Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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When votes are words not deeds: Some evidence from the Nuclear Freeze Referendum pp. 201-216: Susan Feigenbaum, Lynn Karoly and David Levy
On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective pp. 217-235: Paul Johnson
Controlling leviathan through tax reduction pp. 237-245: Michael Marlow and William Orzechowski
In search of efficacious executive veto authority pp. 247-257: David Schap
Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination pp. 259-268: Al Wilhite
The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates pp. 269-275: David Laband and John Sophocleus
Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Comment pp. 277-284: Peter Saunders
Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Reply pp. 285-294: Michael Marlow
Reviews pp. 295-296: Gordon Tullock

The Congress and fiscal policy pp. 101-122: Janet Pack
The political economy of development: A cross-national causality test of development-democracy-growth hypothesis pp. 123-141: Abbas Pourgerami
Who are the volunteers in the battle against budget deficits? pp. 143-159: Martin Prachowny
Limitations of the spatial model pp. 161-167: Amihai Glazer and Bernard Grofman
Tariff-revenue transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or supplementary reward for successful lobbying? pp. 169-172: Arye Hillman
Rent-seeking and market structure: Comment pp. 173-185: Russell Pittman
Market structure and campaign contributions: Does concentration matter? A reply pp. 187-191: Asghar Zardkoohi
Reviews pp. 193-200: Mark Sproule-Jones, Michael Crew and Richard Musgrave

Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards pp. 3-20: G. Choate and Fred Thompson
Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered pp. 21-34: Gerald Keim and Asghar Zardkoohi
Estimating property tax base elasticity over time: Evidence on the revenue maximizing politician pp. 35-44: William Stine
Political liberty and social development: An empirical investigation pp. 45-71: Frank Vorhies and Fred Glahe
Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods pp. 73-78: Gertrud Fremling and John Lott
The impact of sunset review: A study of real estate licensing pp. 79-84: Mary Marvel
The relative restrictiveness of tariffs and quotas: A reinterpretation from a rent-seeking perspective pp. 85-90: Richard McKenzie
Crowding out, deficits, and interest rates: Comment pp. 91-94: Lee Spector and T. Cott
Crowding out, deficits, and interest rates: Reply pp. 95-97: Richard Cebula
Review pp. 99-100: L. Wade

Municipal utilities and local public finance: A simultaneous model pp. 201-212: Kevin Deno and Stephen Mehay
Explaining the growth of government in Sweden: A disequilibrium approach pp. 213-232: Magnus Henrekson and Johan Lybeck
Tax structure and the size of government: An empirical analysis of the fiscal illusion and fiscal stress arguments pp. 233-245: Walter Misiolek and Harold Elder
The place of political science in public choice pp. 247-257: William Riker
Political instability and economic fluctuations in the Republic of Korea pp. 259-274: Byung Soh
Understanding and cooperation in social dilemmas pp. 275-279: David Goetze and John Orbell
Does ideology matter?: Anecdotal experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods pp. 281-286: Stuart Mestelman and David Feeny
Symbol versus substance in legislative activity: The case of illegal immigration pp. 287-294: H. Moehring
Review pp. 295-296: Mwangi Kimenyi

The politicization of market failure pp. 101-113: James Buchanan and Viktor Vanberg
X-efficiency, rent-seeking and social costs pp. 115-126: John Formby, James Keeler and Paul Thistle
Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas pp. 127-139: Philip Hersch and Gerald McDougall
Intergovernmental grants and successful tax limitation referenda pp. 141-154: Dennis Leyden
Democracy, dictatorship and decision costs pp. 155-173: Karol Sołltan
Monetary policy and presidential elections: A nonpartisan political cycle pp. 175-182: David Hakes
Transactions costs and production in a legislative setting pp. 183-186: David Laband
A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities pp. 187-192: Barbara Norrander and Bernard Grofman

Rent-seeking with non-identical players pp. 3-14: Richard Allard
The costs of rent seeking: A metaphysical problem pp. 15-24: Gordon Tullock
Public finance in autocratic process: An empirical note pp. 25-37: Gary Anderson
Rational voting applied to choice of taxes pp. 39-47: J. Biegeleisen and David Sjoquist
Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation pp. 49-67: Michael Crew and Charles Rowley
Buying misery with federal land pp. 69-77: Richard Stroup
An empirical extension of the municipal monopoly model to provision of community infrastructure pp. 79-83: Chris Fawson and Gary Giroux
The return of the Native: The supply elasticity of the American Indian population 1960–1980 pp. 85-88: Bernard Grofman and Michael Migalski
Transactions costs and the controversial good or service pp. 89-93: Robert Kohn