Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 96, issue 3-4, 1998

Political Economy and Political Correctness pp. 219-39

Arye Hillman

Intervention Analysis of Electoral Tax Cycle: The Case of Japan pp. 241-58

Keum-Rok Yoo

Directional and Proximity Models of Voter Choice in Recent US Presidential Elections pp. 259-70

Jay K Dow

Rent-Seeking in Natural Resource Quota Allocations pp. 271-94

John Boyce

Distributional Coalitions, State Strength, and Economic Growth: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Economic Development pp. 295-323

Eddie Wing Yin Tang and R Alan Hedley

Redistribution Tax under Non-benevolent Governments pp. 325-43

Hiroshige Tanaka

The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts pp. 345-62

Alexander Tabarrok

First Branch, or Root? The Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve pp. 363-80

Irwin Morris and Michael Munger

Predicting the Institutional Effects of Term Limits pp. 381-93

Daniel Franklin and Tor Westin

The Importance of the Public Choice School Both for the Criticism of the Centrally Planned Economy and for the Process of Its Dismantling pp. 395-403

Vaclav Klaus

Which Rectangle? pp. 405-10

Gordon Tullock

Externalities and Government pp. 411-15

Gordon Tullock

Volume 96, issue 1-2, 1998

Assessing Comparative Efficiency of the State-Owned Mixed and Private Sectors in Indian Industry pp. 1-24

Sumit K Majumdar

On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests pp. 25-42

Stergios Skaperdas

The Political Economy of Food Pricing: An Extended Empirical Test of the Interest Group Approach pp. 43-60

Thierry van Bastelaer

The Political Costs of Tax Increases and Expenditure Reductions: Evidence from State Legislative Turnover pp. 61-79

Russell Sobel

The Product Paradox of Voting Power pp. 81-92

Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover

A Comparison of Prospective and Retrospective Voting with Heterogeneous Politicians pp. 93-116

W. Reed and Joonmo Cho

Explaining the Size of the Public Sector pp. 117-44

Margarita Katsimi

Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control pp. 145-86

Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen

Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence: A Cross-Country Analysis pp. 187-204

Fatholla M Bagheri and Nader Habibi

Volume 95, issue 3-4, 1998

Conceptualizing Voter Choice for Directional and Discounting Models of Two-Candidate Spatial Competition in Terms of Shadow Candidates pp. 219-31

Merrill, Samuel, and Bernard Grofman

Analyzing the Turnout-Competition Link with Aggregate Cross-Sectional Data pp. 233-46

Bernard Grofman, Christian Collet and Robert Griffin

What Congressmen Knew and When They Knew It: Further Evidence on the Origins of U.S. Broadcasting Regulation pp. 247-76

Charlotte Twight

Oak Leaves and the Origins of the 1927 Radio Act: Comment pp. 277-85

Thomas Hazlett

Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election pp. 287-305

Roger Congleton and Bernard Steunenberg

The Tax-Spend Debate: Time Series Evidence from State Budgets pp. 307-20

James Payne

Interjurisdictional Redistribution and Public Goods with Increasing Returns to Scale pp. 321-29

Norbert J Haering

The One-Third Rule: Learning about the Net Economic Benefit of a Subsidy from a Single Observation pp. 331-34

Jorg Schimmelpfennig

The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further Research pp. 335-61

Stephen J Bailey and Stephen Connolly

Further Evidence on the Relationship between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth pp. 363-80

Jakob de Haan and Clemens L J Siermann

Some Norwegian Politicians' Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis pp. 381-401

Karine Nyborg

Public Pensions and Voting on Immigration pp. 403-13

Alexander Haupt and Wolfgang Peters

Erratum [Tullock's Rent-Seeking Contest with a Minimum Expenditure Requirement] pp. 423-34

Lambert Schoonbeek and Peter Kooreman

Volume 95, issue 1-2, 1998

Exchange Rate Evidence on the Effectiveness of United Nations Policy pp. 1-25

Russell Sobel

How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis pp. 27-49

Katerina Sherstyuk

Whether One Votes and How One Votes pp. 51-62

Rodney Fort and Douglas N Bunn

Additional Incumbent Spending Really Can Harm (at Least Some) Incumbents: An Analysis of Vote Share Maximization pp. 63-87

Dennis Coates

Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer pp. 89-115

Douglas Davis and Robert Reilly

The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting pp. 117-29

Glenn R Parker and Suzanne L Parker

By-Elections, Changing Fortunes, Uncertainty and the Mid-Term Blues pp. 131-48

Simon Price and David Sanders

Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium pp. 149-75

Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin

The Political Economy of Targeting pp. 177-200

Philippe De Donder and Jean Hindriks

Volume 95, issue 1, 1998

Exchange rate evidence on the effectiveness of United Nations policy pp. 1-25

Russell Sobel

How to gerrymander: A formal analysis pp. 27-49

Katerina Sherstyuk

Whether one votes and how one votes pp. 51-62

Rodney Fort and Douglas Bunn

Additional incumbent spending really can harm (at least some) incumbents: An analysis of vote share maximization pp. 63-87

Dennis Coates

Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer pp. 89-115

Douglas Davis and Robert Reilly

The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting pp. 117-129

Glenn Parker and Suzanne Parker

By-elections, changing fortunes, uncertainty and the mid-term blues pp. 131-148

Simon Price and David Sanders

Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium pp. 149-175

Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin

The political economy of targeting pp. 177-200

Philippe De Donder and Jean Hindriks

Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game theory and the law pp. 201-204

Atin Basuchoudhary

Dirk-Jan Kraan, Budgetary decisions: A public choice approach pp. 204-206

Philip Grossman

Joseph Cornwall Palamountain, Jr., The politics of distribution pp. 206-209

William Shughart

Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas (Eds.), The political economy of conflict and appropriation pp. 210-213

Russell Sobel

Robert E. Goodin (Ed.), The theory of institutional design pp. 214-218

Dennis Coates