Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 24, issue 1, 1975

Political contribution and policy — Some extensions pp. 1-12

Benjamin Bental and Uri Ben-Zion

A theory of exchange, philanthropy and appropriation pp. 13-26

Albert Danielsen

The theory of agency pp. 27-42

Barry Mitnick

Information and voting: An empirical note pp. 43-49

Robert Tollison, W. Crain and Paul Pautler

Bureaucratic performance and budgetary reward pp. 51-57

Ronald Warren

Optimal city size, the economic theory of clubs and exclusionary zoning pp. 59-70

Oscar Fisch

The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic society pp. 71-92

Michael Lovell

Social preference ordering in a probabilistic voting model pp. 93-100

Shmuel Nitzan

Vote trading and Pareto efficiency pp. 101-109

Thomas Schwartz

A note on unconditional probabilities and the voter's paradox pp. 111-114

James Buckley

Volume 23, issue 1, 1975

Price externalities influence public policy pp. 1-10

Kenneth Goldin

Individual system preference pp. 11-23

Alexander Groth and Robert Curry

The private allocation of public funds pp. 25-34

G. Philpotts

Pricing public goods pp. 35-48

Bruce Scherr and Emerson Babb

Experimenting with public goods pricing pp. 49-53

Edward Clarke

A clear test of rational voting pp. 55-67

Jeffrey Smith

Is a paretian liberal really impossible pp. 69-73

Peter Bernholz

A note on the probability of a tied election pp. 75-79

Nathaniel Beck

The possibility of double-peaked preference rankings for public school expenditures pp. 81-85

Marilyn Flowers

The probability of intransitive majority rule pp. 87-94

Dean Jamison

Bureaucratic profits, migration costs, and the consolidation of local government pp. 95-100

Dolores Martin and Richard McKenzie

The rational behavior theory of voter participation pp. 101-108

Jonathan Silberman and Garey Durden

Rotc service commitments pp. 109-114

L. Thomas and Harold Bierman

Budgetary cutbacks, political promises and the unemployment problem pp. 115-120

James Yeager

Utopia, the minimal state, and entitlement pp. 121-126

James Buchanan

Volume 22, issue 1, 1975

Candidate support functions in the 1968 election pp. 1-22

John Aldrich

Income distribution under majority rule and alternative taxation criteria pp. 23-35

Donald Campbell

Voting models incorporating interactions between voters pp. 37-53

Robert May and Brian Martin

Congressional committee assignments pp. 55-78

Kenneth Shepsle

Rational choice, light guessing and the gambler's fallacy pp. 79-89

Rebecca Morrison and Peter Ordeshook

Inessential games and non-imposed solutions to allocation problems pp. 91-102

Charles Bird

Voting with endogenous preferences pp. 103-106

J. Yeabsley

Social choice theory and citizens' intransitive weak preference—A paradox pp. 107-111

Dénnis Packard

Volume 21, issue 1, 1975

Voting behavior, efficiency, and equity pp. 1-14

Yoram Barzel and Robert Deacon

Bureaucrats and public goods pp. 15-25

Walter Hettich

Viability, preference, and coalitions in the french election of 1951 pp. 27-39

Howard Rosenthal

Competing for aid pp. 41-51

Gordon Tullock

The logic of bureaucratic back scratching pp. 53-67

Robert Goodin

Progressive tax reform and majority voting pp. 69-78

Pierre Pestieau

On the form of special interest legislation pp. 79-90

Paul Rubin

Self-generating growth in public programs pp. 91-97

Richard Craswell

A comment on ‘democratic theory: A preliminary mathematical model.’ pp. 99-103

Bernard Grofman

Institutional entropy pp. 105-106

Barry Keating and Maryann Keating

Logrolling and the arrow paradox: A note pp. 107-110

Nicholas Miller

Is a paretian liberal really impossible: A reply pp. 111-113

Amartya Sen

A comment on McCaleb's “The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions” pp. 115-116

Richard Stoll

Leibenstein's bandwagon effect as applied to voting pp. 117-122

Charles Zech

Reviews pp. 123-124

Jeffrey Smith

Volume 20, issue 1, 1974

Models for the optimal allocation of funds over N constituencies during an election campaign pp. 1-16

W. Cook, M. Kirby and S. Mehndiratta

Monopolistic trading economies: A case of governmental control pp. 17-32

Amoz Kats

Single-peakedness and guttman scales: Concept and measurement pp. 33-45

Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg

A model of regulatory agency behavior pp. 47-62

Milton Russell and Robert Shelton

Collective consumption of private goods pp. 63-81

Robert Spann

The economics of campaign funds pp. 83-97

William Welch

Is a paretian liberal really impossible? pp. 99-107

Peter Bernholz

Potential theft as indirect taxation pp. 109-111

Richard Cebula and Paul Gatons

The cost of internal organization: A suggested simplification pp. 113-116

Andrew Gold

The economic theory of representative government: A review pp. 117-128

Jean-Luc Migué

The economic theory of representative government: A reply pp. 129-133

Albert Breton

Book reviews pp. 135-141

Russell Hardin, Richard Merelman and Wilber Chaffee