Public Choice
1966 - 2025
Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II
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Volume 101, issue 3-4, 1999
- The Weak Government Thesis: Some New Evidence pp. 163-76

- Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Geert Beekhuis
- Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism pp. 177-93

- Matthias Wrede
- Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-party System: An Application to the Netherlands pp. 195-213

- Otto Swank and R Eisinga
- Voting, Collective Action, and Liberalisation in Latin America: The Rise and Fall of the Hillinger Paradox pp. 215-33

- Shanti P Chakravarty and David E Hojman
- Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Education Subsidies pp. 235-49

- Alexander Kemnitz
- The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation pp. 251-65

- Guang-Zhen Sun and Yew-Kwang Ng
- The Probability of Being Decisive pp. 267-83

- A J Fischer
- The Political Economy of Inflation: Bargaining Structure or Central Bank Independence? Erratum pp. 285-306

- Torben Iversen
Volume 101, issue 1-2, 1999
- Legislating from Both Sides of the Aisle: Information and the Value of Bipartisan Consensus pp. 1-22

- David Epstein
- Optimal Procurement Contracts under a Binding Budget Constraint pp. 23-37

- Rosella Levaggi
- The Double Dividend: Miracle or Fata Morgana? pp. 39-58

- Klaus Zimmermann and John D Gaynor
- Public Accounting Fudges towards EMU: A First Empirical Survey and Some Public Choice Considerations pp. 59-84

- Bernard Dafflon and Sergio Rossi
- Coexistence of Public and Private Job Agencies: Screening with Heterogeneous Institutions pp. 85-107

- Dorothea Kübler
- U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective pp. 109-28

- Gert Svendsen
- Property Rights vs. Redistribution: Which Path to National Wealth? pp. 129-45

- Filip Palda
Volume 100, issue 3-4, 1999
- The Provision of Public Services by Government Funded Decentralized Agencies pp. 157-84

- Robin Boadway, Isao Horiba and Raghbendra Jha
- Reversal of Fortune: The Politics and Economics of the Superconducting Supercollider pp. 185-201

- Atin Basuchoudhary, Paul Pecorino and William Shughart
- Economic Freedom and Equality: Friends or Foes? pp. 203-23

- Niclas Berggren
- Ideology, Economic Interests, and Congressional Roll-Call Voting: Partisan Instability and Bank of the United States Legislation, 1811-1816 pp. 225-43

- Jeffery A Jenkins and Marc Weidenmier
- A Note on the Political Economy of Immigration pp. 245-51

- Fritz Sollner
- Competing Bureaus and Politicians: A Compliance Approach to the Diversion of Public Funds pp. 253-70

- Silvia Fedeli
- Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game pp. 271-88

- Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino
- Women's Suffrage and the Growth of the Welfare State pp. 289-300

- Burton Abrams and Russell F Settle
- Persistence in Government Spending Fluctuations: Reply pp. 301-02

- Brian Goff
Volume 100, issue 1-2, 1999
- On the Economic Theory of Interest Groups: Towards a Group Frame of Reference in Political Economics pp. 1-29

- Frans van Winden
- Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules: An Equilibrium Rescued pp. 31-38

- Douglas Davis and Robert Reilly
- The Two Freedoms, Economic Growth and Development: An Empirical Study pp. 39-64

- Wenbo Wu and Otto A Davis
- Structural Constraints on Partisan Bias under the Efficient Gerrymander pp. 65-84

- Thomas W Gilligan and John Matsusaka
- Are Economists More Selfish Than Other 'Social' Scientists? pp. 85-101

- David Laband and Richard Beil
- Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting pp. 103-22

- James Adams
- Lowering the Cost of Pollution Control versus Controlling Pollution pp. 123-34

- Dwight R Lee
Volume 99, issue 3-4, 1999
- The Political Economy of Inflation: Bargaining Structure or Central Bank Independence? pp. 237-58

- Torben Iversen
- Multiparty Spatial Competition with Probabilistic Voting pp. 259-74

- James Adams
- Rent Seeking and Rent Setting with Asymmetric Effectiveness of Lobbying pp. 275-98

- Inderjit Kohli and Nirvikar Singh
- Robust Voting pp. 299-310

- Gilbert Bassett and Joseph Persky
- Veterans Interests and the Transition to Government Growth: 1870-1915 pp. 311-26

- Randall Holcombe
- Immigration Reform, the INS, and the Distribution of Interior and Border Enforcement Resources pp. 327-45

- Alberto Davila, Jose A Pagan and Montserrat Viladrich-Grau
- In Defense of the Articles of Confederation and the Contribution Mechanism as a Means of Government Finance: A General Comment on the Literature pp. 347-56

- Russell Sobel
- Rethinking the Partisan Effects of Higher Turnout: So What's the Question? pp. 357-76

- Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen and Christian Collet
- Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience pp. 377-94

- Amihai Glazer and Susanne Lohmann
- The Effect of Government Size on the Unemployment Rate pp. 395-401

- Burton Abrams
- Market Failure, Government Failure, and the Private Supply of Public Goods: The Case of Climate-Controlled Walkway Networks pp. 403-37

- Michael R Montgomery and Richard Bean
- The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests pp. 439-54

- Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries
- The Reciprocal Relationship between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in Congress pp. 455-63

- Thomas M Carsey and Barry Rundquist
- Persistence in Government Spending Fluctuations: New Evidence on the Displacement Effect pp. 465-66

- Martin T Bohl
- Predicting the Institutional Effects of Term Limits: Erratum pp. 481

- Daniel Franklin and Tor Westin
Volume 99, issue 1-2, 1999
- Fiscal Illusion and the Australian Local Government Grants Process: How Sticky Is the Flypaper Effect? pp. 1-13

- Andrew Worthington and Brian Dollery
- The Effects of Campaign Spending on Electoral Outcomes: A Data Envelopment Analysis pp. 15-37

- Dennis Coates
- Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality pp. 39-55

- Andre Blais and Robert Young
- The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result pp. 57-62

- J. Atsu Amegashie
- The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions: Committees, Preliminary and Final Contests pp. 63-76

- J. Atsu Amegashie
- Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships between State and Local Governments pp. 77-102

- Mark Skidmore
- The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment pp. 103-18

- Melanie B Marks and Rachel Croson
- The Median Voter Model across Levels of Government pp. 119-38

- Geoffrey K Turnbull and Peter M Mitias
- The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good with Diminishing Marginal Returns pp. 139-60

- Susan Laury, James Walker and Arlington Williams
- When Registration Barriers Fall, Who Votes? An Empirical Test of a Rational Choice Model pp. 161-76

- Craig Leonard Brians and Bernard Grofman
- Friedman's Theory of Income Redistribution Up after Being Down for the Count pp. 177-84

- Michael Brooks
- Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance pp. 185-216

- Steven Levitt and James Poterba