Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Collective goods and collective decision mechanisms pp. 1-17: Richard Auster and Morris Silver
The control of politicians: An economic model pp. 19-42: Robert Barro
Pareto desirable redistribution: The non-altruistic dimension pp. 43-67: Geoffrey Brennan
The institutional structure of externality pp. 69-82: James Buchanan
On the incentives of regulators: The case of taxicabs pp. 83-99: Ross Eckert
A diagrammatic exposition of an economic theory of imperialism pp. 101-107: Paul Roberts and Alvin Rabushka
A note on revenue sharing and the theory of public expenditures pp. 109-116: Sidney Carroll
Welfare effects of announcing election forecasts pp. 117-123: Kenneth Brown and Charles Zech
Poll positions and win probabilities: a stochastic model of the electoral process pp. 125-132: Jerry Medler and Donald Tull
The appeal of minimum wage laws and the invisible hand in government pp. 133-136: Frank Steindl
Cheating and control pp. 137-142: Charles Nichols and Donald Wittman
The public choice theory of murray N. Rothbard, a modern anarchist pp. 143-154: Harry Frech
Reviews pp. 155-165: Melville McMillan, Robert Ross, Paul Portney and Eugene Swimmer

Benevolence, malevolence and economic theory pp. 1-19: George Daly and J. Giertz
Consensus or conflict: Alternative strategies for the bureaucratic bargainer pp. 21-29: David Davis
An economic approach to riot analysis pp. 31-46: J. Gunning
On division of the question pp. 47-54: Joseph Kadane
The social gains from exchanging votes: A simulation approach pp. 55-79: Dennis Mueller, Geoffrey Philpotts and Jaroslav Vanek
Serving the elderly?—an illustration of the niskanen effect pp. 81-90: Richard Sterne, Alvin Rabushka and Helen Scott
Economic competition and political competition pp. 91-106: George Stigler
Manuscripts in the maelstrom: A theory of the editorial process pp. 107-111: Alice Vandermeulen
Political participation and income level: An exchange pp. 113-122: Keith Russell, John Fraser and Bruno Frey
Rawls on justice as fairness pp. 123-128: James Buchanan
Reviews pp. 129-147: William Havard, Gordon Tullock, William Riker, David Johnson, T. Tideman, George Daly, John Moorhouse and Jon Sonstelie

Choice, faith, and politics: The political economy of hutterian communes pp. 1-11: John Baden and Richard Stroup
The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of bureaucracy pp. 13-33: John Chant and Keith Acheson
The politician's dilemma: What to represent pp. 35-41: Thomas Ireland
Exclusion costs and the provision of public goods pp. 43-55: Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz
Representative democracy via random selection pp. 57-68: Dennis Mueller, Robert Tollison and Thomas Willett
A social choice model of the California feather river project pp. 69-87: Norman Plotkin
Federal open market committee decisions in a markov process pp. 89-109: William Yohe
A note on cyclical majorities pp. 111-111: Edgar Browning
A note on some generalizations of the paradox of cyclical majorities pp. 113-114: Bernard Grofman
A suggestion on the positive theory of redistribution pp. 115-118: Joseph Newhouse
Reviews pp. 119-126: Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan

Principles of urban fiscal strategy pp. 1-16: James Buchanan
Multipart pricing of public goods pp. 17-33: Edward Clarke
Internal processes governing party positions in elections pp. 35-60: James Coleman
A linear programming approach to the economic theory of elections pp. 61-72: J. Davis and Louis Zincone
Social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies pp. 73-87: Melvin Hinich and Peter Ordeshook
The paradox of revolution pp. 89-99: Gordon Tullock
Why do high income people participate more in politics? pp. 101-105: Bruno Frey
A note on administrative behavior and public policy pp. 107-110: James Weatherby
Reviews pp. 111-122: Burton Weisbrod, Harold Hochman, Joe Hulett, Richard Wagner and Gordon Tullock

On political competition, economic policy, and income maintenance programs pp. 1-19: Hirschel Kasper
Ideology, public approval, and government behavior pp. 21-40: Lawrence Lau and Bruno Frey
A note on uniform election processes as Riemann-Stieltjes integrals pp. 41-60: B. Meek
Politics and the initiation of economic development pp. 61-80: Adam Przeworski and Martin Zechman
An organizational model of the market pp. 81-92: Paul Roberts
A “taxpayers' revolution” and economic rationality pp. 93-96: Raymond Jackson
A note on condorcet sets pp. 97-101: I. Good
Pressure groups and public investment decisions: A note pp. 103-108: David Shapiro
Reviews pp. 109-117: James Buchanan, Robert Wallace and Mark Pauly