Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 151, issue 3, 2012

Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences pp. 409-423

Peter Casey, Mark Wierman, Michael Gibilisco, John Mordeson and Terry Clark

Defensive Politics pp. 425-444

Edward Wesep

Efficient public goods provision with incomplete markets pp. 445-464

Greg Hunter

Volunteering and the state pp. 465-495

Franz Hackl, Martin Halla and Gerald Pruckner

An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions pp. 497-515

Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis

Divided we vote pp. 517-536

Peter Calcagno and Edward Lopez

Spend it like Beckham? Inequality and redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004 pp. 537-563

Andreas Georgiadis and Alan Manning

Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements pp. 565-584

Pierre Courtois and Guillaume Haeringer

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes pp. 585-610

Marco Portmann, David Stadelmann and Reiner Eichenberger

Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax mix pp. 611-630

Jenny De Freitas

Does immigration weaken natives’ support for the unemployed? Evidence from Germany pp. 631-654

Holger Stichnoth

Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis pp. 655-678

Keith Dougherty and Julian Edward

Information alliances in contests with budget limits pp. 679-693

Kai Konrad

Patriotism, taxation and international mobility pp. 695-717

Salmai Qari, Kai Konrad and Benny Geys

Lessons in disguise: multivariate predictive mistakes in collective choice models pp. 719-737

Bruce Desmarais

Bargaining and voting pp. 739-755

Dan Usher

Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies pp. 757-787

Rene van den Brink and Frank Steffen

Last-period problems in legislatures pp. 789-806

Glenn Parker and Matthew Dabros

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki: Majority judgment: measuring, ranking, and electing pp. 807-810

Paul Edelman

George G. Szpiro: Numbers rule: the vexing mathematics of democracy, from Plato to the present pp. 811-812

Justin Buchler

Volume 151, issue 1, 2012

An evaluation of EU regional policy. Do structural actions crowd out public spending? pp. 1-21

Juan Gonzalez-Alegre

Bargaining unexplained pp. 23-41

Dan Usher

Incumbent positioning, ideological heterogeneity and mobilization in U.S. House elections pp. 43-61

Michael Ensley

Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law: an empirical analysis pp. 63-90

Michael Herrmann

Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games pp. 91-119

Sabrina Teyssier

Coalition incentives for political budget cycles pp. 121-136

Marek Hanusch

Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest pp. 137-148

Toshihiro Ihori and C. Yang

Bureaucrats and short-term politics pp. 149-163

Marcus Drometer

Fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks pp. 165-183

Monica Escaleras and Charles Register

Islam and democracy pp. 185-192

Niklas Potrafke

Social identity and voting behavior pp. 193-214

Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan

Do ideological and political motives really matter in the public choice of local services management? Evidence from urban water services in Spain pp. 215-228

Andres Picazo-Tadeo, Francisco González-Gómez, Jorge Wanden-Berghe and Alberto Ruiz-Villaverde

The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment pp. 229-254

Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume

Determinants of government size: evidence from China pp. 255-270

Alfred Wu and Mi Lin

China’s evolution toward an authoritarian market economy—a predator–prey evolutionary model with intelligent design pp. 271-287

Yongjing Zhang

European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model pp. 289-323

Ansgar Belke and Barbara Schnurbein

Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? pp. 325-362

Margarita Katsimi and Vassilis Sarantides

Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly? pp. 363-397

Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm

John Meadowcroft: James M. Buchanan pp. 399-401

Randall Holcombe

Shmuel Nitzan: Collective preference and choice pp. 403-404

Daniel Sutter

Federico Varese: Mafias on the move: how organized crime conquers new territories pp. 405-407

David Skarbek

Volume 150, issue 3, 2012

On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts pp. 399-423

Roger Congleton

Competition among officials and the abuse of power pp. 425-438

Mikael Priks

Uncertainty and ratification failure pp. 439-467

Arzu Kıbrıs

The spirits of capitalism and socialism pp. 469-498

Christian Bjørnskov and Martin Paldam

Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study pp. 499-510

Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe

The paradox of voting intelligently pp. 511-524

R. Urbatsch

The importance of modeling spatial spillovers in public choice analysis pp. 525-545

James LeSage and Matthew Dominguez

Consistent allocation of cabinet seats: the Swiss Magic Formula pp. 547-559

Reiner Wolff and Yavuz Karagök

Why is there no revolution in North Korea? pp. 561-578

Thomas Apolte

How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking pp. 579-594

Johannes Münster and Klaas Staal

Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences pp. 595-608

Patrick Hummel

Property rights and competing for the affections of Demos: the impact of the 1867 Reform Act on stock prices pp. 609-631

John Turner and Wenwen Zhan

Price-earnings changes during US presidential election cycles: voter uncertainty and other determinants pp. 633-650

John Goodell and Richard Bodey

Political parties and political shirking pp. 651-670

Jason DeBacker

Corporate governance under proportional electoral systems pp. 671-690

Jaekwon Suh

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints pp. 691-713

Martin Grossmann and Helmut Dietl

Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes pp. 715-730

Antonis Adam

Does social capital increase political accountability? An empirical test for Flemish municipalities pp. 731-744

Dimi Jottier and Bruno Heyndels

Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China pp. 745-769

John Gilbert and Reza Oladi

Voter response to congressional campaigns: new techniques for analyzing aggregate electoral behavior pp. 771-792

Scott Basinger, Damon Cann and Michael Ensley

Bo Rothstein: The quality of government: corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective pp. 793-795

Robert Lawson

Bjorn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The role of governments in legislative agenda setting pp. 797-799

Matt Ryan

Volume 150, issue 1, 2012

Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice) pp. 1-25

Nicholas Miller

The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings pp. 27-49

Mark Schelker

Length of compulsory education and voter turnout—evidence from a staged reform pp. 51-75

Panu Pelkonen

Fiscal effects of budget referendums: evidence from New York school districts pp. 77-95

Phuong Nguyen-Hoang

Communication in committees: who should listen? pp. 97-117

Elisabeth Schulte

Land inequality and conflict intensity pp. 119-135

Giacomo De Luca and Petros Sekeris

Balancing constituency representation and party responsiveness in the US Senate: the conditioning effect of state ideological heterogeneity pp. 137-154

Jeffrey Harden and Thomas Carsey

Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006 pp. 155-179

Niklas Potrafke

Electoral terms and terrorism pp. 181-193

Roland Hodler and Dominic Rohner

Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy pp. 195-208

Benjamin Powell

The information content of elections and varieties of the partisan political business cycle pp. 209-240

Cameron Shelton

Positive versus normative economics: what’s the connection? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy and the General Social Survey pp. 241-261

Bryan Caplan and Stephen Miller

Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences pp. 263-282

Giuseppe Ciccarone and Enrico Marchetti

Is tolerance good or bad for growth? pp. 283-308

Niclas Berggren and Mikael Elinder

Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model pp. 309-326

Gonzalo Fernandez-de-Cordoba, Javier Pérez and Jose Torres

Does information increase political support for pension reform? pp. 327-362

Tito Boeri and Guido Tabellini

A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting pp. 363-383

Duane Cooper and Arthur Zillante

Erratum to: An economic analysis of voting in Sweden pp. 385-385

Henrik Jordahl

Roger D. Congleton: Perfecting parliament: constitutional reform, liberalism, and the rise of Western democracy pp. 387-389

Randall Holcombe

Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting: A behavioral theory of elections pp. 391-394

Arye Hillman

Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government pp. 395-398

Randall Holcombe