Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Laissez-faire in campaign finance pp. 201-212: W. Crain, Robert Tollison and Donald Leavens
The median voter, setters, and non-repeated construction bond issues pp. 213-231: Rodney Fort
Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’? pp. 233-247: Alphons Kragt, Robyn Dawes and John Orbell
Financing the unemployment insurance system and the interest group theory of government pp. 249-258: Michael Maloney and Rob McGregor
Fiscal decentralization and government size pp. 259-269: Michael Marlow
Bureaucracy and the ‘publicness’ of local public goods pp. 271-284: Paul Wyckoff
The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis, inequality-transfer curve and the natural distribution of income pp. 285-294: Richard Vedder, Lowell Gallaway and David Sollars
On the political participation of the firm in the electoral process: An update pp. 295-298: Michael Munger

Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science pp. 101-119: William Mitchell
State government purchases in a federalist economy pp. 121-130: Steven Craig and Joel Sailors
Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government pp. 131-152: Charlotte Twight
The Calculus of consent: A Wicksellian retrospective pp. 153-166: Richard Wagner
Regulators, legislators and budget manipulation pp. 167-180: Bruce Yandle
Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count? pp. 181-184: Roger Congleton
The economic model of voter participation: A further test pp. 185-192: Tikva Darvish and Jacob Rosenberg
Government and economic growth: A non-linear relationship pp. 193-200: Philip Grossman

Rent seekers who demand government production: Bureaucratic output and the price of complements pp. 3-16: Bruce Benson and Jean Mitchell
The design of rent-seeking competitions pp. 17-29: Robert Michaels
Is political rivalry an incentive to vote? pp. 31-43: Henri Capron and Jean-Louis Kruseman
A forecasting model for state expenditures pp. 45-55: Jane Leuthold
Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario, Canada pp. 57-67: Michael McKee
Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment pp. 69-72: Steven Deller and David Chicoine
Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Reply pp. 73-76: Rexford Santerre
Morals by agreement pp. 89-96: Frank Forman

How (and why) Congress twists its own arm: The political economy of tax-funded politics pp. 199-213: James Bennett and Thomas Dilorenzo
The fairness of discounting: A majority rule approach pp. 215-226: Stephen Brown
On the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility pp. 227-244: Winston Chang and Lawrence Southwick
Institutional structure, finance, and race in higher education: Public-private sectoral differences pp. 257-264: G. Sav
Bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output: Further econometric evidence pp. 265-272: N. Vasudeva Murthy
Auctions, experiments and contingent valuation pp. 273-289: Robin Gregory and Lita Furby
Markets and the measurement of value pp. 291-297: Don Coursey

Introduction pp. 1-3: Allan Meltzer, Keith Poole and Thomas Romer
The lessons of 1787 pp. 5-34: William Riker
Comment on the Riker paper pp. 35-39: Douglass North
Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting pp. 41-73: Dennis Epple and Michael Riordan
A comment on the Epple and Riordan paper pp. 75-79: Edward Green
Reputation and legislative leadership pp. 81-119: Randall Calvert
Comment on the Calvert paper pp. 121-126: Daniel Ingberman
Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice pp. 127-160: Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette
Comments on the Dudley and Montmarquette paper pp. 161-162: Edwin Mills
A public and private-choice model of broadcasting pp. 163-187: Eli Noam
The economics and political economy of broadcasting: challenges in developing an analytic foundation pp. 189-198: Steven Garber

Rational, adaptive and learning behavior of voters: Evidence from disaggregated popularity functions for Sweden pp. 197-210: Lars Jonung and Eskil Wadensjö
The determinants of the choice between public and private production of a publicly funded service pp. 211-230: Robert McGuire, Robert Ohsfeldt and T. Cott
The political policy cycle: Presidential effort vs. presidential control pp. 231-259: Janet Pack
The distribution of income in a despotic society pp. 261-276: Dan Usher and Merwan Engineer
Agency audits and congressional oversight: The impact of state tax burdens on GAO audit requests pp. 277-281: David Willison
In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: A comment pp. 283-288: Michael Brooks
In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: Reply pp. 289-290: Richard Cebula and Milton Kafoglis
A theorem on the existence of zones of initiation and deterrence in Intriligator-Brito arms race models pp. 291-297: Murray Wolfson

Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting pp. 101-121: Thomas Schwartz
Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting pp. 123-139: David Austen-Smith
A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections pp. 141-169: Larry Samuelson
A theory of the spoils system pp. 171-185: Roy Gardner
An extension of Black's theorem on voting orders to the successive procedure pp. 187-190: Richard Niemi and Bjørn Rasch
A note on Nanson's rule pp. 191-193: Emerson Niou

Government, special interest groups, and economic growth pp. 3-18: John McCallum and André Blais
The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns pp. 19-25: Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower
The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods pp. 27-39: Mark Schneider and Byung Ji
Federal advisory commissions in an economic model of representative democracy pp. 41-62: William McEachern
Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders pp. 63-82: Arye Hillman and Dov Samet
Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock pp. 85-87: Arye Hillman and Dov Samet
The institutional arrangement of public education: The puzzle of exclusive territories pp. 89-96: John Lott