Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 159, issue 3, 2014

The costs of collectivization, per se pp. 321-326

James Buchanan and Yong Yoon

Albert Heckscher on collective decision-making pp. 327-339

Eerik Lagerspetz

Did southerners favor slavery? Inferences from an analysis of prices in New Orleans, 1805–1860 pp. 341-361

Jeffrey Grynaviski and Michael Munger

Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat pp. 363-383

Gabriel Leon

Religious decline in the 20th century West: testing alternative explanations pp. 385-414

Raphael Franck and Laurence Iannaccone

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government pp. 415-433

Casper Hunnerup Dahl

Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies pp. 435-455

Lars Feld and Jan Schnellenbach

Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles pp. 457-467

Marek Hanusch and Daniel Magleby

(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalities pp. 469-483

Claus Michelsen, Peter Boenisch and Benny Geys

The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem pp. 485-501

Ellen Seljan

Form vs. substance in selection through competition: elections, markets, and political economy pp. 503-514

Richard Wagner and Deema Yazigi

Third-party threat and the dimensionality of major-party roll call voting pp. 515-531

Daniel Lee

Electoral misgovernance cycles: evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece pp. 533-559

Spyros Skouras and Nicos Christodoulakis

Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis pp. 561-576

Christian Bredemeier

Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner: The Behavior of Federal Judges pp. 577-579

Alison Newman

Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and politics for a stateless society pp. 581-583

Edward Stringham

Francesco Parisi (ed.), Production of Legal Rules, volume 7: Encyclopedia of law and economics (2nd ed.) pp. 585-587

J. Robert Subrick

Zoltan J. Acs: Why Philanthropy Matters: How the Wealthy Give, and What It Means for Our Economic Well-Being pp. 589-593

Lenore Ealy

Dinissa Duvanova: Building business in post-communist Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia: collective goods, selective incentives, and predatory states pp. 595-597

Dalibor Roháč

Volume 159, issue 1, 2014

Common pool size and project size: an empirical test on expenditures using Danish municipal mergers pp. 3-21

Sune Hansen

A correction to Potters and van Winden (1992) pp. 23-26

Jason Weinreb and Joan Ricart-Huguet

On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes pp. 27-52

Joel Guttman and Rafael Reuveny

Participation quorums in costly meetings pp. 53-62

Sabine Flamand and Orestis Troumpounis

How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy pp. 63-82

Matthias Dahm, Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer

Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study pp. 83-98

Onur Doğan and Ayça Giritligil

Returns to effort in rent-seeking games pp. 99-104

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Francesco Parisi

The welfare state, migration, and voting rights pp. 105-120

Christine Fauvelle-Aymar

On the political and fiscal determinants of income redistribution under federalism and democracy: evidence from Germany pp. 121-139

Helmut Herwartz and Bernd Theilen

Exploring the nature of inter-country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements: the case of the Kyoto Protocol pp. 141-158

Alexandre Sauquet

Voters, dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality pp. 159-176

Emir Kamenica and Louisa Egan Brad

Can democracy induce development? A constitutional perspective pp. 177-196

Hans Gersbach and Lars-Hinrich Siemers

Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition pp. 197-218

John Jackson

Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition pp. 219-234

Sivan Frenkel

A preferential attachment model of campaign contributions in state legislative elections pp. 235-249

Greg Vonnahme

Legislative budget cycles pp. 251-275

Cameron Shelton

The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England pp. 277-298

Mark Koyama

Erratum to: Douglas W. Allen: The institutional revolution: measurement and the economic emergence of the modern world pp. 299-299

Karen Clay

Richard E. Wagner: Deficits, debt, and democracy: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons pp. 301-303

Adam Martin

Jeff D. Makholm: The political economy of pipelines: a century of comparative institutional development pp. 305-307

Robert Bradley

John Tomasi: Free market fairness pp. 309-311

John Thrasher

Wayne A. Leighton and Edward J. López: Madmen, intellectuals, and academic scribblers: the economic engine of political change pp. 313-315

Michael Thomas

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty pp. 317-320

Atin Basuchoudhary

Volume 158, issue 3, 2014

Empirical social choice: an introduction pp. 297-310

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox pp. 311-330

Adrian Deemen

Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate? pp. 331-357

T. Tideman and Florenz Plassmann

An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule pp. 359-382

Keith Dougherty, Brian Pitts, Justin Moeller and Robi Ragan

Cycles and instability in politics. Evidence from the 2009 Danish municipal elections pp. 383-397

Malthe Munkøe

The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post: a social choice analysis of simulated data based on English elections, 1992–2010 pp. 399-425

Nicholas Miller

The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election pp. 427-463

Maria Gallego, Norman Schofield, Kevin McAlister and Jee Jeon

Modeling the effects of changing issue salience in two-party competition pp. 465-482

Scott Feld, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman

Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975 pp. 483-497

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Insincere voting under the successive procedure pp. 499-511

Bjørn Rasch

A Danish killer amendment—when judicial review was banned from the 1849 Constitution pp. 513-523

Mogens Pedersen

Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009 pp. 525-539

Steven Brams, Gustavo Camilo and Alexandra Franz

Sophisticated and myopic? Citizen preferences for Electoral College reform pp. 541-558

John Aldrich, Jason Reifler and Michael Munger

Equilibrium institutions: the federal-proportional trade-off pp. 559-576

Josep Colomer

Institutions, information, and faction: an experimental test of Riker’s federalism thesis for political parties pp. 577-588

John Aldrich, Michael Munger and Jason Reifler

Erratum to: The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule Versus First-Past-The-Post: A Social Choice Analysis of Simulated Data Based on English Elections, 1992–2010 pp. 589-589

Nicholas Miller

Volume 158, issue 1, 2014

Betty Tillman pp. 1-2

Donald Boudreaux

Betty Tillman: a remembrance pp. 3-4

Dwight Lee

A tribute to Betty Tillman pp. 5-6

Richard McKenzie

Remembering Betty Tillman pp. 7-8

Karen Vaughn

Betty Tillman, a remembrance of times long ago pp. 9-10

Richard Wagner

Property and markets in Elmer Kelton novels pp. 11-19

Randy Simmons

The political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities pp. 21-38

Dashle Kelley

Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral dilemmas from Locke’s Venditio pp. 39-49

Ricardo Guzmán and Michael Munger

The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council pp. 51-83

Axel Dreher, Matthew Gould, Matthew Rablen and James Vreeland

Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power pp. 85-100

John Meadowcroft

Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence pp. 101-120

Dimitrios Xefteris

The devil is in the shadow. Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity? pp. 121-141

Axel Dreher, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Friedrich Schneider

The role of political partisanship during economic crises pp. 143-165

Vincenzo Galasso

Do intergovernmental grants create ratchets in state and local taxes? pp. 167-187

Russell Sobel and George Crowley

Can corruption foster regulatory compliance? pp. 189-207

Fabio Mendez

Why do crises go to waste? Fiscal austerity and public service reform pp. 209-220

David Hugh-Jones

Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Evidence from Chinese villages pp. 221-242

Li Han

Taking dictatorship seriously: a reply to Quesada pp. 243-251

Greg Fried

Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: Rejoinder to Fried pp. 253-259

Antonio Quesada

Law-and-economics: why Gordon Tullock prefers Napoleon Bonaparte over the Duke of Wellington; and why he may end up on St. Helena pp. 261-279

Jennis Biser

Douglas W. Allen: The institutional revolution: measurement and the economic emergency of the modern world pp. 281-283

Karen Clay

Gunnar Trumbull: Strength in numbers: the political power of weak interests pp. 285-288

George Crowley

Ronald Coase, Ning Wang: How China became capitalist pp. 289-291

Nara Dillon and William Keech

Allan H. Meltzer: why capitalism? pp. 293-295

Diana Thomas