Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 88, issue 3-4, 1996

Federal Antitrust Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective pp. 223-38

M Albert Vachris

Strategic Responses to Institutional Change: Parties, Committees and Multiple Referral pp. 239-58

Kathleen Bawn

A Mathematical One-Man One-Vote Rationale for Madisonian Presidential Voting Based on Maximum Individual Voting Power pp. 259-73

A Natapoff

Rethinking Ward and At-Large Elections in Cities: Total Spending, the Number of Locations of Selected City Services, and Policy Types pp. 275-93

Laura I Langbein, Philip Crewson and Charles Niel Brasher

Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods? pp. 295-308

James Andreoni and Ted Bergstrom

Corporate Political Offices in a Rent-Seeking Society pp. 309-31

Paul E Johnson

A Political Economic Analysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistribution pp. 333-63

Isidoro Mazza and Frans van Winden

Changing Paradigms: Changing Interpretations of the Public Sector in Latin America's Economies pp. 365-79

Werner Baer

To Fight or Not to Fight? An Analysis of Submission, Struggle, and the Design of Contests pp. 381-92

Achim Korber and Martin Kolmar

Exiting Behavior under Tiebout Conditions: Towards a Predictive Model pp. 393-406

Keith Dowding and Peter John

Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: A Re-examination of Old Evidence from Churches: Comment pp. 407-11

Peter A Zaleski and Charles E Zech

Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: A Re-examination of Old Evidence from Churches: Reply to Zaleski and Zech pp. 413-16

Jody W Lipford

Volume 88, issue 1-2, 1996

Towards a Positive Theory of Political Rhetoric: Why Do Polticians Lie? pp. 1-13

Michael L Davis and Michael Ferrantino

Instability of Collective Decisions? Testing for Cyclical Majorities pp. 15-28

Thomas Stratmann

The Political Economy of the Peace Dividend pp. 29-42

Dwight R Lee and Richard K Vedder

Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence and the Exchange Rate: A Game Theoretic Analysis pp. 43-56

P Lynn Kennedy, Harald von Witzke and Terry Roe

The Public Demand for Smoking Bans pp. 57-67

William J Boyes and Michael Marlow

The Political Temptations of Rationing by Insiders pp. 69-81

George von Furstenberg and Nicholas O Spangenberg

Agent Heterogeneity and Consensual Decision Making on the Federal Open Market Committee pp. 83-101

George A Krause

Rent-Seeking in Higher Education: Voting on Academic Requirements pp. 103-13

Robert W Brown and R Todd Jewell

The 1992, 1994 and 1996 Elections: A Comment and a Forecast pp. 115-25

Alberto Alesina, John Londregan and Howard Rosenthal

The Political Economy of Central Bank Intervention pp. 127-46

Geert J Almekinders

Ideology and Interest Groups pp. 147-60

Rainald Borck

Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland pp. 161-70

Werner W Pommerehne and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann

A Futher Experimental Study of Expressive Voting pp. 171-84

A J Fischer

A Politico-economic Approach to Intergovernmental Lump-Sum Grants pp. 185-201

Paulo Pereira

Volume 87, issue 3-4, 1996

Institutions and the Convergence Hypothesis: The Cross-National Evidence pp. 207-28

Stephen Knack

Congressional Allocation of Federal Funds: The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 pp. 229-42

Shirley Svorny

Pigou, Coase, Common Law, and Environmental Policy: Implications of the Calculation Debate pp. 243-58

Pasour, E C,

Biased Ballots? The Impact of Ballot Structure on North Carolina Elections in 1992 pp. 259-80

James T Hamilton and Helen Ladd

Committee Choice and the Core under Supramajority Rule: Results from Simulation of Majority Choice in 2-Dimensional Space pp. 281-301

David H Koehler

Electoral Equilibria with Entry: Some Simulations pp. 303-14

Bruce Bender and Timothy C Haas

Alternative Forms of the Shapley Value and the Shapley-Shubik Index pp. 315-18

Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover

Democracy as Insurance pp. 319-45

Einar Overbye

Public Pensions and Immigration Policy in a Democracy pp. 347-61

Ulrich Scholten and Marcel Thum

Can Leviathan Governments Mitigate the Tragedy of the Commons? pp. 363-77

Franz Wirl

Regional Free Trade and Social Integration pp. 379-93

Carsten Hefeker

Competition, Expenditures and Student Performance in Mathematics: A Comment on Couch et al pp. 395-400

M V Borland and Roy Howsen

Competition, Expenditures and Student Performance: Reply to Borland and Howsaen pp. 401-03

Jim F Couch and William Shughart

Volume 87, issue 1-2, 1996

The Price of Nationalism: Evidence from the Soviet Union pp. 1-18

D. Andrew Austin

Some Empirical Evidence on Rent-Seeking pp. 19-33

R L Beck and J M Connolly

Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fact-Track Trade Procedures: Prelude to NAFTA pp. 35-53

Leo Kahane

Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts pp. 55-66

Tai-Yeong Chung

Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature pp. 67-100

Bruce Bender and Lott, John R,

Why Does the Senate "Win" In Conference Committee?: A Stability Explanation pp. 101-16

Lydia D Ortega and Lawrence J McQuillan

Moral Public Choice pp. 117-41

Serge-Christophe Kolm

Does Inequality Cause Inflation?: The Political Economy of Inflation, Taxation and Government Debt pp. 143-62

Roel Beetsma and Frederick (Rick) van der Ploeg

Political Economy of Agricultural Policy pp. 163-75

Anne O Krueger

A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest pp. 177-84

Derek J Clark and Christian Riis

On "Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: Another Hypothesis." by Jody W. Lipford: Comment pp. 185

Gordon Tullock

On "Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: An Examination of New Evidence from Churches": A Reply to Tullock pp. 187-88

Jody W Lipford