Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Incumbent performance and electoral control pp. 5-25: John Ferejohn
Elections and income redistribution pp. 27-91: Peter Coughlin
Elections and reputations pp. 93-99: John Ledyard
The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models pp. 135-178: Kenneth Shepsle
Discussion of "The positive theory of legislative institutions" pp. 179-183: Melvin Hinich
Legislative coalitions and electoral equilibrium pp. 185-210: David Austen-Smith
Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle pp. 211-219: Thomas Palfrey
Tariffs, quotas and domestic-content protection: some political economy considerations pp. 221-242: Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz

Nuclear consequences of the welfare state pp. 201-222: Robert Ayanian
The public interest hypothesis revisited: A new test of Peltzman's theory of regulation pp. 223-234: Gilbert Becker
Taxes, welfare costs, and public consumption: The case of the unwitting monopsonist pp. 235-247: Cecil Bohanon and James McClure
Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising pp. 249-263: Roger Congleton
The public choice of differing degrees of tax progressivity pp. 265-282: Kenneth Greene
An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of government pp. 283-294: Michael Nelson

The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending pp. 101-116: Burton Abrams and William Dougan
The private interest in public redistribution: A public choice view of the geographic distribution of federal funds pp. 117-125: David Laband
Tax deductions and credits, direct subsidies, and efficiency in public expenditure pp. 127-141: Thomas McCaleb
Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies pp. 143-154: Michael Marlow
State university boards of trustees: A principal-agent perspective pp. 155-163: Eugenia Toma
Optimism and pessimism in political and market institutions pp. 165-178: Thomas Zorn and Dolores Martin
Pufendorf on collective decisions pp. 179-182: Eerik Lagerspetz
Why so much stability? On the single membership constituency and the law of large numbers: A note pp. 183-190: Uzi Segal and Avia Spivak
A note on the role of knowledge in direct voting on milk price decontrol pp. 191-194: Clifford Thies
Reviews pp. 195-200: William Mitchell, Roger Faith and Robert Tollison

Vote buying in a stylized setting pp. 3-15: James Buchanan and Dwight Lee
Factors affecting property tax reliance: Additional evidence pp. 17-28: David Chicoine and Norman Walzer
The relative efficiency of private and public transfers pp. 29-45: Joseph Cordes, Robert Goldfarb and Harry Watson
The application of laboratory experimental economics to the contingent valuation of public goods pp. 47-68: Don Coursey and William Schulze
Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy? pp. 69-77: James Griffith and Charles Knoeber
Property taxes, tax-cost illusion and desired education expenditures pp. 79-97: R. Lankford
Review pp. 99-100: Randall Holcombe

The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments pp. 201-215: William Baber and Pradyot Sen
Efficient allocation and unanimous consent with incomplete demand disclosures? pp. 217-227: R. Brubaker
Non-optimal unanimous agreement pp. 229-244: Randall Holcombe
Determinants of the political participation of women pp. 245-253: Marshall Medoff
Fragmentation and the growth of local government pp. 255-263: Mark Schneider
Rentless rent-seeking and abnormal returns pp. 265-270: Bruce Yandle
Optimal majorities for decisions of varying importance pp. 273-290: Bengt-Arne Wickström
Comment pp. 291-294: Gordon Tullock
Comment on a comment pp. 295-298: Bengt-Arne Wickström

Economic value of an in-house editorship pp. 101-112: John McDowell and Ryan Amacher
Reinterpreting the role of inflation in politico-economic models pp. 113-124: Robert Michaels
Interest groups and the size of government pp. 125-145: Dennis Mueller and Peter Murrell
The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents pp. 147-155: G. Sav
Endogenous supranational policy decisions: The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community pp. 157-174: Harald Witzke
Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking pp. 175-181: Elie Appelbaum and Eliakim Katz
On the voting participation of public bureaucrats pp. 183-187: Bert Jaarsma, Arthur Schram and Frans Winden
Tax/compensation schemes: Misleading advice in a rent-seeking society pp. 189-194: Richard McKenzie
Reviews pp. 195-199: William Mitchell and W. Smith

An agenda for the study of institutions pp. 3-25: Elinor Ostrom
Municipal residency laws and local public budgets pp. 27-35: Stephen Mehay and Kenneth Seiden
On the inefficient extraction of rents by dictators pp. 37-48: Wayne Brough and Mwangi Kimenyi
Religion as DUP activity pp. 49-54: Jagdish Bhagwati and T. Srinivasan
Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance pp. 55-63: Rexford Santerre
A note on the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis: The period 1975–1980 pp. 65-69: Richard Cebula and Milton Kafoglis
A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees pp. 71-79: Daniel Richards
On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators pp. 81-87: John Lott and David Reiffen
On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators: Reply pp. 89-91: Adam Gifford and Roy Kenney
Review article pp. 93-99: Charles Rowley