Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 137, issue 3, 2008

Homo economicus and homo politicus: an introduction pp. 429-438

Geoffrey Brennan

Is the political realm more encompassing than the economic realm? pp. 439-450

Tracy Strong

Passions and interests revisited: the psychological foundations of economics and politics pp. 451-461

Ruth Grant

Are homo economicus and homo politicus identical twins? pp. 463-468

Russell Hardin

In search of homunculus politicus pp. 469-474

James Buchanan

Psychological dimensions in voter choice pp. 475-489

Geoffrey Brennan

Brief lives: economic life and political life in the history of economic thought pp. 491-505

Shannon Stimson and Murray Milgate

Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits pp. 507-522

Michael Munger

Afterword pp. 523-524

Michael Gillespie

Volume 137, issue 1, 2008

Implications of the ‘bread and peace’ model for the 2008 US presidential election pp. 1-10

Douglas Hibbs

Why does government produce national defense? pp. 11-19

Randall Holcombe

The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations pp. 21-41

Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén

Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market pp. 43-55

Andrea Mattozzi

Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities pp. 57-80

Martial Foucault, Thierry Madiès and Sonia Paty

International migration and the role of institutions pp. 81-102

Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi

Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study pp. 103-117

Susanne Büchner, Andreas Freytag, Luis González and Werner Güth

The fiscal effects of statehood: New Mexico and Arizona, 1903–1919 pp. 119-126

Stephanie Moussalli

Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption pp. 127-143

Tim Friehe

The political economy of IMF forecasts pp. 145-171

Axel Dreher, Silvia Marchesi and James Vreeland

Elemental tests of the traditional rational voting model pp. 173-195

Darren Grant and Michael Toma

Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment pp. 197-206

Juan Campoy and Juan Negrete

Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules pp. 207-220

Michael Peress

What’s in a poll? Incentives for truthful reporting in pre-election opinion surveys pp. 221-244

Jeremy Burke and Curtis Taylor

Does public sector efficiency matter? Revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in a world sample pp. 245-278

Konstantinos Angelopoulos, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Mike Tsionas

Bringing home the bacon: an empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics pp. 279-299

Andrew Leigh

Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities pp. 301-314

Sergio Sakurai and Naercio Menezes-Filho

Surprise party pp. 315-328

Robert Grafstein and Kiki Caruson

Separation of powers and political budget cycles pp. 329-345

Alejandro Saporiti and Jorge Streb

Ideological extremism and electoral design. Multimember versus single member districts pp. 347-368

Anthony Bertelli and Lilliard Richardson

Studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons pp. 369-401

J. Stephen Ferris, Soo-Bin Park and Stanley Winer

Federations, coalitions, and risk diversification pp. 403-426

Shin-Hwan Chiang and Ahmed Mahmud

New publications in fiscal sociology pp. 427-428

Jürgen Backhaus

Volume 136, issue 3, 2008

Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation pp. 255-267

Robert Elgie and Iain McMenamin

The institutions of economic freedom and entrepreneurship: evidence from panel data pp. 269-282

Kristina Nyström

Efforts in two-sided contests pp. 283-291

Gil Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan and Mordechai Schwarz

Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention pp. 293-313

Keith Dougherty and Jac Heckelman

The political-economy of conflicts over wealth: why don’t the rabble expropriate the rich? pp. 315-330

Alex Coram

Delayed privatization pp. 331-351

Bernardo Bortolotti and Paolo Pinotti

Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects pp. 353-377

Thomas Schwartz

Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU pp. 379-396

Mark Hallerberg and Guntram Wolff

Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking pp. 397-409

Roger Faith, Brian Goff and Robert Tollison

Political distortions in state forecasts pp. 411-427

Richard Boylan

Per-capita public expenditures and population size: a non-parametric analysis using French data pp. 429-445

Robert Breunig and Yvon Rocaboy

A welfare simulation of mixed-member electoral systems pp. 447-456

Jin-Hyuk Kim

The impact of government structure on local public expenditures pp. 457-473

Lynn MacDonald

Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation pp. 475-495

Lars-Erik Borge, Torberg Falch and Per Tovmo

Christopher J. Coyne: After war: the political economy of exporting democracy pp. 497-500

William Shughart

Volume 136, issue 1, 2008

Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting pp. 1-17

Edward Lopez and Carlos Ramirez

Paying the partners pp. 19-37

T. Tideman and Florenz Plassmann

How to make a dis-entrepreneur of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur: the impact of institutional settings on growth pp. 39-54

Giuseppe Eusepi and Edgar Wilson

Biased contests pp. 55-67

Matthias Dahm and Nicolás Porteiro

A simple way of estimating interest group ideology pp. 69-86

Amy McKay

Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more? pp. 87-101

Randall Holcombe and Lawrence Kenny

Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments? pp. 103-122

Frode Brevik and Manfred Gärtner

Do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes? pp. 123-138

Signe Krogstrup and Sébastien Wälti

Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis pp. 139-164

Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele

Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate pp. 165-180

Aggey Semenov

Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits pp. 181-200

Yu-Bong Lai

A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation pp. 201-213

Elizabeth Penn

Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform pp. 215-239

Daniel Houser and Thomas Stratmann

Adrian Vermeule. Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small pp. 241-244

Christopher Coyne

Terry L. Anderson, Bruce L. Benson, & Thomas E. Flanagan, eds., Self-Determination: The Other Path for Native Americans pp. 245-247

Edward Stringham

Alain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin (eds.): Democracy, Freedom, and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach pp. 249-251

Benjamin Powell

John H. Aldrich, James E. Alt, and Arthur Lupia, Positive Changes in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s Most Influential Writings pp. 253-254

Arthur Denzau and Ravi Roy