Public Choice
1966 - 2025
Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II
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Volume 3, issue 1, 1967
- The central argument in Lewis Carroll's The Principles of Parliamentary Representation pp. 1-17

- Duncan Black
- Models of the working of a two-party electoral system — I pp. 19-37

- David Chapman
- Should “public goods” be public? pp. 39-47

- Francesco Forte
- The rationale of revolt pp. 49-66

- Thomas Ireland
- The peculiar economics of disaster pp. 67-83

- Howard Kunreuther
- A utility analysis of post-disaster co-operation pp. 85-90

- Louis Alessi
- On paradigms in political science and economics pp. 91-92

- Lewis Froman
- The Rand-Parkinson effect pp. 93-96

- Gordon Tullock
- Book review pp. 97-105

- Gordon Tullock, Louis Alessi, Joseph Spengler and Mark Pauley
Volume 2, issue 1, 1967
- Fiscal policy and fiscal preference pp. 1-10

- James Buchanan
- Ethics and game theory: The prisoner's dilemma pp. 11-26

- R. Cunningham
- Constitutional asymmetry pp. 27-44

- David Tuerck
- A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes pp. 45-59

- Charles Plott
- Alternative voting rules and local expenditure: The town-meeting vs. city pp. 61-70

- Harvey Wheeler
- A rational theory of the federal budgeting process pp. 71-89

- Oliver Williamson
- A note on supplemental appropriations in the federal budgetary process pp. 91-101

- Gary Bowman, Otto Davis, Henry Gailliot and Alan Hess
- Review pp. 103-104

- Roger Sherman
- Bibliography of recent works in non-market decision making pp. 105-118

- Mark Pauly
Volume 1, issue 1, 1966
- Preface pp. i-ii

- Gordon Tullock
- A simple theory of non-cooperative games with ordinal utilities (1) pp. 1-48

- Duncan Black
- Individual interests and collective action pp. 49-62

- James Coleman
- On the process of budgeting: An empirical study of congressional appropriation pp. 63-132

- Otto Davis, M. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky
- A pareto optimal group decision process pp. 133-140

- E. Thompson
- Information without profit pp. 141-159

- Gordon Tullock
- Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs: A review article pp. 161-170

- Richard Wagner