Public Choice
1966 - 2025
Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II
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Volume 37, issue 3, 1981
- Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition pp. 389-402

- David Austen-Smith
- Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests pp. 403-423

- Lee Dutter
- Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting pp. 425-434

- Peter Fishburn and Steven Brams
- Instability in voluntary contributions based upon jointness in supply pp. 435-445

- Ralph Frasca
- Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting pp. 447-472

- Robert Mackay and Carolyn Weaver
- The firm's objective function as a collective choice problem pp. 473-486

- Frank Milne
- The universal-instability theorem pp. 487-501

- Thomas Schwartz
- Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice pp. 503-519

- Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast
- Political power and the market for governors pp. 521-529

- Burton Abrams
- Choice models and voting behaviour: The case of the Dutch electorate pp. 531-546

- Fred Bronner and Robert Hoog
- Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance pp. 547-558

- Bev Dahlby
- An empirical assessment of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis pp. 559-568

- Thomas Dilorenzo
- The expenditure effects of restricting competition in local public service industries: The case of special districts pp. 569-578

- Thomas Dilorenzo
- Agenda control and budget size: An extension of the Romer-Rosenthal model pp. 579-584

- Marilyn Flowers
- Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A comment pp. 585-588

- Chris Goodrich
- Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A reply pp. 589-593

- Manfred Gärtner
- Government as a super Becker-altruist: A comment pp. 595-601

- R. Terrebonne
- Government as a super Becker-altruist: A reply pp. 603-606

- Bruce Bolnick
- Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A comment pp. 607-608

- Brian Beavis and Martin Walker
- Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A reply pp. 609-609

- Gene Mumy
- Reviews pp. 611-620

- James Buchanan, James Bennett, Carl Dahlman, William Niskanen and Gordon Tullock
Volume 37, issue 2, 1981
- Why so much stability pp. 189-204

- Gordon Tullock
- The determinants of voting by the National Labor Relations Board on unfair labor practice cases: 1955–1975 pp. 207-218

- Charles Delorme, R. Hill and Norman Wood
- Citations as an indicator of classic works and major contributors in social choice pp. 219-230

- Paul Downing and Elizabeth Stafford
- Towards a theory of yes-no voting pp. 231-245

- Roger Faith and James Buchanan
- Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war pp. 247-260

- Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito
- The size of government pp. 261-274

- James Kau and Paul Rubin
- Second best and monopoly: A cautionary tale pp. 275-285

- Clarence Morrison
- An essay on the rationality of economic policy: The test-case of the electional cycle pp. 287-305

- Martin Paldam
- Bureaucratic politics and the labor market pp. 307-320

- William Peirce
- Voting with one's feet: A brief note on the case of public welfare and the American Indian pp. 321-325

- Leonard Carlson and Richard Cebula
- A note on the determinants of AFDC policies pp. 327-330

- Richard Cebula
- Conflict of interest and congressional voting: A note pp. 331-335

- Henry Chappell
- Representation of high demand constituencies on review committees: A research note pp. 337-342

- Susan Cowart
- A note on politics and franchise bidding pp. 343-348

- Robert Ekelund and Richard Saba
- The impact of different government units in the regulation of the workplace environment pp. 349-356

- Michael Marlow
- A theory of government enterprise: University Ph. D. production pp. 357-363

- David Sisk
- Revenue sharing and monopoly government: A comment pp. 365-370

- David Friedman and Michael Kurth
- Revenue sharing and monopoly government: A reply pp. 371-374

- Richard McKenzie and Robert Staaf
- The Borda Game: A correction pp. 375-376

- Roy Gardner
- Reviews pp. 377-388

- Thomas Willett, David Laband, Todd Sandler, David Davies and Douglass North
Volume 37, issue 1, 1981
- The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison pp. 5-31

- Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette
- Comment: The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison pp. 33-39

- Thomas Borcherding
- Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology pp. 41-59

- Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator
- Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology pp. 61-68

- Robert Mackay
- Regulation, redistribution, and public choice pp. 69-100

- Peter Aranson and Peter Ordeshook
- Comments on Aranson & Ordeshook's regulation, redistribution, and public choice pp. 101-105

- Thomas Moore
- Legislators, bureaucrats, and locational decisions pp. 107-132

- R. Arnold
- Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond pp. 133-140

- Joe Oppenheimer
- Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence pp. 141-178

- Dennis Epple and Katherine Schipper
- "Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence" by Dennis Epple and Katherine Schipper pp. 179-187

- Robert Inman