Public Choice
1966 - 2025
Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II From Springer Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 34, issue 3, 1979
- Federal tax burdens and grant benefits to states: The impact of imperfect representation pp. 255-269

- James Bennett and Eddie Mayberry
- The cost of voting: Its fiscal impact on government pp. 271-284

- Robert McCormick and Richard McKenzie
- Property tax consciousness pp. 285-295

- Peter Ordeshook
- Dynamic models of the voter's decision calculus: Incorporating retrospective considerations into rational-choice models of individual voting behavior pp. 297-315

- Martin Zechman
- Local fiscal crises and intergovernmental grants: A suggested hypothesis pp. 317-331

- Roger Faith
- Budget-maximizing agencies and efficiency in government pp. 333-357

- Thomas McGuire, Michael Coiner and Larry Spancake
- Non-monetary competition for students within the university pp. 359-363

- John Lewis and T. Cott
- Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A graphical exposition pp. 365-380

- Manfred Gärtner
- The expenditure effects of alternative public supply institutions pp. 381-397

- Robert Deacon
- The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress pp. 399-418

- Linda Fowler
- Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures pp. 419-434

- Joe Oppenheimer
- Some aspects of the political economy of election campaign contribution laws pp. 435-461

- Peter Aranson and Melvin Hinich
- A note on the optimal use of clearance procedures pp. 463-466

- David Weimer
- Bureaucracy and grants-in-aid pp. 467-471

- Joseph Magaddino and Roger Meiners
- Coupon rationing and rent-seeking bureaucrats pp. 473-479

- Marilyn Flowers and Richard Stroup
- On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees: A perverse result pp. 481-491

- Robert Mackay and Carolyn Weaver
- Complexity as a characteristic of policies in Albert Breton's economic theory of representative government pp. 493-498

- Lawrence Bezeau
- Government as a super Becker-altruist pp. 499-504

- Bruce Bolnick
- A further note on migration patterns and local government policy toward public education pp. 505-507

- Anthony Ostrosky
Volume 34, issue 2, 1979
- A simple direction model of electoral competition pp. 141-156

- Steven Matthews
- Vote trading in a legislative context: An analysis of cooperative and noncooperative strategic voting pp. 157-175

- James Enelow and David Koehler
- Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions pp. 177-188

- Allan Feldman
- Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies pp. 189-200

- Bernard Grofman
- Electoral College reform and the distribution of voting power pp. 201-215

- Douglas Blair
- Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments pp. 217-230

- James Buchanan and Roger Congleton
- On the appeal (or is it repeal?) of minimum wage laws: A reply to Browning pp. 231-232

- Frank Steindl
- Reviews pp. 233-254

- David Friedman, Alan Waters, John Moore, Bernard Lentz and Gordon Tullock
Volume 34, issue 1, 1979
- Rent-seeking competition in political parties pp. 5-14

- Robert McCormick and Robert Tollison
- Public interest lobbies: membership and influence pp. 45-54

- James Kau and Paul Rubin
- Public versus private provision of collective goods and services: garbage collection revisited pp. 55-63

- James Bennett and Manuel Johnson
- The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting pp. 69-85

- Richard Bensel and M. Sanders
- Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous pp. 87-97

- Ehud Kalai, Eitan Muller and Mark Satterthwaite
- Class conflict and fairness in “democratic capitalism” pp. 99-116

- Yvo Dirickx and Murat Sertel
- The impact of institutional structures on city-country consolidation outcomes pp. 117-122

- Mark Toma
- Pareto-optimality and gains-form-trade: a public choice interpretation pp. 123-127

- Charles Rowley and Martin Walker
- Living costs, the Tiebout hypothesis, and welfare policy pp. 129-130

- Richard Cebula
Volume 33, issue 4, 1978
- Pigouvian policies in closed behavioral systems pp. 5-26

- Peter Aranson, Terry Ferrar and Peter Sassone
- Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo pp. 27-43

- Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal
- Testing political economy’s ‘as if’ proposition: is the median income voter really decisive? pp. 45-65

- Robert Inman
- The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter pp. 67-83

- Francisco Arcelus, Gary Mauser and Zane Spindler
- State tax structure and the supply of AFDC assistance pp. 85-96

- Hugh Spall
- A collective goods model of pluralist political systems pp. 97-113

- John Chamberlin
- Agency budgets and the use of eligibility rules pp. 115-130

- Robin Walther and Jeffrey Chapman
- A note on nonwhite migration: welfare levels and the political process: a comment pp. 131-134

- S. Jones-Hendrickson
- Nonwhite migration, welfare, and politics: a re-examination pp. 135-136

- Richard Cebula
Volume 33, issue 3, 1978
- Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections pp. 5-13

- Ryan Amacher and William Boyes
- An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation amendment pp. 15-26

- Steve Mariotti
- The rational voter: an analysis of two Atlanta referenda on rapid transit pp. 27-44

- Larry Schroeder and David Sjoquist
- Constitutional guarantees and the distribution of power and wealth pp. 45-63

- Jürgen Backhaus
- On the stability of logrolling outcomes in stochastic games pp. 65-82

- Peter Bernholz
- Campaign spending and votes: a reconsideration pp. 83-92

- Ron Johnston
- Revenue sharing and monopoly government pp. 93-97

- Richard McKenzie and Robert Staaf
- Election periods and state tax policy cycles pp. 99-106

- John Mikesell
- Donor optimization and the food stamp program: comment pp. 107-111

- Edgar Browning
- On the political economy of food stamps pp. 113-117

- J. Giertz and Dennis Sullivan
- A note on providing public goods through voluntary contributions pp. 119-123

- Clarence Morrison
- An alternative campaign finance reform: public “laundries” for secret cash contributions pp. 125-127

- John Beck
- Reviews pp. 129-133

- Robert Tollison, Barry Keating and James Buchanan
Volume 33, issue 2, 1978
- A linear inequality method of establishing certain social choice conjectures pp. 5-16

- J. Chamberlin and Malcolm Cohen
- An economic approach to social choice — II pp. 17-31

- Ted Bergstrom and Trout Rader
- Social choice and economic growth pp. 33-48

- Nathaniel Beck
- The inevitability of the “paradox of redistribution” in the allocation of voting weights pp. 49-67

- Dietrich Fischer and Andrew Schotter
- The effects of abstentions on election outcomes pp. 69-82

- William Gehrlein and Peter Fishburn
- Some evidence on non-voting models in the spatial theory of electoral competition pp. 83-102

- Melvin Hinich
- Revealed public preference and social utility pp. 103-115

- Perry Shapiro
- The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic society: a generalization pp. 117-120

- Lawrence Kenny
- What happens when majority rule breaks down? pp. 121-126

- Colin Bell
- Empirical estimates for the likelihood of a divided verdict in a presidental election pp. 127-133

- Samuel Merrill
Volume 33, issue 1, 1978
- Pareto on public choice pp. 5-17

- Jurgen Backhaus
- The evaluation of corporate contributions pp. 19-28

- Ferdinand Levy and Gloria Shatto
- The ‘crowding-out’ effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions pp. 29-39

- Burton Abrams and Mark Schitz
- Coordination and the management of estuarine water quality pp. 41-53

- Mark Sproule-Jones
- Optimality and the institutional structure of bureaucracy pp. 55-59

- Randall Holcombe and Edward Price
- On the distributional implications of collective provision of public goods pp. 61-69

- Mo-Yin Tam and Joseph Persky
- Politicians and property rights pp. 71-74

- Adam Gifford and Gary Santoni
- Strategic voting and the borda method pp. 85-90

- William Ludwin
- More on the appeal of minimum wage laws pp. 91-93

- Edgar Browning
- Fiscal illusion, the nature of public goods and equation specification pp. 95-100

- Vincent Munley and Kenneth Greene
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