Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter? pp. 177-206

Thomas Stratmann, Francisco J. and Francisco Aparicio

Using state polls to forecast U.S. Presidential election outcomes pp. 207-223

Souren Soumbatiants, Henry Chappell and Eric Johnson

Social dynamics pp. 225-229

Adam Gifford

Fairness versus welfare pp. 231-234

Paul Rubin

The economic effects of constitutions pp. 235-240

Michael Reksulak

The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics pp. 241-243

James Hamilton

Volume 126, issue 1, 2006

Voting by proxy pp. 1-26

Dan Alger

Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets pp. 27-43

Stefan Maus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States pp. 45-73

Guy Holburn and Richard Bergh

Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings pp. 75-85

Craig Depken and Courtney LaFountain

Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation pp. 87-106

Gökhan Karahan, R. Morris Coats and William Shughart

The political economics of not paying taxes pp. 107-134

Jesper Roine

A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter pp. 135-144

J. Atsu Amegashie

The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain pp. 145-176

Albert Solé-Ollé

State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints? pp. 177-199

Gary Wagner and Russell Sobel

The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers pp. 201-224

Rudiger Ahrend and Carlos Winograd

Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis pp. 225-256

Danila Serra

Volume 125, issue 3, 2005

Policy making in divided government: A pivotal actors model with party discipline pp. 247-269

Josep Colomer

Interest group size dynamics and policymaking pp. 271-303

Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans Winden

Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach pp. 305-337

Cecilia Testa

Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model pp. 339-361

Iljoong Kim and Inbae Kim

The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections pp. 363-383

Antoine Auberger and Eric Dubois

Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States pp. 385-407

John Bradbury and W. Crain

A partisan model of government expenditure pp. 409-429

Thomas Bräuninger

The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^* pp. 431-444

James Forder

Political instability and growth in dictatorships pp. 445-470

Jody Overland, Kenneth Simons and Michael Spagat

Gerry Mackie, Democracy defended. Contemporary Political Theory, ed. by Ian Shapiro pp. 471-475

Peter Stone

John R. Lott, Jr., The Bias Against Guns: Why Almost Everything You've Heard About Gun Control is Wrong. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. 349 pages. USD 27.95 (cloth) pp. 477-480

Dennis Coates

Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, Designing federalism: A theory of self-sustainable federal institutions pp. 481-485

Michael Alexeev

Volume 125, issue 1, 2005

Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls pp. 1-15

Michael Berlemann

A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes pp. 17-41

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

Assessing the citizen – candidate model pp. 43-65

Dan Usher

Forming stable coalitions: The process matters pp. 67-94

Steven Brams, Michael Jones and D. Kilgour

The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements pp. 95-127

Michael Finus, Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and Ekko van Ierland

Salience: Agenda choices by competing candidates pp. 129-149

Marcus Berliant and Hideo Konishi

Unanimous constitutional consent and the immigration problem pp. 151-170

Stefan Josten and Klaus Zimmermann

Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study pp. 171-188

Werner Güth, Maria Levati and Rupert Sausgruber

Rigging elections with violence pp. 189-202

Ashish Chaturvedi

Public choice and political philosophy: Reflections on the works of Gordon Spinoza and David Immanuel Buchanan pp. 203-213

Hartmut Kliemt

Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes pp. 215-228

Manfred Holler and Peter Skott

Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War pp. 229-234

William Shughart

Appointing central bankers: The politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions pp. 235-238

Mark Toma

Economic welfare, international business and global institutional change pp. 239-242

Shawn Humphrey

Signaling goodness: Social rules and public choice pp. 243-245

David Laband