Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 166, issue 3, 2016

Blair disease? Business careers of the former democratic heads of state and government pp. 335-354

Alexander Baturo and Slava Mikhaylov

Intra-party diversity and ministerial selection in coalition governments pp. 355-378

Hanna Bäck, Marc Debus and Wolfgang C. Müller

Volume 166, issue 1, 2016

Suicide attacks and religious cleavages pp. 3-28

Andra Filote, Niklas Potrafke and Heinrich Ursprung

Antitrust exemptions for joint R&D improve patents pp. 29-52

Samuli Leppälä

Tax limits and local elections pp. 53-68

Federico Revelli

Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity? pp. 69-86

Sounman Hong and Jeehun Lim

Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy pp. 87-111

Dima Yazji Shamoun and Bruce Yandle

Political leader survival: does competence matter? pp. 113-142

Shu Yu and Richard Jong-A-Pin

Does forced voting result in political polarization? pp. 143-160

Fernanda Leite Lopez Leon and Renata Rizzi

The perils of government enforcement pp. 161-182

Rustam Romaniuc, Katherine Farrow, Lisette Ibanez and Alain Marciano

The volatility of median and supermajoritarian pivots in the U.S. Congress and the effects of party polarization pp. 183-204

Thomas L. Brunell, Bernard Grofman and Samuel Merrill

Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods pp. 205-233

Federica Alberti and Edward Cartwright

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus pp. 235-259

Eric Dubois

Volume 165, issue 3, 2015

A tragedy of the anticommons: local option taxation and cell phone tax bills pp. 171-191

Matthew Mitchell and Thomas Stratmann

The paradox of grading systems pp. 193-210

Steven Brams and Richard Potthoff

Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas pp. 211-238

James Lake and Maia Linask

Does electoral competition affect politicians’ trade policy preferences? Evidence from Japan pp. 239-261

Banri Ito

Representation, neighboring districts, and party loyalty in the U.S. Congress pp. 263-284

Justin Kirkland and Ruth Williams

A dynamic Duverger’s law pp. 285-306

Jean Guillaume Forand and Vikram Maheshri

Nina M. Moore: The political roots of racial thinking in American criminal justice pp. 307-309

Daniel D’Amico

James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher (eds.): The political economy of the United Nations Security Council: money and influence pp. 311-314

Jared Pincin

Edward Peter Stringham: Private governance: creating order in economic and social life pp. 315-317

Michael Munger

Volume 165, issue 1, 2015

Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter views pp. 1-12

Richard Potthoff and Michael Munger

The paradox of information and voter turnout pp. 13-23

Joseph McMurray

The Jeffords switch and legislator rolls in the U.S. Senate pp. 25-43

Chris Den Hartog and Nathan Monroe

The monetary mechanism of stateless Somalia pp. 45-58

William Luther

Corruption and entrepreneurship: evidence from Brazilian municipalities pp. 59-77

Jamie Bologna and Amanda Ross

Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights pp. 79-96

Alexander Salter

A note on Poisson contests pp. 97-102

Nava Kahana and Doron Klunover

Influence versus utility in the evaluation of voting rules: a new look at the Penrose formula pp. 103-122

Michel Breton and Karine Van der Straeten

Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries pp. 123-145

Andreas Kyriacou, Leonel Muinelo-Gallo and Oriol Roca-Sagalés

The political economy of the Essential Air Service program pp. 147-164

Joshua Hall, Amanda Ross and Christopher Yencha

Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne (eds.), The Oxford handbook of Austrian economics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015, xiii + 813 pp., USD 150.00 (cloth) pp. 165-167

Alexander Salter

Michael C. Munger and Kevin M. Munger, Choosing in groups: analytical politics revisited pp. 169-170

Roger Congleton

Volume 164, issue 3, 2015

Guest editor’s introduction to the symposium on the 50th anniversary of Olson’s Logic of Collective Action pp. 191-193

Jac Heckelman

Collective action: fifty years later pp. 195-216

Todd Sandler

The Logic of Collective Action and beyond pp. 217-234

Roger Congleton

Olson and imperceptible differences: the Tuck critique pp. 235-250

Geoffrey Brennan

Supermajority rule and the law of 1/n pp. 251-274

Dongwon Lee

The beast is not easily starved pp. 275-285

Dwight Lee

Political biases despite external expert participation? An empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in Germany pp. 287-307

Thiess Buettner and Björn Kauder

Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources pp. 309-329

Stuart Kasdin and Luona Lin

Competing for global capital or local voters? The politics of business location incentives pp. 331-356

Nathan Jensen, Edmund Malesky and Matthew Walsh

From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD pp. 357-378

Andrew Young

Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model pp. 379-399

Jan Brueckner and Kangoh Lee

Virtual world order: the economics and organizations of virtual pirates pp. 401-421

Carl Mildenberger

Citizens’ preferences about voting rules: self-interest, ideology, and sincerity pp. 423-442

André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, François Poinas and Karine Van der Straeten

George J. Borjas: Immigration economics pp. 443-445

Zachary Gochenour

Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London & the Limits of Eminent Domain pp. 447-449

Thomas Miceli

Volume 164, issue 1, 2015

The anatomy of government failure pp. 1-42

William Keech and Michael Munger

Erratum to: The anatomy of government failure pp. 43-44

William Keech and Michael Munger

The empty intersection: why so little public choice in political science? pp. 45-56

Randy Simmons and Ryan Yonk

Al Qaeda at the bar: coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations pp. 57-73

Kjell Hausken, Sheheryar Banuri, Dipak Gupta and Klaus Abbink

Regulation and corruption pp. 75-85

Randall Holcombe and Christopher Boudreaux

Risk lovers and the rent over-investment puzzle pp. 87-101

Paan Jindapon and Christopher Whaley

From mixed economy to entangled political economy: a Paretian social-theoretic orientation pp. 103-116

Meg Patrick and Richard Wagner

Keeping the party together pp. 117-133

Hande Mutlu-Eren

Sabotage in contests: a survey pp. 135-155

Subhasish Chowdhury and Oliver Gürtler

Political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations: a duration analysis pp. 157-175

Kevin Grier, Shu Lin and Haichun Ye

Jonathan D. Caverley: Democratic militarism: voting, wealth, and war pp. 177-179

Abigail Hall

David Reisman: James Buchanan pp. 181-183

Randall Holcombe

Richard H. Thaler: Misbehaving: the making of behavioral economics pp. 185-188

Alex Cartwright

Erratum to: Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral dilemmas from Locke’s Venditio pp. 189-189

Ricardo Guzmán and Michael Munger