Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Economic justice and economic power: An inquiry into distributive justice and political stability pp. 225-249: Bengt-Arne Wickström
Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules pp. 251-285: Manimay Sen
Multi-candidate equilibria pp. 287-291: Donald Wittman
An impossibility theorem for spatial models pp. 293-305: Kim Border
Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies pp. 307-327: Larry Samuelson
Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies pp. 329-343: Lloyd Shapley and Bernard Grofman

Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations pp. 113-149: R. Isaac, James Walker and Susan Thomas
An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries pp. 151-171: Peter Murrell
Determinants of regulatory policies toward competition in the electric utility industry pp. 173-186: Walter Primeaux, John Filer, Robert Herren and Daniel Hollas
Public opinion and regulatory behavior pp. 187-194: S. Anderson and Amihai Glazer
Early projections and voter turnout in the 1980 presidential election pp. 195-202: John Carter
Politicians and protection: Tariffs and elections in Australia pp. 203-209: John Conybeare
On the mutuality of interest between bureaus and high demand review committees: The case of joint production pp. 211-215: Michael Munger
Reviews pp. 217-223: Loren Lomasky and Robert McNown

The free rider problem: Experimental evidence pp. 3-24: Oliver Kim and Mark Walker
Public versus private economic activity: A new look at school bus transportation pp. 25-43: Robert McGuire and T. Cott
Public protection against misperceived risks: Insights from positive political economy pp. 45-64: Mark Pauly, Howard Kunreuther and James Vaupel
A theory of the bureaucratic value of Federal Reserve operating procedures pp. 65-76: Neil Skaggs
Sequential referenda and bureaucratic man pp. 77-82: Kenneth Greene
A note on centralized regulatory review pp. 83-88: James Miller, William Shughart and Robert Tollison
Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking pp. 89-94: William Corcoran
Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment pp. 95-97: Gordon Tullock
The Electoral College and voter participation rates: A comment pp. 99-100: Anthony Ostrosky
The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Reply pp. 101-102: Richard Cebula and Dennis Murphy
Reviews pp. 103-112: Robert Tollison, William Mitchell and S. Roy

Social choice and the status quo pp. 225-234: Jeffrey Richelson
Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings pp. 235-246: John Weymark
Utility function, group size, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good pp. 247-255: Koji Okuguchi
Are qualified majority rules special? pp. 257-272: Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush
The accuracy of group majority decisions in groups with added members pp. 273-285: Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman
Maximizing models of legislative choice pp. 287-294: Ronald Warren
Measuring state power in presidential elections pp. 295-310: Terrence Levesque
To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting pp. 311-325: Guillermo Owen and Bernard Grofman

Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution pp. 113-131: Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer
Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes pp. 133-145: Alan Hamlin
Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government pp. 147-160: D. Kenyon
Schumpeter and public choice, Part II Democracy and the demise of capitalism: The missing chapter in Schumpeter pp. 161-174: William Mitchell
Public bureau budgets and jurisdiction size: An empirical note pp. 175-183: David Nellor
Recurrent cost and performance comparisons within public administration: A method of generating efficiency-promoting competition pp. 185-192: Ernst Jonsson
Is Tullock correct about Sunday closing laws? pp. 197-203: John Moorhouse
Off-budget activities of local government: Comment pp. 205-211: Robert Blewett
Off-budget activities of local government: Reply pp. 213-215: James Bennett and Thomas Dilorenzo
Reviews pp. 217-224: Mark Toma, Martin Gaynor, Fred Glahe and John Goodman

Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting pp. 3-24: Steven Johnson
Is there a relationship between economic conditions and political structure? pp. 25-37: David Laband
Towards a neoaristotelean theory of politics: A positive account of ‘fairness’ pp. 39-54: David Levy
The social choice of alternative corrective devices pp. 55-71: Stuart Mestelman
Schumpeter and public choice, Part I: Precursor to public choice? pp. 73-88: William Mitchell
A (partial) rehabilitation of the public interest theory pp. 89-99: Gordon Tullock
Socialism and the revenue maximizing Leviathan pp. 101-106: Adam Gifford and Roy Kenney
Reviews pp. 107-112: John Stehle and Richard Bean