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Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

From Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

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Volume 3, issue 1, 1967

The central argument in Lewis Carroll's The Principles of Parliamentary Representation pp. 1-17 Downloads
Duncan Black
Models of the working of a two-party electoral system — I pp. 19-37 Downloads
David Chapman
Should “public goods” be public? pp. 39-47 Downloads
Francesco Forte
The rationale of revolt pp. 49-66 Downloads
Thomas Ireland
The peculiar economics of disaster pp. 67-83 Downloads
Howard Kunreuther
A utility analysis of post-disaster co-operation pp. 85-90 Downloads
Louis Alessi
On paradigms in political science and economics pp. 91-92 Downloads
Lewis Froman
The Rand-Parkinson effect pp. 93-96 Downloads
Gordon Tullock
Book review pp. 97-105 Downloads
Gordon Tullock, Louis Alessi, Joseph Spengler and Mark Pauley

Volume 2, issue 1, 1967

Fiscal policy and fiscal preference pp. 1-10 Downloads
James Buchanan
Ethics and game theory: The prisoner's dilemma pp. 11-26 Downloads
R. Cunningham
Constitutional asymmetry pp. 27-44 Downloads
David Tuerck
A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes pp. 45-59 Downloads
Charles Plott
Alternative voting rules and local expenditure: The town-meeting vs. city pp. 61-70 Downloads
Harvey Wheeler
A rational theory of the federal budgeting process pp. 71-89 Downloads
Oliver Williamson
A note on supplemental appropriations in the federal budgetary process pp. 91-101 Downloads
Gary Bowman, Otto Davis, Henry Gailliot and Alan Hess
Review pp. 103-104 Downloads
Roger Sherman
Bibliography of recent works in non-market decision making pp. 105-118 Downloads
Mark Pauly

Volume 1, issue 1, 1966

Preface pp. i-ii Downloads
Gordon Tullock
A simple theory of non-cooperative games with ordinal utilities (1) pp. 1-48 Downloads
Duncan Black
Individual interests and collective action pp. 49-62 Downloads
James Coleman
On the process of budgeting: An empirical study of congressional appropriation pp. 63-132 Downloads
Otto Davis, M. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky
A pareto optimal group decision process pp. 133-140 Downloads
E. Thompson
Information without profit pp. 141-159 Downloads
Gordon Tullock
Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs: A review article pp. 161-170 Downloads
Richard Wagner
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