Public Choice
1966 - 2025
Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II From Springer Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 139, issue 3, 2009
- Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics pp. 263-272

- Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson
- Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little? pp. 273-299

- Charles Rowley and Nathanael Smith
- Campaign contributions as a commitment device pp. 301-315

- Zacharias Maniadis
- Seat-vote curves, loyalty effects and the provincial distribution of Canadian government spending pp. 317-333

- Vaughan Dickson
- The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players pp. 335-342

- Takeshi Yamazaki
- It’s the economy, and then some: modeling the presidential vote with state panel data pp. 343-356

- Leo Kahane
- Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding pp. 357-369

- Gil Epstein and Yosef Mealem
- Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance pp. 371-387

- Claudia Williamson
- Fiscal adjustments: do labor and product market institutions matter? pp. 389-411

- Athanasios Tagkalakis
- Coalition politics and accountability pp. 413-428

- Áron Kiss
- Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes? pp. 429-441

- Frank Daumann and Alfred Wassermann
- The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract pp. 443-459

- Peter Leeson
- Choice of law and legal evolution: rethinking the market for legal rules pp. 461-492

- Emanuela Carbonara and Francesco Parisi
- Federal, state, and local governments: evaluating their separate roles in US growth pp. 493-507

- Matthew Higgins, Andrew Young and Daniel Levy
Volume 139, issue 1, 2009
- Editorial announcement pp. 1-1

- William Shughart
- The legacy of Bismarck pp. 3-3

- Gordon Tullock
- Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects pp. 5-19

- Leif Helland and Rune Sørensen
- Pivotal states in the Electoral College, 1880 to 2004 pp. 21-37

- John Wright
- (When and how) do voters try to manipulate? pp. 39-52

- Sebastian Kube and Clemens Puppe
- The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion pp. 53-59

- Eyal Baharad and Ruth Ben-Yashar
- Educational business cycles pp. 61-82

- Markus Tepe and Pieter Vanhuysse
- Political decision of risk reduction: the role of trust pp. 83-104

- Meglena Jeleva and Stéphane Rossignol
- Factors explaining local privatization: a meta-regression analysis pp. 105-119

- Germà Bel and Xavier Fageda
- Third parties in equilibrium: comment and correction pp. 121-124

- Haldun Evrenk
- The political trend in local government tax setting pp. 125-134

- Raffaella Santolini
- An econometric analysis of counterterrorism effectiveness: the impact on life and property losses pp. 135-151

- Konstantinos Drakos and Nicholas Giannakopoulos
- Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest pp. 153-158

- Lambert Schoonbeek
- More evidence of the effects of voting technology on election outcomes pp. 159-170

- Maarten Allers and Peter Kooreman
- Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase pp. 171-196

- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Sander Onderstal and Francesco Parisi
- The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini pp. 197-225

- Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt and Carsten Wolf
- How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study pp. 227-240

- Charles Raux, Stéphanie Souche-Le Corvec and Yves Croissant
- Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy pp. 241-262

- Robert Deacon
Volume 138, issue 3, 2009
- Political competition and economic performance: evidence from the Italian regions pp. 263-277

- Fabio Padovano and Roberto Ricciuti
- General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch pp. 279-299

- Russell Golman and Scott Page
- Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence pp. 301-315

- Daniel Horgos and Klaus Zimmermann
- The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of terrorism pp. 317-345

- Bruno Frey, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer
- A model of candidate location with endogenous valence pp. 347-366

- Alexei Zakharov
- Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program pp. 367-386

- Scott Carrell and Janice Hauge
- Political institutions and debt crises pp. 387-408

- Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder di Mauro
- Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale pp. 409-422

- Yong Sui
- Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes pp. 423-446

- Andreas Haufler, Alexander Klemm and Guttorm Schjelderup
- What explains attitudes across US trade policies? pp. 447-460

- Michael Hoffman
- The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment pp. 461-474

- Marcus Drometer and Johannes Rincke
- The change in aggregate budget behavior in the 1990s: a cointegration-error correction model analysis pp. 475-482

- Paul Blackley
- Government spending and happiness of the population: additional evidence from large cross-country samples pp. 483-490

- Rati Ram
- Andreas Bergh and Rolf Höijer, eds., Institutional Competition pp. 491-492

- Randall Holcombe
- Wilfried Ver Eecke. Ethical Dimensions of the Economy: Making Use of Hegel and the Concepts of Public and Merit Goods pp. 493-494

- Randall Holcombe
Volume 138, issue 1, 2009
- Rejoinder to “The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment” pp. 1-2

- Justin Buchler
- How to avoid transferring a valuable asset pp. 3-8

- Sam Bucovetsky and Amihai Glazer
- The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures pp. 9-27

- Yogesh Uppal
- Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability pp. 29-44

- Ronen Bar-El
- Pre-electoral commitments and government formation pp. 45-64

- Marc Debus
- Labor market institutions and income inequality: an empirical exploration pp. 65-81

- Cesar Calderon and Alberto Chong
- False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate pp. 83-95

- Franklin Mixon, Rand Ressler and M. Gibson
- Patriotism, pigskins, and politics: an empirical examination of expressive behavior and voting pp. 97-108

- David Laband, Ram Pandit, John Sophocleus and Anne Laband
- Does Wal-Mart reduce social capital? pp. 109-136

- Art Carden, Charles Courtemanche and Jeremy Meiners
- Ideologies, vested interest groups, and postal saving privatization in Japan pp. 137-160

- Masami Imai
- Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry pp. 161-169

- Paul Pecorino
- Non-voted ballots, the cost of voting, and race pp. 171-197

- John Lott
- Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study pp. 199-216

- Maria Levati, Andrea Morone and Annamaria Fiore
- The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment pp. 217-219

- Randall Holcombe
- Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology pp. 221-238

- Michael Ensley
- Voting on income tax exemptions pp. 239-253

- Salvatore Barbaro and Jens Suedekum
- Magnus Henrekson and Robin Douhan: The political economy of entrepreneurship, 2 vols pp. 255-256

- Randall Holcombe
- Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy pp. 257-258

- Friedrich Schneider
- Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe, eds., The Economics of Transparency in Politics pp. 259-261

- Christopher Coyne
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