Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Aneconomic analysis of government ownership and reculation pp. 1-42: Louis Alessi
The carrot and the stick pp. 43-61: Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer
An experiment in public choice pp. 63-75: J. Giertz
The Gpitpc and institutional entropy pp. 77-83: R. Auster
Local government policies and migration pp. 85-93: Richard Cebula
Mixed goods and bads pp. 95-105: Bruce Yandle
Fiscal preference and balanced budget fiscal policy pp. 107-109: Ryan Amacher and Robert Tollison
Economic theory of democracy pp. 111-115: Michael Boss
The fate of solzhenitsyn pp. 117-120: Pham Chung
Transaction costs, uncertainty, and externalities pp. 121-122: Adam Gifford
Laborintensity, productivity, and the growth of the federal sector pp. 123-126: William Orzechowski
Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy pp. 127-131: Gordon Tullock
Vote earning versus vote losing properties of minimum wage laws pp. 133-137: E. West
More on minimum wages and political clout pp. 137-138: Frank Steindl
Reviews pp. 139-150: Anatol Rapoport, Howard Tuckman, John Ferejohn, Bruce Buchanan and Robert Butterworth

Game-theoretic models of bloc-voting under proportional representation pp. 1-23: Howard Rosenthal
Artificial markets and the theory of games pp. 25-40: W. Montgomery
Cycles of risk pp. 41-66: Richard McKelvey and Jeff Richelson
Voting behavior and aggregate policy targets pp. 67-81: Susan Lepper
On social restriction of individual freedom pp. 83-92: Rubin Saposnik
The calculus of rational choice pp. 93-105: William Stratmann
Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior pp. 107-126: Martin McGuire
Reviews pp. 127-131: John Chamberlin and Gordon Tullock

On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society pp. 1-10: Uri Ben-Zion and Zeev Eytan
When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be pp. 11-25: Steven Brams and John Heilman
Toward a general theory of managerial discretion pp. 27-47: Jean-Luc Migué, Gérard Bélanger and William Niskanen
Some observations on the political economy of property tax reform pp. 49-62: Ralph Miner
Political revolution and repression: An economic approach pp. 63-71: Morris Silver
A description and explanation of citizen participation in a canadian municipality pp. 73-83: Mark Sproule-Jones
Bargaining costs and social choice under uncertainty pp. 85-91: Antonio Barbosa
Pareto optimal growth pp. 93-97: John Blair and Walter Chatfield
Hegel on the calculus of voting pp. 99-101: James Buchanan
Economic competition and political competition: Comments and corrections pp. 103-106: Noel Edelson
The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions pp. 107-109: Thomas McCaleb
Dynamic consistency in constitutions pp. 111-113: John Yeabsley
Reviews pp. 115-129: Donald Wittman, Bruno Frey, Richard Rosett, Ray Whitman, Gordon Tullock, David Marwick, John Wanat, George Furstenberg and Oran Young

Efficiency in the provision of fire services pp. 1-15: Rogers Ahlbrandt
Democratic organization: A preliminary mathematical model pp. 17-26: Raphael Kazmann
Normative assumptions in the study of public choice pp. 27-41: Duncan MacRae
A note on the empirical nature of the taxpayer rebellion pp. 43-50: John Mikesell and John Blair
Is the act of voting rational? pp. 51-58: Yoram Barzel and Eugene Silberberg
Some simple economics of voting and not voting pp. 59-71: R. Tollison and T. Willett
A note on collective goods and the theory of political entrepreneurship pp. 73-75: Jeffrey Richelson
The rhodesian constitution and predictions for political stability pp. 77-80: Ewen Wilson
The economic theory of politics: A survey of german contributions pp. 81-89: Bruno Frey and Rene Frey
Reviews pp. 91-97: James Buchanan, Winston Bush, Louis Alessi and Warren Samuels
Collective Goods and Collective Decision Mechanisms pp. 98-98: Richard Auster and Morris Silver

Editor's note pp. i-i: Gordon Tullock
Indifference, alientation and rational decisions pp. 1-17: Richard Brody and Benjamin Page
Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games pp. 19-48: Judith Sloss
An economic approach to social choice pp. 49-75: Trout Rader
Measuring power in voting bodies pp. 77-85: Harvey Kushner and Arnold Urken
Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities pp. 87-95: Peter Bernholz
The hunting of the paradox pp. 97-102: Roger Marz, Thomas Casstevens and Harold Casstevens
The paradox of voting pp. 103-117: Thomas Hansen and Barry Prince
Communications pp. 119-119: I. Good